Kharkiv Area. Why Russians Failed to Implement Offensive Plan and Ukrainians Failed to Keep Composure

The loss of every meter of our land resonates with pain in the hearts of Ukrainians.

However, the Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region, which in terms of the results achieved by the enemy does not even resemble the loss of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, let alone Mariupol or Kherson, not to mention the actual surrender of southern Ukraine and vast areas in the north and east at the beginning of the war, has caused an extremely powerful resonance and reaction both from law enforcement agencies and in the information space.

To what extent does this reaction correspond to the scale and nature of the event?

In order to answer this question thoroughly, it is necessary to have complete information about the composition and condition of the troops of the opposing sides on the battlefield. In military terms, this means having information about the composition, manning, supply of troops, their level of training and morale, and the engineering equipment of the defense line. In addition, it is necessary to know and understand the intentions of the command of the warring parties to conduct, on the one hand, an offensive and, on the other hand, a defensive operation.

Of course, I don't have such comprehensive information, and neither do the so-called experts or politicians who take the liberty of making categorical conclusions about the course of hostilities.

My analysis is based on an understanding of the laws of military art and the results of battles achieved by the parties. Ignorance of the details of organizing and conducting combat operations shapes their primitive perception. An offensive is simplistically perceived as an event when a mass of people and equipment, with the fire support of artillery and aviation, moves forward, trying to destroy those who oppose them. And these others sit in the trenches and destroy those who are advancing. In short, it's like a war newsreel.

The essence is correct, but the details are a bit more complicated.

Key tasks of the parties

Both the attacking and defending sides echelon their forces. The defending side places them on the frontiers in the depths of the defense, and the attacking side distributes its forces into echelons, each of which is introduced into the battle at a certain stage and has its own task - to break through the enemy's defense at a certain defensive line. When planning an offensive, echeloning is calculated in such a way as to ensure a consistent breakthrough of all defense lines by introducing reserves in stages and to fulfill the objectives of the operation by reaching the intended line.

If a particular echelon fails to break through the defense line intended for it, the advancing party is forced to bring another echelon into the battle in advance. At the same time, it becomes clear at this stage that, having reached a certain point, the advancing party will not have the reserves to increase its efforts and break through the next defensive position, since it has already deployed these reserves in advance at the previous stages of the battle.

An offensive operation involving tens of thousands of personnel and hundreds of pieces of equipment cannot be stopped before the front line of defense (in our case, the state border). It will inevitably be captured by the enemy.

The task of the defending side is to hold the defensive positions steadfastly and force the enemy to bring in reserves in advance, which it planned to bring in at later stages of the offensive.

And the skill of the command of the defense forces is, on the one hand, to ensure the stability of the defense, and on the other hand, to sense the critical moment when the enemy will be forced to deploy another echelon of troops, and to withdraw your own troops from under attack, thus preventing their destruction.

This is easy to write about or discuss, but extremely difficult to execute successfully. It requires not only a theoretical understanding, which, as you can see, is not difficult, but also, above all, combat experience and the iron will of both the command of the defending forces and junior and mid-level commanders. It requires the faith of commanders that their subordinate troops will defend their positions as long as possible. It requires subordinates’ faith in themselves and higher commanders that they will not be left to their own devices and that the necessary decisions will be made in a timely manner.

In addition, to understand the events that took place, it should be noted that an advanced position is created in front of the front line of defense at a distance of 3–5 km, where limited forces and means are deployed. One of the purposes of its creation is to hide the front line and the deployment of forces and firepower from the enemy. The task of the troops defending it is to force the enemy to deploy the units of the first echelon of the offensive in combat order in advance, to determine the direction of the enemy's main efforts, which will allow the command to respond to this, as far as the situation allows.

Analyzing the events, we should keep in mind that the enemy, unfortunately, has seized the strategic initiative. Today, he is deciding when and in what direction to go on the offensive. The defending side cannot be strong on all fronts at the same time. Under these conditions, the main efforts of troops are usually concentrated in the depths, and a smaller part of the forces is allocated to the defense of the first lane. Undoubtedly, it should be as strong as possible, as far as the availability of troops allows. This approach makes it possible, during the battles for the first defensive line, to identify the directions of the enemy's attacks and to increase efforts on them.

Results of the defense operation

We will evaluate only the information that is publicly available, but we will not go into details and keep in mind that this information may be partially incomplete.

Units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the State Border Guard Service took up defense on a wide front in the first echelon at a certain distance from the state border.

Shortly before the start of the offensive, the enemy, probably having received information and correctly timed it, increased the depth of the defense by deploying additional forces on the second line of defense. This change in the nature of the defense and the composition of the defending troops created an element of surprise for the enemy, as he was preparing an offensive based on a different assessment of the situation. At the same time, the first line of defense was reinforced by the transferred units of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR).

