“We Have to Work Like an Orchestra, and Now Everyone Is Playing Something Different.” Three Reasons Why Ukraine Will Lose Pokrovsk

“We can count on reinforcements or at least some reinforcement only if the media writes about our direction or the enemy breaks through far into the rear. And there is no need to talk about global changes. I think they will never be there,” says Roman, a lieutenant in one of the territorial defense brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which defends the area south of Pokrovsk.

We manage to talk for about an hour while the soldier takes his car for repairs. He is brief, but emphasizes: the area can be held if a significant number of reserves are transferred here, which have armored vehicles in service and, most importantly, have undergone high-quality coordination. However, the situation south of Pokrovsk is not currently showing any signs of improving.

On December 12, journalist Yurii Butusov said that near the settlement of Shevchenko, the invaders captured an entire fortified area of ​​the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which our military did not manage to occupy. Literally two days later, the soldiers of the Russian Federation themselves showed photos and videos of the defensive structures they occupied. From the available material, it is clear that this is a well-built bunker with equipped sleeping places and a supply of provisions.

The territorial defense unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Roman, a military man with whom the ZN.UA correspondent spoke, is holding defenses near this place. The lieutenant states: the problem is very multifaceted and is far from the first time it has manifested itself. A similar situation previously developed in the village of Novohrodivka, which was occupied by the enemy in the summer, as well as in other sections of the front near Pokrovsk.

Having talked with Roman and two other lower-level commanders who hold defenses in this direction, we were able to identify three reasons for such miscalculations:

• lack of clearly established interaction between brigades / battalions responsible for a certain section of the front;
• untimely reporting of the situation on the front line due to the fear of individual commanders to report failures to higher levels;
• lack of people to hold positions, including due to mass unauthorized abandonments of the military unit (UAMU), which have acquired a global scale in the past few months.

The military is unanimous in the fact that solving these problems through the initiative of individual commanders on the ground is impossible. However, they are cautiously optimistic after the appointment of Mykhailo Drapatyi as commander of the Land Forces of Ukraine and say that if there is the necessary resource, he will be able to correct the situation. However, according to military officials, there is very little room for decision-making.

To improve interaction between military units on the front line, only one decision can be made, namely the transition to the divisional structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Thus, due to the increase in the structural military units themselves, such an architecture will be able to resolve most issues regarding interaction on the front line. However, at the same time, it is worth remembering that such a transition itself is a very long and complex procedure that cannot be implemented in a few months or even half a year. It also requires attracting additional resources for training officers, re-equipping units, and systematizing work.

"Here's a conditional example: we hold one village, and next to it another military battalion of another brigade holds another village. This is not our area of ​​responsibility because we are different military units and have different subordination. And even when we enter into interaction, we may not understand what plans that brigade has. There were cases when some military units simply retreated from their positions, which is why we also had to retreat so as not to be surrounded. And if there was a divisional military structure, we would work as one mechanism, like an orchestra. Because now the situation is that we are all just playing together, but each one plays something different," Roman concludes.

Another problem that the military speaks of off the record is the command’s misunderstanding of the clear situation on the ground. The reason for this is the very long way to convey information from the front line to the commanders who make the final decisions. Very often, brigade commanders (not to mention battalion commanders) are afraid to make decisions even on a tactical scale without the approval of the higher military leadership “from Kyiv”, fearing to take responsibility.

It is worth noting that the situation is truly unique. It is no secret that in repelling the Russian offensive in February-March 2022, Ukraine owes much to the initiative of the lower military leadership. Sergeants and lieutenants, who led their platoons and companies into battle without waiting for orders from the higher military leadership, were able to turn the tide of the battles with the enemy. After all, enemy military units at that time were waiting for communication with the higher military leadership in Moscow to resolve any issues.

At that time, the enemy Russian operational-tactical missile systems (OTMS) "Iskander" received an order to strike an hour and a half after detecting potential targets, and the brigade commanders were pawns in the hands of Herasimov, who took the next step only if they received an order from the higher military leadership.

However, time passed, and the trends changed. Now the enemy Russian operational-tactical missile systems (OTMS) "Iskander" strike targets 2-3 minutes after their detection by intelligence, which means a complete leveling of the entire vertical of issuing military orders. That is, drone operators provide coordinates of the direction to the Russian operational-tactical missile systems (OTMS) "Iskander" launchers, without waiting for any approval. The implementation of decisions on assaults in each direction was given to the brigade commanders, who are now personally responsible for carrying out certain actions on the front line.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the Ukrainian command is moving in the opposite direction. In addition, it is worth noting that, according to ZN.UA sources in the security structures, orders to conduct operational and sometimes even tactical actions on the line of military contact are approved directly by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi. Unfortunately, his decisions are often untimely, and delay is now costing our country a great price, namely the loss of human lives and square kilometers of lost territory. At the same time, brigade commanders and officers of smaller structural units are afraid to make decisions on their own, expecting the “great responsibility” that they are often threatened with.

From the above, an ironic thesis follows, which the head of the “Come Back Alive” foundation, Taras Chmut, likes to express: “A small Soviet army will never defeat a large Soviet army.” And there is much more truth in this sentence than it seems at first glance.

The third problem that the commanders of units in the Pokrovsky direction talk about is the large number of unauthorized abandonments of the military unit. It is worth noting that this problem probably has the least options for a possible solution. According to ZN.UA sources in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, every month Ukraine loses from four to five thousand soldiers, taking into account the dead, seriously wounded and those who have abandoned a military unit without authorization. It is very difficult to restore such a number of losses at the moment.

At the same time, the problem is not only in the direct implementation of mobilization, but also in the quality of the average mobilized military. This is a topic for a separate article, but we will note only one thing: the existing mobilization indicators are enough only to address tactical threats in the short term, and there is no need to talk about any strategic planning at all now.

In the near future, we will see how the three problems listed above will affect the defense of Pokrovsk, a city that has incredible military and industrial importance for Ukraine. None of the three military personnel interviewed by ZN.UA answered the question of whether Pokrovsk will be able to be defended if these problems are not resolved.

At the same time, the enemy is eight kilometers from the Pokrovsk-Dnipro highway and is slowly taking it under control of FPV drones (First Person View). After all, the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region is exactly the same distance from the forward units of the invaders.