Umerov's “Ministry of Sabotage”

In November, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented the Ukraine Resilience Plan, a list of changes to strengthen the state from within. A month earlier, the president handed over to the allies a five-point Victory Plan with three secret annexes that would have turned the tide of the war with Russia in Ukraine's favor. Our readers have already seen dozens of discussions about the content of both plans in the media and social networks.

However, we are confident that no matter what Zelenskyy's “external or domestic” victory plan is, there is no strong defense minister in the president's team today who can implement them.

More than two months ago, we published an article titled Umerov's Ministry of Chaos. Its summary is simple: in his year as defense minister, Umerov has only achieved real results in procurement and digitalization. But these changes have occurred mostly in spite of the minister, not because of him.

In this article, we have clearly articulated which areas in the ministry need urgent repair and proposed specific management steps that can fix the most important processes in the ministry. These are the “chaotic” management system in the MoD, international cooperation and defense procurement.

Without success in these three areas, any of Zelenskyy's plans will not work. After all, for the Frontline and Arms priorities of the Resilience Plan, Zelenskyy needs a Defense Ministry with clear management capable of directing the General Staff, taking responsibility and saying “no” to anyone when necessary. Without strong military diplomacy from the Defense Ministry, we will not see Western weapons, and local production will not survive without international investment, controlled exports and access to Western defense technologies. In our opinion, none of these problems has been solved by the minister.

Below, we will try to explain at length how the chaos in the ministry is gradually turning into sabotage and subversion and transforming Umerov's ministry into a “ministry of defeat.”

Has Umerov been able to organize work in the procurement sector? No.

Firstly, there was a public and awkward attempt to remove the head of the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA), Maryna Bezrukova, who is renowned even outside Ukraine for her efficiency and integrity. To do this, Umerov's old friend and deputy for procurement, Dmytro Klimenkov, suggested abolishing the Defense Procurement Agency by integrating it into the much smaller State Logistics Operator (SOT). This task was entrusted to him by the minister. Both Klimenkov and Umerov justified all of this with “NATO standards,” which turned out to be a lie, and the NATO Representation had to publicly deny it. Only thanks to pressure from civil society experts and international partners did the minister back away from the idea of abolishing the DPA and submit candidates to the agency's supervisory board, who were approved by the government on October 11. However, the Supervisory Board of the DPA never started working.

As of the end of November, the supervisory board is not authorized and cannot play its role as a safeguard against the political dismissal of the head of the DPA. The conclusion of contracts with board members is delayed due to documentary formalities. As a result, the supervisory board cannot conclude a contract with the current head of the agency, and her dismissal can be implemented by a single decision of the Minister of Defense.

Secondly, special exporters have not been abolished. After a high-profile investigation into corruption in the work of one of the special exporters, Spetstechnoexport, Umerov announced the transfer of the company from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the MoD to the Ministry of Defense and the subsequent liquidation of the enterprise.

As a reminder, it is through Spetstechnoexport and two other companies, Ukrspetsexport and Progress, that weapons are often supplied at inflated prices and through dubious intermediaries, or deliveries are disrupted despite significant prepayments.

The elimination of special exporters (depriving them of their import functions) is a real NATO requirement, and Ukraine must fulfill it without waiting for the end of martial law.

However, two months after the announcement, neither the Minister of Defense nor his deputies have provided any information on the results of the purges. As a result, we assume that Ukraine continues to receive more expensive weapons in smaller quantities.

Thirdly, the procurement function in the Ministry is dualized and scattered, and the scheme of financing research and development is not entirely transparent.

The most notorious department of the Ministry of Defense, the Department of Military and Technical Policy (DMTP), is still functioning. The DMTP continues to service all arms agreements signed before the establishment of the DPA and also retains a monopoly on defense innovation procurement through the outdated Soviet procedure of “research and development work.” The total value of these contracts is over UAH 410 billion as of the beginning of 2024.

The management of the notorious department continues to include Toomas Nahkur, who is suspected of embezzling UAH 1.5 billion in mortar rounds. Most of the employees who serviced the scandalous contracts also still hold their positions. Neither the Accounting Chamber nor the Main Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense itself has inspected the DMTP.

