How US, Europe and Ukraine Leave Loopholes for Russian Oil

On September 13, Donald Trump said, “I am ready to impose serious sanctions against Russia when all NATO countries stop buying oil from it.”

Only three NATO member states receive Russian oil: Turkey by sea and Hungary and Slovakia via the Druzhba pipeline. So NATO has nothing to do with this; the Alliance does not buy or sell oil. There are individual governments of several countries with their own policies towards Moscow. Everyone has already grown accustomed to the American leader's (anti)sanctions balancing act, but this is something completely different. Trump's version of the Protagoras' paradox is to impose a condition on allies that is impossible to fulfill a priori. This ensures that the “hellish sanctions” against Russian oil, with the participation of the US, will not materialize, and after that, it will be easy to shift the blame onto the Europeans, thereby deepening the rift within the “Alliance of the Frightened.”

It does not even matter which version of the explanation for Trump's behavior is the most correct: whether it is another manifestation of ignorance and unawareness, whether he is an agent recruited by the KGB of the USSR, or a fanatical supporter of Putin, but one thing is clear: he is playing on the Kremlin's side. And in essence, inaction is also an action, a form of facilitating the Russian Federation's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and Europe. Actions to deepen the rift in NATO and prevent the application of sanctions against Russian hydrocarbons: recall, for example, the adoption of the EU's 18th package of sanctions in June, which reduced the price cap on Russian oil from $60 to $47.6 per barrel, with the US opposing it. The same applies to the recent revelations by Vice President Jay D. Vance that the US is not interested in the economic isolation of Russia.

However, leaving Trump aside, let's take a closer look at those to whom the American president should specifically address his remarks. After all, Ukraine also demands that Europeans stop purchasing Russian energy resources.

Who are these admirers of Urals?

Hungary's national oil and gas company, MOL Group, still imports about 5 million tons of Russian oil per year via the Druzhba pipeline through Ukraine, averaging more than 400,000 tons per month. The flow of Russian oil with a targeted “discount from Putin” helps Orbán stay in power by maximizing margins in the operational chain of “cheap raw materials for processing — low transit costs — high selling prices for finished petroleum products.”

All the oil Slovakia needs also comes through the Druzhba pipeline. In 2022–2024, Slovakia imported about 13 million tons of Urals oil worth approximately €6 billion. In addition, Slovakia's only oil refinery, Slovnaft, located in Bratislava, belongs to the same MOL Group and is one of the country's key industrial assets. It should be understood that, as in Hungary, MOL ignores the maritime alternative to Druzhba—the Adria pipeline from the Omisal terminal on the Adriatic coast of Croatia. Back in 2015, the route was modernized with an increase in transportation capacity to 14 million tons per year, which corresponds to the full design capacity of oil refining at both MOL Group refineries. This means that the group can fully supply both of its plants in Hungary and Slovakia from the Mediterranean market.

Moreover, the Hungarians have access to resources and transport routes, which enables them to receive and process non-Russian oil. MOL Group owns shares in the international consortium for the extraction of Azerbaijani oil at the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field group and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline: 9.57 percent and 8.90 percent, respectively.

According to research by authoritative European think tanks, the Finnish Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) and the Bulgarian Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), imports of Russian crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022–2024 have brought the Kremlin €5.4 billion in revenue, equivalent to the cost of 1,800 Iskander-M ballistic missiles. In addition, a loophole in the sanctions also allowed for the export of Russian petroleum products from Slovakia to the Czech Republic worth €520 million in 2024.

Unlike Hungary and Slovakia, Turkey is outside the EU sanctions regime and does not support the Western sanctions policy against Russia as such. Turkey is the world's third-largest buyer of Russian oil after China and India. Official statistics for 2025 are not yet available, but Eurostat data for 2023 and part of 2024 show that Turkey purchased an average of about 1 million tons of Russian oil per month. According to the aforementioned CREA and CSD study, Russian oil was flowing into the EU en masse via Turkey. According to CREA, in May 2025 alone, Russia's revenues from exports of petroleum products to Turkey amounted to €1.1 billion per month.

The not-so-innocent United States

But is the United States itself so faultless? The Biden administration banned imports of Russian oil and petroleum products on March 8, 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Although the US no longer imports directly from Russia, some petroleum products imported by the US, such as diesel fuel, may originate from Russian crude oil that has been refined at refineries in other countries.

It is worth noting that India has become the world's second-largest buyer of Russian crude oil after China since the full-scale invasion. According to the US Energy Information Administration, imports of oil and petroleum products (aggregated) to the United States from India amounted to 26.455 million barrels per year in 2024, or slightly less than 1 percent of total imports of oil and petroleum products (3,088.15 million barrels per year). Imports of petroleum products to the US from Turkey account for less than half a percent of total imports of oil and petroleum products.

