"Spiritual Independence": About the Ban on the Russian Orthodox Church and "Foreign Agents in Cassocks"

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted Law No. 8371, popularly nicknamed "on the ban of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)". This event was announced personally by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who promised "good news" in the near future about the protection of the "spiritual independence" of Ukraine. Good news in difficult times is a particularly valuable commodity. Well, here you go: Ukrainian legislators have banned the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine. However, they did not solve the problem of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). And they fired a salvo of "friendly fire" towards other Ukrainian churches.

Somehow it turned out that the "law on the abolition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)" turned into a "law on the ban of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) " right in the session hall. On the one hand, it's for the best: the bill didn't even have those three cherished letters, but instead had a heavy phrase about "a church with its center in a state that is committing armed aggression against Ukraine and/or has occupied part of Ukraine's territory." So, thanks for the "ROC." Even despite the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is not present in the territories controlled by Ukraine. That is, there is nothing to "cancel." The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) structures are present only in the annexed and occupied territories, and, one must assume, they will disappear from there only together with the occupation regime.

But we have the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) on our territory. And political leaders again failed to pay due attention to this church. It seems that it has slipped through the fingers of legislators again. According to the new version of the Law on Freedom of Conscience, it may, of course, start having problems — if there is patience and political will for it. But, as in the first reading, the connection with the "governing center in Moscow" will have to be proven in each specific case. Namely, it will be necessary to separately clarify and prove that a specific parish, monastery or seminary has a connection with the governing center in Moscow.

The decision on "affiliation" will be made by the State Service for ethnic policy and Freedom of Conscience, after which the organization will be given time to "cleanse" the documents of any hints of "affiliation". After that, if measures are not taken, the decision will be made by the court — in all instances, up to the Supreme Court. And even these actions will not be taken today or 30 days after the adoption of the law, but after nine months. The legislators decided to write three letters in the document — the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). But you will not find a direct mention of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) in the document. In fact, it seems that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) has disappeared between the lines of the documents into some strange legal oblivion. As if it was not what we are talking about. As if we had a whole list of "churches, whose governing centers, etc."

There may be several reasons for the reluctance to call things as they are. For example, this allows us to at least partially avoid accusations of "persecution and oppression of the church," which are taken very seriously in the West. The emphasis is shifted from a specific confession to circumstances, namely the threat to the national security of our country that the activities of religious organizations that are part of the structure of this church pose to Ukraine. This greatly complicates verbal constructions. But what's worse is that this verbal uncertainty leaves many opportunities for misinterpretations and abuses.

The law concerns the activities of individual religious organizations, and not the confession as a whole. Let me remind you that the concept of "religious organizations" does not include the church as a whole, but its "elementary particles," namely parishes, monasteries, educational institutions, publishing houses, media, charitable foundations, etc. They will be checked for "affiliation" with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).

"Affiliation" is perhaps the most important word in the document, and one of its main tasks is to define this "affiliation" so that it unambiguously points specifically to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). This legal term is intended to compensate for the lack of direct indications of the ties between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and its Moscow center, which after the start of the full-scale war were carefully erased from the documents of the Kyiv Metropolitanate of Ukraine. At the same time, it is important to note that "affiliation" can be multi-stage: a religious organization affiliated with a governing center, which is affiliated with a governing center, is subject to a ban... and so on, until we finally get to the essence, namely, ties with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).

At the same time, the list of "signs of affiliation" given in the law cannot be called impeccable. For example, there is a clause that "affiliation" can be established if a religious organization is indicated as a structural/subordinate part of a foreign church in the charter of this foreign church itself. That is, if the Charter of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) does not mention any connection with Moscow, but in the Charter of with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) it is indicated as a structural subdivision of with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), then one must believe the Charter of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), and not the Charter of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). If the Charter of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is a lie, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) is not a structural part of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) at all, then why hasn't it yet demanded that this item be removed from the Charter of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)? There was no demand to do this either through the court, or even just through a direct appeal.

The article on promoting the ideology of the "Russian world" sounds just as vague, which could also be a reason to ban a religious organization. The intention is good. But unlike "affiliation", which legislators at least tried to spell out, the law does not stipulate what is included (and what is not included) in the "ideology of the Russian world". If you feel that "there is a smell of the Russian spirit", it is suggested to contact experts and study the sources. Moreover, it is worth taking into account any available sources, including "publications in the media". That is, anything may turn out to be (or not turn out to be) part of the ideology of the "Russian world".