Today, the DMTP virtually duplicates the functions of the newly created Procurement Policy Department (PPD). Both departments are involved in prioritizing the list of weapons to be purchased at the request of the General Staff. The motives behind the workings of both departments and others involved in the “prioritization” remain a mystery.

All of this is overseen by Deputy Minister Dmytro Klimenkov, who is so indispensable (or compliant) that in addition to defense procurement with a total budget of over UAH 800 billion, Umerov gave him several new money-intensive areas with high corruption risks. We are talking about three departments of the Defense Ministry, namely capital investments (construction of housing for the military), defense lands and funds of the Defense Ministry (training grounds, partially construction of fortifications, etc.) and corporate management (about 100 state-owned enterprises subordinated to the Defense Ministry, among the most famous ones are Motor Sich and Ukrnafta). Thus, Umerov has only one deputy in charge of four highly complex money-intensive and risky areas, who is a close friend and ex-business partner of the minister.

The problem of chaotic and unsystematic management has not been solved by the minister — it has become a new culture

The Ministry of Defense, having all the resources, support from the government and parliament, civil society and international donors, is walking on crutches because the minister does not delve deeply enough, is not well-versed and does not manage things personally.

Umerov himself makes no secret of it and calls this style “delegation of responsibility.”

This “delegation” has already led to the Ministry of Defense withdrawing at least 100,000 domestically produced mines from the front. The reason is that the mines are of inappropriate quality. This area is controlled by a department directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, the so-called military representatives. As journalists found out, these military representatives turned a blind eye to the glaring inability of the domestic plant to produce large volumes of shells of proper quality and, despite this, recommended signing a contract with it. All the reports of the military representatives were put on the table of the Ministry of Defense. It was only when mines started exploding on the Internet and social media, and not at the front, that Umerov's ministry began to respond.

“Weapons” is the third item of the President's Resilience Plan. It deals with increasing domestic production of guns and artillery shells, missiles, and drones in cooperation with partners. We can see the ability of the current head of the Defense Ministry to implement this item in practice: at the most crucial period of the war, the military lacked mortar shells.

“Delegation of responsibility” creates favorable conditions for sabotaging any changes: different departments in the ministry can duplicate each other's functions, friendly-minded deputies can oversee a bunch of money-intensive areas, and advisors and assistants to the minister are allowed to give orders to the deputies themselves.

For example, two of Umerov's longtime friends and business partners, Snaver Seitkhalilev (since 2021, former deputy to Oleksii Reznikov as Minister for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories) and Lenur Mambetov, are authorized to give tasks on behalf of the Defense Minister. Both are registered with the Ministry as freelance advisers to the State Secretary on a pro bono basis. Interestingly, there has been no state secretary at the ministry since October; there is an acting one instead.

Umerov, Mambetov and Seitkhalilev started their careers simultaneously in the 2000s at Astelit, which later became known as Lifecell, a joint venture of Rinat Akhmetov and Turkish mobile operator Turkcell.

Despite the lack of formal positions in the MoD, which means no access to state secrets, no need to file an electronic declaration and no need to undergo a special background check, the advisors often attend important meetings within the MoD and thus may have access to sensitive information.

According to unofficial databases widely used by investigative journalists to obtain information about Russian citizens, Seitkhalilev and Mambetov have Russian passports. We have at our disposal data from registers that may indicate that both of the minister's confidants have Russian citizenship. Most likely, this is related to the occupation of Crimea, where Lenur and Snaver's families lived for some time, and doing business on the peninsula after the occupation.

The extracts from business registers of the United States, Turkey, Ukraine, Panama, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of South Africa, Estonia, Tunisia, Canada and other countries we have obtained confirm (see documents) that Snaver Seitkhalilev, Lenur Mambetov and Rustem Umerov have been reliable business partners in entities related to Turkish investment and influence in Ukraine for almost two decades.

It is hardly surprising why Seitkhalilev and Mambetov participate in numerous official visits to Turkey on behalf of the Defense Ministry. Umerov himself, as Minister of Defense, has been to Turkey at least three times on official trips, while his first visit to Denmark, which provides us with the most aid for arms purchases among other countries as a percentage of GDP, took place only in November 2024.