On May 10, the enemy launched an offensive in two directions. The construction of the defense made it possible to determine the areas of concentration of the enemy's main efforts during the fighting and to further build up additional forces in them, in particular by attracting reserves from the depths. The promptness with which the reserves arrived indicates that their use was probably envisaged in the plan of the defense operation.

The actions of the troops defending the first line of defense should be noted separately. They forced the enemy to bring in reserves in advance, and even under these conditions, he advanced at a rate of 2–2.5 kilometers per day. Although there might have been cases of unauthorized abandonment of positions, it was definitely not a mass panic flight.

Already on May 14, the enemy's advance was stopped in the Lukianske-Lozova direction, and on May 16 — in the Nova Tavolzhanka-Vovchansk direction.

Until May 19, the enemy tried to expand the captured area without advancing into the depths of our territory, and on May 20, all offensive actions were stopped. During the week of the offensive, the enemy advanced no more than 5–6 kilometers deep.

The objective of the defense operation was achieved. The enemy used reserves in advance, but was unable to accomplish the planned tasks and was stopped within the defense line. He suffered significant losses. Conditions were created for a counterattack to restore the state border.

But a counterattack is not carried out. Three conditions must be met for it to be carried out:

• The enemy has been stopped;
• its reserves are exhausted;
• the counterattack grouping must be equal to or greater than the enemy forces that have intervened in the defense.

Probably, it is the forces that we lack to launch a counterattack.

So what's wrong? What has caused such excitement in the SBI? Will criminal cases be opened after each lost village?

Groundless information attack on commanders

I emphasize once again that the analysis is not based on any insider information.

However, it appears that in the face of limited forces and means, with limited units and formations ready to perform tasks, the command of the Kharkiv operational-tactical group together with the command of the Khortytsia operational-strategic group and, probably, with the participation of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, professionally and unconventionally planned and successfully conducted a defensive operation, during which the enemy's plan to reach Kharkiv was thwarted. The success of the operation was ensured by the resilience and heroism of the vast majority of our troops, the will and military skill of the commanders of all levels - from junior commanders to the highest-ranking commanders.

Can anyone do better? It would be logical to offer to try. But realizing the tragic results of such possible attempts, I will not offer.

Against this background, the reason for the removal of General Yuriy Halushkin from the command of the Kharkiv operational-tactical group on the first day of the enemy's offensive remains unclear. I know neither the initiator of this decision nor the details of its adoption. I will not engage in speculation and conspiracy theories.

However, with all due respect to General Mykhailo Drapatyi, I would like to point out that the replacement of the commander during an operation that has been planned, prepared in a certain way, and is already underway cannot by itself radically change its course for the better in a day or two. The change in the course of the battle was due to the fact that the newly appointed commander did not arrive empty-handed. He brought in reserve troops, which turned the tide in our favor.

If these reserves had been at the disposal of the command of the Kharkiv operational-tactical group from the very beginning, the need to replace General Yurii Halushkin would probably have disappeared by itself. But, obviously, the Ukrainian Armed Forces Command could not create such a reinforced grouping in this area because of the limited reserves. They are subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief and can be quickly deployed to any direction: Kharkiv, Sumy, Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar...

Unfortunately, the enemy has the initiative, there are several threatening directions, and our reserves are limited. Under these circumstances, this approach to the use of reserves seems to be the only reasonable solution.

Even before the fighting in the Kharkiv area ended, there was a surge of information activity against the military command. Starting with Generals Yurii Halushkin and Yurii Sodol, this information wave reached the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, and the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Anatolii Barhylevych, and eventually the entire senior military leadership, summarized by the authors as “generals.”

I will leave the level of professionalism of the analysis and assessment of the situation without comment.

It is difficult to link these information injections to a desire to influence the situation in order to improve it. The biographies of people who have been defending Ukraine from the first day of Russian aggression, stopping the enemy in Donbas, and actively participating in repelling open aggression from the very beginning are deliberately defamed. At the same time, the authors do not spare insulting epithets both for specific individuals mentioned in the reports and for the senior military leadership in general.

Objectively speaking, despite all the differences in the authors' views on life and the motivation for their criticism, it undoubtedly has signs of a special information operation aimed at discrediting the military leadership.

Unfortunately, I do not know General Yurii Sodol personally, so I cannot formulate my own opinion about him. But I am familiar to varying degrees with the other military leaders mentioned. My attitude to them may be perceived as too subjective, based on corporate solidarity, so to speak. However, their military career speaks for itself in an unbiased and convincing way.