Brazil is worthy of attention. In 2024, US imports of oil and petroleum products from Brazil accounted for 3.3 percent of total imports. Brazil does not import crude oil directly from Russia, as it is itself a producer and exporter. However, it ranks third in the world among buyers of Russian petroleum products. Imports of Russian petroleum products to Brazil increased by 40 percent between January and October 2024 compared to the same period in 2023. After Turkey (26%) and China (13%), Brazil accounts for 12 percent of Russian oil product exports. Brazil currently imports 50 percent of its oil products from Russia.

Thus, at least half of the total 3.3 percent share of US imports of petroleum products from Brazil may be resales of Russian fuel.

In general, the goal of any sanctions is, first and foremost, to limit financial inflows to the aggressor country. Recall Iraq during the time of Saddam Hussein and the sanctions for aggression against Kuwait under the “oil for food” formula.

It is also worth mentioning the mineral fertilizer market here. In 2023, the US purchased $1.62 billion worth of fertilizers from Russia (see figure below), and in 2024, slightly less, $1.3 billion. These are mainly nitrogen fertilizers, i.e., gas chemistry products. And with the loss of the EU market, Russia has a problem selling gas, so they are intensively processing it into fertilizers, and the US is buying them, thereby helping the Kremlin replenish its war budget.

What could happen?

So, instead of offering Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey real incentives to abandon Russian oil in a carrot-and-stick approach, while at the same time abandoning Russian fertilizers themselves, Trump's main goal is to give Putin time to deepen the rift among European NATO members so that he can then blame them for the failure of the sanctions.

Could the US persuade Turkey to abandon Russian oil?

Hypothetically, it could offer an incentive. As is well known, Ankara wants to be reinstated in the F-35 multirole fighter cooperation program, from which the Turkish aviation industry was excluded after purchasing Russian S-400 air defense systems in 2019. For Turkey, returning to the F-35 is not just about strengthening the air component of its armed forces, but also about reaching a new level of technological and industrial development, as well as restoring trust in NATO and recouping previous investments. Without this, Turkey risks losing strategic parity with its neighbors and lowering its status in the Alliance, where it is already considered an unreliable partner. This could become a platform for a mutually acceptable solution: “Turkey's refusal of Russian oil in exchange for US agreement to resume cooperation on the F-35.” Of course, Ankara would also have to either remove the purchased Russian S-400 air defense systems from its air defense system or transfer control of them to the United States.

The US could contribute to EU sanctions against the so-called shadow tanker fleet by sending a small group of coast guard ships to the Danish straits to work with Europeans to “filter” tankers heading for the Baltic, preventing ships on the sanctions lists from entering.

In fact, the US is not only holding back the introduction of new sanctions against Russia, but also poking holes in the existing sanctions regime. The lifting of sanctions on Belarusian Belavia creates a “window of opportunity” for Russian aviation. While Poland is demonstrating an effective example of economic isolation of the aggressor (Russia) and its satellite (Belarus), as well as a logistical blow to the aggressor's patron (China)—a complete blockade of transport links at the EU-Union State of Russia and Belarus border—the US is doing the opposite.

Ukraine: pure as the driven snow

Finally, if readers think that the Ukrainian government looks immaculate by demanding that Europeans and Americans tighten sanctions against Russian oil, this is, unfortunately, far from the case. In fact, there is a fifth column operating in Ukraine under the umbrella of Naftogaz, which continues to assist Russian companies in exporting Urals to Europe.

A bill on Ukraine's termination of transit services for Russian oil exports has been pending in the Verkhovna Rada for a long time. It would have been possible to take a different, simpler route long ago—with the help of a decision by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and a corresponding presidential decree. None of this has happened. Therefore, the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Ukrainian army, led by Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, have to make effective adjustments to the sanctions regime.

Meanwhile, the ten-year agreement between Ukrtransnafta and Transneft continues to operate: on April 1 of this year, it was disguised as an agreement with Hungary's MOL on the transit of “Hungarian” oil for the remaining five-year period (until 2030). Moreover, since September 12, the Ukrainian operator has been improving the quality of Russian Urals in the pipeline by mixing in high-quality (low-sulfur) oil of Ukrainian origin, for which the Hungarian end of the pipeline would have to pay more than for the high-sulfur Russian export blend. It is likely that someone is receiving something for this from Budapest or some offshore location. MOL is a sophisticated creator of corruption schemes. Just look at its actions in Croatia, which landed even the prime minister behind bars. Such schemes that benefit certain individuals do not encourage our partners to take the sanctions we so desire. It would be naive to hope that they do not notice this.

Read this article in ukrainian and russian.