Putin’s Last Argument. Ukraine Has a Chance to Change the Situation on the Front

Events that affect the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war are developing rapidly.

The adoption by the United State administration, and after them by our other partners, of the decision to lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons for strikes on military facilities on the territory of the Russian Federation caused, without exaggeration, considerable fear among the leadership of the aggressor country. They were satisfied with the existing picture of the war.

If you think about it, the current situation is essentially cynical and shocking. For almost three years, the aggressor has been covering himself with his own border like a wall, not only shooting down military and industrial facilities on our territory like a shooting range, but also terrorizing the civilian population, killing people with rocket and air strikes in residential buildings, hospitals, and supermarkets. And at this time, the partners forbid the side that suffered from this terror to defend itself, striking back at the murderers.

Finally, this terrible situation has been changed.

Two strikes with powerful weapons on such facilities as the arsenal in the Bryansk region and the protected command post in Kursk were enough for the aggressor to realize that the situation had changed radically.

Ukraine finally got the opportunity to strike at enemy airfields in order to drive away its tactical aviation from the line of combat contact and reduce the intensity of its use. As for army aviation (combat helicopters), provided that there is effective intelligence in the interests of the task of missile strikes on their bases (dispersal, unexpected attack), we have the opportunity to stop using them altogether.

At the same time, the main attention of most experts is focused on the range of application of the ATACMS missiles transferred to us, leaving out of consideration the characteristics of their warheads. But this is perhaps their main value. They include a set from powerful monoblocks to various types of cluster warheads with various combat elements, including smart submunitions that are capable of finding, identifying and highly effectively destroying targets, including those that are moving.

In addition, it has become possible to destroy operational and strategic level logistics centers at a considerable depth from the line of combat contact. This makes it problematic to organize the provision of enemy troops in the volumes necessary for conducting large-scale not only offensive, but also defensive operations.

The Crimean Bridge was upset, sensing its imminent end.

Its destruction, together with the effective and powerful military control of the ports of Crimea — and our Navy, as well as the Air Force, have shown that they can do this — will create a de facto strategic encirclement of the entire group of troops in Crimea.

It has become possible to destroy and keep under fire control transport communications along the Sea of ​​Azov, which provide logistical support to enemy troops in the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, with missile strikes, and in the event of the destruction of the Kerch Bridge, this can also be done in Crimea. What our troops failed to do by striking in 2023, can be done now, provided that missile weapons are used effectively.

All this taken together created the prerequisites for a radical change in the situation at the front. The prospect of conducting ground offensive operations opens up, and not at the expense of unacceptable losses of the advancing troops, but as a result of gaining fire superiority in military operational depth.

Such opportunities are not implemented instantly. But the chances are real provided that partners supply missile weapons in the necessary optimal quantity and remove restrictions on their use.

At the same time, thoughtlessly throwing missiles at secondary targets is also not necessary. There are too many targets. Each missile strike must be carefully prepared. Strike only at the “most important” targets. Each strike is a planned operation with a breakthrough of air defense. Each missile must hit the target. At the same time, control over the effectiveness of the use of the provided missile weapons can be left to the partners.

Political leaders in Moscow understand that the end of impunity has come. The reaction was traditional and fully consistent with the Russian strategy of waging war, namely bluffing and nuclear intimidation of Ukraine's partners.

Already on November 19, well-known changes were made to the Russian Federation's nuclear doctrine by law.

And on November 21, a somewhat strange strike on the city of Dnipro took place from a military point of view. The strangeness lies in the fact that the individual guidance blocks did not carry explosives.

Although Ukraine officially announced that the strike was carried out by a missile that, according to its flight characteristics, corresponds to the class of intercontinental ballistic missiles, throughout the day the media were lively discussing what kind of missile it was and other details related to this strike.

Finally, at the end of the day, the bunker leader crawled out from under some hole and declared that they had struck with a missile from the "unparalleled" series, the purpose of which was to once again scare our partners and demand that they stop supplying us with weapons and threats against them.

He does not directly intimidate our country. He understands that doing so is futile.

I think that the strike was planned specifically for the State Factory "Production Union Southern Machine-Building Plant (Yuzhmash). We know little about the missile, but from what we do know, we can draw certain conclusions.

1. A missile of this class (regardless of its name) is designed to deliver strikes with nuclear munitions. In order to deliver 1.5 tons of conventional explosives, it is pointless to use a 50-ton missile. We remember that back in 2022, the aggressor used three-ton bombs dropped from an airplane to strike the defenders of Mariupol, and in June 2024, a FAB-3000 M-5 guided aerial bomb destroyed a residential building in the village of Liptsi, north of Kharkiv. It is worth noting that such bombs weighing 3,000 kg carry a charge of 1,200 kg of explosives, that is, the same amount as the missile that hit the city of Dnipro could have brought. However, the financial cost of such a strike for the aggressor is not commensurate.

An intercontinental ballistic missile requires a much more powerful charge, namely a nuclear warhead. But in the missile that hit the city of Dnipro, the individual guidance blocks did not contain explosives at all. The strike was delivered, so to speak, with a weight model.

The demonstration of determination turned out to be somewhat hesitant.

This “manifestation of humanism” took place against the backdrop of dozens of strikes on residential buildings in settlements, including the Dnipropetrovsk region, that took the lives of our peaceful fellow citizens that same day.

It is not a matter of humanism, which suddenly seized the terrorists, but of the absence of submunitions in the usual equipment for this type of missile. And it is hardly possible to make such submunitions in a short time.

Replacing nuclear charges, which, despite their high power, have a relatively small weight, with a warhead in a usual equipment, which would have more or less significant power, will lead to a significant increase in the mass of the missile warhead.