The military talent of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, is clearly illustrated by the Kharkiv offensive operation developed and conducted under his leadership in the fall of 2022. In the absence of superiority over the enemy in the number of troops, the enemy's air superiority resulted in the defeat of the enemy and the rapid advance of our troops. Neither we nor the Russians have been able to carry out such an operation again.

I am sure that this is not the last brilliant victory of the Commander-in-Chief.

Few people know that the foundations of the current Territorial Defense Forces were laid under the leadership of Major General Anatolii Barhylevych. He developed the concept, drafted and advocated the legislative framework in the Verkhovna Rada, organized scheduled training in training centers for personnel assigned to territorial defense units, and conducted exercises with them. I was once impressed by how fundamentally he organized this work.

As fate would have it, he did not become their commander after completing the work of reorganizing the TRO forces. It happens. They were led by Brigadier General Yurii Halushkin.

It is he who is the focus of the main accusations, heavily mixed with brutal humiliation, about the events in the Kharkiv area in the first days of the defense operation. Moreover, they do not spare derogatory epithets and portray him as a kind of parquet general who got into office through nepotism and personal connections.

I would like to remind you that since 2013, Colonel Yurii Halushkin was the deputy commander of the Highly Mobile Airborne Troops. In this position, he started his war in Donbas in 2014. During the fiercest fighting from June 2014 to January 2015, he served as the commander of the airborne troops. And then, after the creation of the airborne troops as a separate branch of the army and until the end of 2019, General Yurii Halushkin was the deputy commander. This is due to his alleged lack of combat experience in leading troops in modern warfare.

In 2015–2016, I worked with him in Donbas to organize the fight against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance forces. I personally saw his organizational skills as a military leader.

In January 2022, he took command of the newly created Territorial Defense Forces as a branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It is worth noting that many, if not almost all, commanders of Territorial Defense brigades and battalions were replaced at the same time. People came in who had to deal with the state of affairs. The reason for such a massive replacement on the eve of the war, which was clearly on the horizon, is a topic for a separate discussion. A month and a half later, a full-scale invasion began.

On the morning of February 24, 2022, I started performing assigned tasks as part of the Territorial Defense command and witnessed the work of the commander firsthand. The troops were understaffed, without uniforms, without communication equipment, without transport. What was especially disconcerting was that in the early days they were unarmed.

On the first day, I witnessed a telephone conversation with General Halushkin, in which he told the caller in a rather harsh manner that neither he nor the command would abandon Kyiv and would defend it as long as they had the strength.

The next day after the aggression began, they received weapons, including NLAW anti-tank systems, some of which were left in reserve at the command.

There were fierce battles for Moshchun. The enemy broke through to Brovary. The road to Zhytomyr was cut. There was a real threat of the enemy reaching Kyiv.

By order of the commander, the Chief of Staff, then Colonel and now General Serhii Sobko, gave the officers a brief briefing on the preparation of this British anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) for use and the fire procedure. By order of the commander, officers from the department were assigned to create officer mobile anti-tank groups, which, if the enemy broke through to Kyiv, were to provide fire support to the troops defending Kyiv with small arms only.

I cite these examples to emphasize the traits inherent in General Yurii Halushkin as a person: determination, willingness to sacrifice, making unconventional decisions when the situation calls for it, and willingness to take responsibility for these decisions. It sounds a bit pretentious, but it is completely true.

The commander managed to organize the work of the department and maintain control over the situation not only in the Kyiv garrison, but also in all regions. In just a few days, tens of thousands of people were recruited, armed and engaged in repelling the aggression without any unnecessary formalities, as required by the procedure. It was a titanic work in terms of intensity and effectiveness, based on patriotic enthusiasm and covering all levels from the command to the lowest levels of government. The work that united the efforts of the military and the entire society. I think most of us remember and recall that time in this way - the same feelings, but in other areas of work.

When the enemy was pushed back from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy, and the danger had subsided, General Yurii Halushkin was unexpectedly removed from his post and reassigned to a position with a significant demotion. The reason remained a mystery to me.

Of course, we should not make our military leaders saints and untouchables. No past merit should provide protection from responsibility for mistakes. But only their senior leaders, up to and including the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, can professionally assess the actions of commanders. No one is allowed to defame or humiliate people who are fully committed to the defense of Ukraine.

At the same time, I unquestionably agree that it cannot be the norm to involve in an operation the formations that are exhausted in previous battles, are limitedly combat-ready in terms of manning and supplies, and are not designed to perform the tasks assigned to them by their organizational and staffing structure. But this is not a question for the command of the military groups and even, to some extent, not for the General Command of the Armed Forces. They use the forces that have been assigned to them during operations.

Read this article in Ukrainian and russian.