All these arguments will be used (are already being used) by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and their defenders. In fact, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) has already commented on the law in the sense that "this does not concern us since we are no longer the Moscow Patriarchate (MP)". That is, the Kyiv Metropolitanate is not going to change anything. The leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) is going to continue to wait out the turbulent times. They do it with such incredible calm that it seems they know what they are waiting for.

For them, the new version of the law is, at best, the last "Chinese warning". Which is unlikely to change anything. If people have not left Moscow under the pressure of circumstances, shelling, the influence of their own conscience, this means that they will not leave anywhere and will not reconsider anything, and under the threat of sanctions from the state. At best, they will really "clean up" some things in the documents. And at worst, they will wait for something to change in nine months. Note that waiting nine months, and nine military months, is not such a short time. Everything can still change.

Ideally (for the leadership of the UOC-MP), peace talks announced by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for the end of the year will "mature". And there is no doubt that the fate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) structures will be a subject of bargaining for the negotiating parties. A convenient bargaining chip — all partners will welcome a concession from the Ukrainian side on the church issue.

Another possibility that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) may expect is the emergence of a “parallel structure” in the form of an exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine. The idea of ​​a special — “transitional” — structure for those in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) who want to leave Moscow but do not want to unite with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) (for various reasons) — periodically comes up in conversations and church media. Now this topic is being discussed again. It is worth noting that it is discussed even more in Greek church-related media than in Ukrainian ones.

The emergence of a parallel non-Moscow Orthodox structure would not be very good news for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which, of course, sees itself as the main beneficiary of the “law banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP).” It is expected that the adoption of the law will stimulate parishes to switch to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). And it will also open the possibility of transferring church property seized from religious organizations whose "affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)" will be established.

However, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) receives one very large gift under this law. For unknown reasons and with a completely unclear purpose, Ukrainian legislators introduced the concept of a "foreign religious organization" in the new law. And this — and not the "ban on the Russian Orthodox Church" — is the most important innovation in the Ukrainian legislative field.

The very concept of a "foreign religious organization" — something like "foreign agents in cassocks"? — indicates that the principle of equality of religious organizations has been violated. The interpretation of "religious foreign agents" has changed from edition to edition. After all, legislators really wanted to introduce this concept (why?), but they could not reconcile it with the requirements of the norms of freedom of conscience, common sense and simply grammar. As a result, in the end, the definition of a “foreign agent church” does not sound very clear: “For the purposes of this Law, a foreign religious organization is a religious organization (including a religious administration, association, center) as a legal a person who has been created and/or registered in accordance with the laws of another state may reside outside the borders of Ukraine.”

 

Initially, everything was much more transparent in the draft law: all churches with centers abroad were declared "foreign agents". So, we still need to say thank you to the legislators, that instead of a blatant violation of the principle of equality of religious organizations, they wrote something that is not very readable and understandable. But, I'm afraid, the essence of the unreadable phrase can be interpreted in a way that is beneficial to the people making the decision. And a "foreign religious organization" can really be anyone.

Except the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). Even the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church would turn out to be "not quite our church", because its center "is located outside of Ukraine". The fact that the wording of this article was hastily changed to an obscure ambiguity was most likely caused precisely by fears of a protest from the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). The fate of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) and Ukraine is in the same direct and strong dependence as the fate of Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). But after all, the "control center" is not where it should be...

The idea of ​​introducing the concept of a "foreign church" seems especially artificial in light of the decision to name the only "foreign church" that represents a threat to the national security of Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church. The reason for such a desire, apparently, is the desire to outline and emphasize "spiritual independence", which was loudly announced by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself. Now, only what has a "center" in Ukraine belongs to the concept of "ours". That is, depending on the Ukrainian government.

Thus, under the slogan of preserving "spiritual independence", a request was made to narrow the scope of spiritual freedom and equality for religious organizations in Ukraine. Despite the fact that we have not yet achieved any clarity regarding the main goal of the "law on the prohibition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)". There are questions whether the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) will de facto break away from the Moscow Patriarchate (MP)? If so, how and when will it happen?

In nine months, we will see. Who will remember. And who will survive.

Read this article in Ukrainian and russian.