Katarína Mathernová: “Reforms are difficult in peacetime, but reforms during war are exceptionally difficult”

YS: Madam Mathernová, thank you for this opportunity to discuss issues that are crucial for Ukraine. My first question concerns the elections in Hungary, which gave Ukrainians hope. In your assessment, will Hungary really stop blocking EU decisions on Ukraine? And if Hungary changes its position, will it be easier for the EU to work with other countries that are systematically blocking measures to support Ukraine — such as Slovakia, Belgium, and now, apparently, Bulgaria?

KM: Well, I cannot speak on behalf of either Hungary or any other country. What I can reiterate is what the incoming Prime Minister of Hungary has said — that he will no longer oppose the €90 billion loan, right? He has also made positive statements regarding Ukraine's European integration.

And we also see what is happening now: even Prime Minister Orbán, who is stepping down but is still acting Prime Minister — he remains Prime Minister until the new parliament convenes — is himself going to stop opposing the €90 billion aid package for Ukraine. So I think the elections in Hungary have genuinely brought a new momentum, and that is positive for Ukraine.

YS: So we are correct in understanding that Ukraine will still receive the first tranche of this €90 billion package in the second quarter of this year, and not in the second half?

KM: Definitely not in the second half, but in the second quarter. I think the actual decision on the first tranche of the promised €90 billion is imminent. It is a matter of days (this interview was conducted before the decision to allocate the funds was made — editor).

YS: Despite this good news, it is clear that Ukraine has been slow in fulfilling its obligations to its partners, the IMF, and the EU. How serious is this problem, and to what extent does it damage Ukraine's relationship with the institutions and countries that support it?

KM: I would prefer to talk about Ukraine’s obligations to the EU rather than to other institutions. I’m not sure what exactly you mean when you say that Ukraine has been slow. Please specify the timeline and the particular obligations you have in mind, because I think it is better to be precise than to make a general statement that things have been slow. Ask me about a specific period and specific obligations, and I will gladly respond. But let us avoid broad generalizations, because I do not find statements like “generally Ukraine has done this” or “generally Ukraine has not done that” helpful. Such formulations feed narratives that are not helpful to Ukraine.

YS: Of course, I understand. Well, here is a fresh example: under the current IMF program and the Ukraine Facility support program, Ukraine needs to fulfil 18 obligations. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian parliament has managed to adopt only six of them in the past two weeks — one third — which is certainly not a good result.

KM: It is true that there has been a delay under the Ukraine Facility. But two weeks ago, of those six laws that were passed, three were key to unlocking €1.2 billion under the Facility. And I think there is still scope, through government action, to secure €2.7 billion out of the €4 billion that remains.

So yes, there has been a slowdown, but let us not speak in general terms about failing to meet obligations. I think that is a bit unfair, because the Ukraine Facility has been in place since 2024, and a large number of prior obligations were met and payments were disbursed accordingly. In fact, €36.8 billion had been disbursed under the Ukraine Facility by February 2026, which reflects a substantial number of completed steps. So let us not generalize, because that creates the impression that things are not working, which is not the case. Some things are working; some are stalling. Yes, there has been a delay now, and hopefully the Ukrainian parliament and the government will catch up, because in my view it has been a very successful facility with a very strong implementation record—until the recent delay.

YS: Your optimistic perspective is clear, but we have stalled at a rather unfortunate moment. The Middle East crisis is already affecting the global economy. If it continues for a long time, will it limit the EU's ability to support Ukraine and build up its own defense capability?

KM: Well, I think the war against Iran and the resulting renewed crisis in the Middle East have negative consequences for both Europe and Ukraine. For Ukraine, these consequences are, first and foremost, the diversion of defensive weapons that would otherwise be available to Ukraine, the increase in oil prices and the resulting windfall revenues for the Russian budget, and the shift of international attention from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine to the war in the Middle East.

And, of course, for Europe, higher oil prices and the resulting energy pressures are unwelcome as well. They can create inflationary pressures and other economic consequences. So we will see how long the war lasts, because the longer it continues, the greater the consequences.

But I think, deep down, Europe is very much aware of the need to strengthen its own defense and to do so together with Ukraine. So I think the underlying goal has not changed.

YS: In your opinion, is the European Defense Union simply an old dream making a comeback, or is it a real plan that the EU has already begun to implement?

KM: There's never been an old dream.

Let's make something very clear. The European Union has not been set up as a defense union. But we have NATO. And by now, with the accession of Sweden and Finland, except for four countries, all member states of the European Union are members of NATO. There never were any ambitions to actually create a defense union.

These are new developments prompted by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the shifting position of the United States—in other words, by new geopolitical realities. And now we have adopted a defense strategy and have become very active in matters of military support for Ukraine—not only through member states, but also through the European Union itself. These are things that would have been unimaginable just five years ago. The fact that we have a European Peace Facility that has been used to support Ukraine, and the fact that member states have agreed to direct €60 billion out of the €90 billion loan—drawn from their taxpayers' money—to support Ukraine’s military effort, defense industry, and the purchase of needed weapons, are unprecedented steps.

