The Trumpization of NATO: What Ukraine Got and What Putin Saw

Weakened by indecision, doubts and internal contradictions, NATO held another summit—this time in The Hague.

The meeting was brief: just one session lasting a couple of hours, all in the name of not tiring or irritating Donald Trump. Yet, this was not merely an attempt to accommodate the peculiar temperament of the US President. As with many summit decisions, it reflected Europe’s broader strategy: to keep the United States from abandoning its NATO commitments and thus prevent the collapse of the European security architecture.

Although the Russian-Ukrainian war remains the central threat to European security, unlike the last three summits, this time Ukraine and support for it against Russian aggression were pushed to the sidelines. (Nevertheless, Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General, insisted that Ukraine “would be a major topic.”) With Trump demanding that member states raise military budgets to 5 percent of GDP, the primary focus shifted plans to increase NATO defense spending and Iran.

Despite resistance from some members, the allies agreed to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. Funds will be allocated according to a 3.5 + 1.5 formula: 3.5 percent for hard defense (armed forces) and 1.5 percent for soft defense (intelligence, cybersecurity, pensions, infrastructure, defense industry). These commitments were set out in the summit declaration—reduced to a single page to accommodate Trump.

However, this requirement will not apply to all members: Spain secured an exemption, maintaining defense spending at 2 percent. This irritated Trump, who also argued that the US should not have to spend 5 percent of GDP like the others allies: “We’ve been supporting NATO for so long, in many cases, I believe, paying almost 100 percent of the cost. So, I don’t think we should, but I do think that the NATO countries should, absolutely.”

What matters for the future of the Alliance is Trump’s publicly reaffirmed commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: “We are with them to the end.” It’s entirely possible that, within days, the White House may once again question the need to defend America’s European allies. But for now, Europe breathed a sigh of relief as the summit’s final document declared an “ironclad commitment to collective defense as enshrined in Article 5.”

At the same time, the declaration revealed a compromise between the European members and the United States in their assessment of Russia. On one hand, it states that NATO sees Russia as a “long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” On the other, for the first time since 2022, the declaration did not condemn Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Still, it states that allies “reaffirm their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine, whose security contributes to ours.”

Given Trump’s personality and his attitude toward Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukraine, Kyiv refrained from pressing partners to reaffirm Ukraine’s NATO bid in the final document. Doing so would have been counterproductive and risked deepening the gap between Ukraine and the United States. Officially, the Office of the President of Ukraine accepted the approach articulated by Secretary General Rutte: the decisions of previous summits on Ukraine’s irreversible path to NATO remain valid.

But illusions should be avoided.

In its effort not to provoke Trump, NATO is making concessions that play into Putin’s hands. This diplomatic wording may soothe Kyiv, but in fact, it signals that Ukraine is unlikely to join NATO—not only during Trump’s presidency but also for decades to come. The Kremlin received the message: the West is unsure of itself. And therefore, it may even retreat further—perhaps denying Ukraine NATO membership in pursuit of a deal with Russia.

Such an approach by the allies represents a tactical gain for Putin, whose strategic goal is to gain de facto veto power over the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO.

As for Ukraine’s goals in The Hague, they were modest and pragmatic:

Firstly, to secure a meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump. Secondly, to hold a NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) meeting at the highest level, ensuring that the United States would take part. Thirdly, to enshrine in the final document the Western commitment to provide Ukraine with military assistance within the framework of NATO’s planned increase in defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. Fourthly, to ensure the NUC statement included references to the provision of air defense systems to Ukraine. And lastly, to explore the possibility of deploying NATO “deterrence forces” in Ukraine.

Aiming to achieve as many objectives as possible, Ukraine’s Presidential Office capitalized on NATO’s desire to avoid any scandals in The Hague. It kept Zelenskyy’s participation under wraps until the last minute. A few days before the summit, the president even said he had not yet decided whether he would attend. Alyona Getmanchuk, newly appointed head of Ukraine’s mission to NATO, stated that the president would go only if the summit’s decisions had added value for national security.

An attempt to utmaneuver NATO came to no avail: Kyiv’s interest in the summit was evident. Zelenskyy attended The Hague, and the NATO-Ukraine Council was held at the level of foreign ministers—as the allies had planned. Still, Kyiv partially achieved its goals.

Zelenskyy’s participation was not limited to the previously announced dinner hosted by King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands. He met with the NATO Secretary General, the Presidents of the European Council and European Commission. Additional meetings took place with the leaders of the E5 countries (France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK) and leaders of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Talks were also held with French President Emmanuel Macron.

Most importantly, the Ukrainian president held a 50-minute meeting with Trump on the summit’s sidelines. Details remain unknown, as there was no joint press availability. Trump described the meeting as “good,” while Zelenskyy called it “nice” and said that Ukraine seeks peace—but only Putin can end the war. Trump, for his part, said, “We’ll see” regarding future US military and financial support for Ukraine. Zelenskyy noted that they discussed ways to end the war.

However, judging by comments from Marco Rubio, US Secretary of State, the Trump administration currently believes it is not the right time to impose new sanctions on Russia, as doing so could limit Washington’s ability to engage in dialogue with Moscow.

One important outcome for Ukraine was the inclusion in the summit declaration of NATO members’ commitment to support Ukraine’s defense and military-industrial complex using their military budgets. At the summit, Rutte announced that in just the first half of 2025, European countries and Canada had already planned to allocate €35 billion in military aid to Ukraine. For reference, NATO had pledged €40 billion for Ukraine at the Washington summit last year.

In assessing NATO’s prospects, analysts emphasize the divergence in threat perception among transatlantic allies. For the Trump administration, Europe holds little strategic interest, and unlike China, Russia is not seen as a strategic threat. In contrast, for Europe, Russia is the principal threat. The Hague summit did not resolve this fundamental crisis within NATO. Notably, neither China nor Iran were mentioned in the summit declaration.

As NATO walks a tightrope between not provoking Trump and maintaining unity, the Kremlin remains resolute in pursuing its goals. Russia is watching closely how the allies respond to challenges—and what it saw in The Hague was a fear of Trump outweighing the resolve to stop aggression. The West still has a chance to prove otherwise, if it is willing to act rather than merely maintain a brittle balance. But the longer it postpones decisive action, the steeper the price will be—not only for Ukraine but for all of Europe.