The Ministry of Defense is turning into a “Turkish court”. This is a cause for concern for our key ally, the United States, which is particularly concerned about the protection of its defense technologies. Seitkhaliyev and Mambetov's access to sensitive information in the Defense Ministry and the commitment of key Ukrainian defense officials to Turkey are potential threats. Despite the fact that Turkey is a NATO member, relations between Washington and Ankara, especially in the area of defense cooperation, are quite tense.

Americans wonder why Ukraine under Umerov decided to build together with Turkey, and later promised to buy, the fifth-generation KAAN fighter jet, which Turkey is developing as an alternative to the American F-35.

During Donald Trump's first presidency, the United States excluded Turkey from the program to switch to the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets because of the Turks' decision to purchase the S-400 air defense system from Russia.

At a joint press conference with Erdogan in November 2019, Trump noted that Turkey's acquisition of the S-400 systems posed “very serious challenges.” The Pentagon believes that the Russian system will be used to collect confidential information about sensitive technologies inside the F-35.

In general, the United States has repeatedly imposed sanctions on the Turkish defense industry for its cooperation with the Russian defense sector, and Turkish citizens have been on many occasions accused of spying on the Turkish government in the field of defense technology in the United States.

However, Umerov's closeness to Turkey as head of the Ministry of Defense should be of concern not only to the Americans, but also to President Zelenskyy, whose defense policy the minister is supposed to implement.

Turkey has not imposed economic sanctions against Russia, and until October of this year, it continued to supply Moscow with sensitive defense technologies, including those of American origin, for which it received a series of public warnings from the White House. And now it is asking the US to ease sanctions against Gazprombank in order to pay Moscow for gas.

At the G20 summit, the Turkish president presented his peace plan for Ukraine, which differs significantly from Zelenskyy's victory plan and envisages freezing the war along the contact line, Ukraine abandoning hopes to join NATO for at least ten years and establishing a demilitarized zone in eastern Donbas. Erdogan also openly condemned the Biden administration's decision to grant Ukraine even limited permission to strike deep into Russia with long-range Western weapons, a decision that has long been a priority for Ukraine.

According to our information, Ukraine's leadership believes that Umerov and Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin have built a “special rapport.” In fact, there is a significant level of distrust in the United States, and especially in the Pentagon, toward Umerov, including because of his close relations with Turkey and the Middle East in general. Thus, with a second Trump presidency, the disapproval of Umerov in US circles can only grow.

During one of his recent visits to Washington, Minister Umerov could not really explain the details of Zelenskyy's five-point victory plan. That is why Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna went to America with Chief of the General Staff Anatolii Barhylevych to explain Zelenskyy's plan instead of the Defense Minister. According to our sources in Washington, it was during this visit that American officials received answers to important questions they were interested in regarding the decision on long-range strikes from Barhylevych, not Umerov.

Under these circumstances, it can be argued that, despite the daily positive posts on Facebook about the minister's foreign visits, the Ministry of Defense has failed in the area of military diplomacy.

In September last year, Congress had difficulties voting on a law on military and other aid for Ukraine, the so-called supplemental. The main reason for these problems was expressed in his position by California Congressman Mike Garcia, a former marine who served in Iraq. In a lengthy report, he described the conditions for supporting Ukraine, including the need for a realistic plan for victory clearly developed by President Biden and Zelenskyy, with a cost estimate and timeframe. Garcia demanded that the White House specify how the weapons sent to Ukraine should help achieve the goals set out in the victory strategy.

Garcia's demands were echoed by Congressman Michael Waltz, recently nominated by Trump to serve as National Security Advisor. Waltz is also a professional military officer who served in the US Army's elite special operations forces, the so-called Green Berets. Waltz, who will replace Jake Sullivan in the White House after January 20, cannot be spoken to with a set of clichés and slogans. As a professional military officer, he will demand a realistic war plan from Ukraine with clear calculations of the necessary forces and means.

It will not be possible to come to the Trump administration with an MS Excel list of trillions of dollars worth of priority equipment and tell them in a PDF presentation that this equipment is needed to equip 14 new brigades.

Pragmatic Republicans with military education and experience will demand a detailed military justification for Ukraine's arms requests, explaining what military goals Ukraine plans to achieve with these weapons.