So I would not describe a real and active plan of action as an old dream. That dream did not exist before. The EU has always been, above all, a peace project, with rules, procedures, and policies shaped much more by the peace agenda and the common market than by defense. What we are seeing now is still very much evolving in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

YS: How effective are Ukraine's EU integration reforms at present? I understand this is a topic for hours of discussion, but let us at least outline: is the process moving fast enough, or could it be accelerated?

KM: Well, look: the speed with which Ukraine was fulfilling the criteria after its submission of its application on 28 February 2022 for membership in the European Union was breathtaking.

I mean, there were incredibly fast changes over several years, and I personally think that the speed was really remarkable. Now, especially in recent months, we are seeing a certain slowdown. But please let's not forget: we are in the fifth year of war. Everybody is exhausted.

We have a parliament that is about to enter its eighth year in office. We have a president who is entering his eighth year in office—these are mandates that, under normal circumstances, would have been renewed. Due to martial law, however, that is not possible.

So it is actually exceptional that Ukraine is carrying out reforms while at the same time fighting for its national survival and territorial integrity. There is no country in the world that would be fighting such a brutal war while also reforming. None. This is unprecedented. So, for me, honestly, the discussion itself about whether the process is moving fast enough seems somewhat misplaced.

Sure, if Ukraine wants to be in the European Union sooner, we need to pick up the pace — but let's not forget: reforms are difficult in peacetime, and reforms during war are exceptionally difficult.

YS: Almost six months have passed since Ukraine's biggest corruption scandal. In your opinion, has enough been done in that time to fix the situation and prevent it from happening again?

KM: What do you mean by fixing it? Fix what?

YS: For example, to serve suspicions to all persons involved in this corruption scandal.

KM: So let me answer the following way. Unfortunately, the perception in Ukraine and also abroad is that the way to deal with corruption is to serve suspicion and prosecute and put people in jail.

I believe that is happening. Those who deal with development issues and study them — as I have done — would tell you that the most effective way to deal with corruption is to close the space for corruption to occur. You asked whether enough has been done. In my view, the most important thing the government has done to make such scandals impossible in the future is the “rebooting” of the energy sector.

Indeed, the energy sector was experiencing problems — corruption problems, as was uncovered. In the meantime, with the help of international partners, the government has completely reset the governance of all large state-owned energy companies. New supervisory boards have been selected — comprising both independent international members and government representatives — for Energoatom, Ukrenergo, Naftogaz, GasTSO, and it seems the selection process for Ukrhydroenergo is at its final stage. This has been a major achievement, in my view, because this is what should prevent future problems in the energy sector.

So putting people behind bars for past wrongdoing is important, and I think that is a separate track. But the track that receives far less attention here—including in activist circles—is taking the kind of steps that prevent future corruption scandals. And I believe that completely resetting governance in state-owned enterprises, including changes to their charters, has been a very important anti-corruption step. The process also moved very quickly indeed.

YS: Madam Ambassador, you are known for your persistent support of Ukraine. In your opinion, is it really better for Ukraine and its progress to soften the information about corruption and political problems that reaches partner countries?

KM: What do you mean, soften?

YS: Let me explain with a concrete example. According to our sources, the heads of Ukraine's anti-corruption system received a clear and unambiguous signal from Brussels not to serve suspicions to nearly 200 members of the Ukrainian parliament, due to the obvious reputational risks for Ukraine.

KM: I am absolutely not aware of that. And I would be very, very surprised if anyone in Brussels would have been advising on something like this. I don't believe that happened.

YS: Perhaps. Nevertheless, I am afraid that Ukraine will not be able to be a truly reliable “shield of Europe” if, instead of fixing problems, it conceals them.

KM: In fact, we interact with the anti-corruption institutions regularly. Today I had a meeting with the head of SAPO. We strongly support them, including by providing technical assistance through our projects.

So let me stress: personally, I would be very surprised if anything like that happened. I'm not sure that your sources are correct on that one. Moreover, I have never encountered any facts of softening any information regarding Ukraine.

I actually think sometimes there is too much emphasis on the short term. You know, development is never a linear process. It always goes in waves.

And this is clearly visible across the entire trajectory of the rule of law and anti-corruption reforms that this country has done — an extraordinary track record that has only been expanding since Ukraine submitted its EU membership application. I will stress: many of these reforms have taken place after 2022, during the full-scale war, in the most difficult of times. Yes, there's been a recent slowdown. But the Rada is active again now.

Moreover, I think, if anything, we are fairly strict on issues of the rule of law and anti-corruption. So I don't think there is any softer approach on these issues.

YS: Madam Ambassador, you recently said that your role as EU Ambassador will be the last institutional position in your career. If you don't mind sharing, why did you make this decision?

KM: It's very simple. Because I have the best job of my life. And after four years during the war — by the way, I am one of the longest-serving ambassadors during the war — I cannot imagine any other job.

I think it's the most meaningful, the most impactful, the most interesting, and the most challenging job. So I think I will look to do something completely different and yet related to Ukraine. I want to teach, speak, write.

And most importantly, I don't want to shift into any other job that would not relate to Ukraine.