Is the missile carrier designed for such changes? An accurate answer requires an accurate assessment by engineers. But, based on the fact that a weight model arrived at Yuzhnmash, the aggressor has big problems with creating an appropriate non-nuclear warhead.

2. The nuclear type of warhead determines relatively low requirements for the missile's accuracy, namely, 150 meters are declared. Such a deviation from the point of impact of the missile is unacceptable for a warhead even with a significant amount (1.2–1.5 tons) of conventional explosives. But it is absolutely normal when hit by a nuclear munition. The deviation will be leveled due to the radius of action of the striking factors of a nuclear explosion.
3. A missile flying at 4–6 thousand km does not carry tactical nuclear weapons ammunition (ultra-low and low-yield). The missile warhead contains ammunition of at least medium power (TNT equivalent of 10–100 kt).
4. Due to the significant power of nuclear charges in submunitions, the aiming points for each of them are determined at a considerable distance from each other, taking into account the radius of action of the striking factors of each charge. Those video fragments that illustrated the strike on the city of Dnipro show a completely different picture. The individual guidance blocks are spread over a small distance, and their submunitions are not spread at all and hit almost simultaneously at one point. This may indicate that either we were shown video fragments related to other events, or the system for spreading individual guidance blocks and submunitions on this missile has not been worked out.

As a conclusion, the strike on the city of Dnipro was absurd from a military point of view. It did not pose a threat to either the Yuzhmash plant or any other military or industrial facilities.

Faced with the need to respond to the decisions of our partners and effective strikes by Ukraine, understanding the consequences of escalating such strikes in terms of their impact on the course of the war as a whole, the aggressor leadership was faced with the need to demonstrate readiness for another escalation of the conflict by intensifying its strikes.

However, the enemy did not have the forces, means, and methods left for this.

We were already being attacked with all types of weapons that the enemy had. They were attacking us with almost no responsibility, hiding on their territory, protected until recently by the state border from the use of high-tech effective weapons against them.

And if the enemy had something else that had not yet been used, the enemy would have used it without any additional pretexts. But he has nothing else.

He only has nuclear weapons left. Their use cannot be completely ruled out, but it is extremely unlikely.

The format of the article does not provide for coverage of aspects of waging war with the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we will limit ourselves, from a military point of view, to the above conclusion.

But no less attention deserves the assessment of the probability of Russian nuclear strikes from a military-political point of view. In the event of their launch, the aggressor will find himself isolated from almost all countries of the world, including the leaders of the Global South, in particular China and India. Such isolation is a quick inevitable end for the Russian Federation in the short term.

Thus, the strike on the city of Dnipro was exclusively psychological and informational in nature and was a key part of the information and psychological operation, in which there are clearly distinguished stages of implementation.

At the preparatory stage of the operation, on the eve of the strike, against the background of statements by Russian officials, which were filled with uncertainty, an active discussion of the capabilities of the aggressor's intercontinental missiles began in the information field. At the same time, the emphasis was placed on the Rubezh missile complex. A sense of anxiety and fear was formed in the minds of Ukrainian society and Western countries.

The strike on Yuzhmash and Putin’s statement after this strike are the key informational events of the operation.

However, the operation does not end there, but rather enters its main stage.

It is impossible to force the governments of Ukraine and partner countries to change previously made decisions by the strike on the city of Dnipro and the dictator’s speech alone. To do this, it is necessary to create pressure on the leadership of these countries from within, from society. The creation of such pressure will be the basis for the further development of the information operation.

At this stage, we should expect further aggressive statements by the leadership of the Russian Federation, the involvement of pro-Russian politicians, experts, journalists, news sites, other information resources, groups on social networks, public organizations, that is, the entire grouping of forces for carrying out hybrid operations, which is created, managed and financed by Russia, including in other countries. To this should be added a certain number of useful idiots who will join this process. We should expect mass protests in Western countries, organized by these pro-Russian forces, demanding that they stop providing assistance to Ukraine (escalating the conflict, killing people, and so on) and force it to make peace on Russia’s terms.

This is the main goal of the operation, which is unfolding and being carried out before our eyes and with our certain participation.

Putin sees us as a passive object to which information influence is directed. Understanding what is happening makes it possible to consciously resist this influence.

At the same time, Ukraine and its partners should in no case stop at this critical moment.

The statements of most pro-government Western politicians show that they also understand that the strike on the city of Dnipro is a bluff and blackmail.

And the main thing now is not to show weakness and not to make it clear that we were scared, as it was before. Otherwise, having sensed weakness and found a way to put pressure, the aggressor, advancing its hegemony around the world, will continue nuclear blackmail for any reason for every attempt to resist its aggressive policy.

To confirm its determination, the West can announce that in connection with the strikes on Ukraine with intercontinental missiles, it plans to supply it with Tomahawk missile systems and begin training Ukrainian military specialists for their operation.

The aggressor must receive a clear signal that in the event of threats, direct or hidden, to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, the same weapons will be transferred to Ukraine in order to ensure its realization of the right to self-defense.

The statement itself, and even more so the preparatory actions for its implementation, will give the aggressor a signal, namely that the time for intimidation is over, the Russian Federation will lead to peace through coercion and force.

At the same time, it is necessary to continue effective strikes on the enemy deep into his territory of his country with maximum force.

Of course, the enemy will continue to strike Ukraine with one or another type of missiles. They will not have a causal connection with our strikes. The enemy does not need a pretext. He has struck and is striking the territory of our country with all the types of weapons that he had and has.

But under the current conditions, this will not be a unilateral shooting by the aggressor of the country-victim of aggression. This will be an exchange of blows. And as the effectiveness of the first two strikes by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on objects deep into the enemy's territory has shown, we have a strong chance of radically changing the military situation in our favor.