Minister Umerov, in our opinion, is not capable of preparing such a justification and presenting it to his American counterparts in a quality manner. This is also because the Defense Ministry still does not have one person responsible for international cooperation and military diplomacy.

In October, Oleksnder Balanutsa was dismissed from his position as Umerov's deputy in charge of international affairs, having worked for less than four months. He was fired without any explanation or performance assessment. He was replaced by former Deputy Minister of Strategic Industries Serhii Boiev, who again needs time to understand the work of the ministry, all the intricacies of military diplomacy, form a team, etc.

This employee turnover is completely disorienting for all our international partners, for whom it is important to have one responsible professional in the Ministry of Defense through whom they can solve the current tasks of transferring weapons and technologies to us on a daily basis at the tactical level.

But whatever the name of Umerov's deputy responsible for international cooperation, it seems that the minister will not allow him to build the necessary control over this area.

For, as we mentioned earlier, for more than a year now, the ministry's international cooperation has been de facto managed by Diana Davitian, the minister's advisor and a close relative of Zaporizhzhia businessman Vemir Davitian, with freelance advisors going on important foreign visits. In fact, international affairs is, perchance, the only area of the Defense Ministry in which Umerov is proactively and personally involved.

A separate topic is the lack of comprehensive state policies on the part of the Defense Ministry in the field of military technology development during the largest technological war in human history.

The ministry is making progress with technology procurement, and in the third year of the full-scale invasion, it began to buy even a tactical-level support drone, Mavic. However, the volunteer community confirms that they still receive thousands of requests from the frontline, which means they need more drones with thermal cameras, especially in winter.

That said, procurement has begun, and to be fair, this is a real achievement compared to the previous team. After all, Minister Reznikov categorically refused to purchase one of the key drones for the frontline. Even after the first year of the full-scale invasion, he did not realize that it was largely this UAV that kept people on the frontline alive, hence his careless attitude. The work of the DPA has certainly had a positive impact on this remarkable progress.

However, the ministry must also formulate policies, carry out some forecasting and planning. What military technologies will be relevant in a year or at least by the summer of 2025? What is worth investing state resources in now? How else can we simplify the rules of the game, help manufacturers at all stages of logistics, production, contracting and supply to the front? At this juncture, there is no systematic work in these areas, and the Ministry is still a passive buyer without any vision for several steps ahead.

The minister's communication itself is the subject of a separate conversation. There are already jokes and memes about “a mixture of vagueness, swearing and shouting.” In order not to overload the reader, we will quote just a few sentences from the article Seven Questions to Minister Umerov because all of them are still relevant.

“The minister speaks vaguely, creates a smokescreen. Not because he doesn't know how to speak. In my observation, he is a rather intelligent person. It is rather a deliberate trick, a kind of illusionism. It is very difficult to hear specifics. It is often just a stream of incomprehensible, logically unrelated phrases. It's like talking a lot and saying nothing. Subordinates don't understand what their boss is saying for months. And they are afraid to ask again. The management style is oriental. There is a ruler who needs to be appeased, worshiped, and presented with gifts — results. Today the requirements are one, tomorrow they are different, subject to the mood swings. No one really knows what he needs. Therefore, everyone acts at their own discretion, hoping that this is exactly what they will be praised for at the meeting. But priorities can change in a day, and then everyone will have to run in a different direction. If the manager is in a bad mood, he just shouts and threatens to fire you without properly explaining what's wrong.”

 

Conclusion

This article will not contain recommendations on how to resolve the next batch of problems. It would make no sense. The conclusions that follow from this article are obvious. The Ministry of Defense today is more of a brake than an engine. Instead of a strong team capable of performing strategic tasks, we see a chaotic structure where key functions are duplicated, decisions are sabotaged, and international partners lose trust.

Systemic chaos, corruption risks and managerial failure in the Ministry of Defense during the war are not just problems; they are threats. Every day that the Ministry of Defense remains in the hands of a person who demonstrates managerial helplessness brings not victory but disaster closer.

President Zelenskyy must decide whether he is willing to co-author a plan for failure or take a decisive step to put someone at the helm of the ministry who can restore the trust of society and allies and implement his Victory Plan.

 

Read this article in Ukrainian and russian.