NABU Director Semen Kryvonos: “Lawyers under suspicion are not the only ones who downloaded information from registers”

The case of the “hacker lawyers” is a ball of threads that, if desired, can be unraveled and used to begin a genuine reform of the judicial and law enforcement systems. This refers not just to the high-profile names of those involved in criminal cases to whom, according to the investigation, the Guarantee of Your Rights law firm, led by Dmytro Borzykh, sold information. The problem lies in systemic issues that must be addressed by lawmakers. These range from restricting access to court records to long-standing issues of self-regulation within the bar, where the Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) has become a “monopoly” that methodically suppresses anyone who goes against its system.

After the publication of the article The Case of Hacker Lawyers. How NABU Found Parasites, the bar association went on with its vigorous information campaign against NABU, siding with the group of suspected lawyers and accusing ZN.UA of lobbying for the interests of the anti-corruption authorities. To be honest, it was a pretty good campaign. However, the proposals outlined in the article resonated not only among lawyers controlled by Medvedchuk's long-time associate Lidiia Izovitova (we even received an indignant letter demanding that we “disclose the value of the commercial contract with NABU”) but also among lawyers opposed to the UNBA. As an objective platform for discussion on the reform of the judiciary, ZN.UA published an article by lawyer Dmytro Ostapenko on this topic.

The main debate revolved around NABU's demand to restrict access to the Unified State Register of Court Decisions (USRCD) during the pre-trial investigation phase. Lawyers consider the openness of registers to be a major democratic achievement in the field of justice, which guarantees respect for human rights and reduces abuse by law enforcement agencies.

Can this openness be sacrificed for the sake of the secrecy of pre-trial investigations? To what extent have leaks damaged investigations into specific cases involving corrupt high-ranking officials? Will exposing a group of suspected lawyers reliably plug the leak through which secret information is leaking from NABU? What response to these developments do the anti-corruption institutions expect from the government?

I asked Semen Kryvonos, NABU Director, to answer these questions.

IV: Mr. Kryvonos, constant leaks since the creation of NABU have weakened the position of detectives and prosecutors from the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office in court, which affects the fairness of verdicts. Sometimes they even ruin cases at the pre-trial investigation phase. What threat does the group of “hacker lawyers” led by Borzykh pose to the anti-corruption institutions?

SK: We were aware of the scale of the problem, but we couldn't talk about it openly for a long time. The investigation was ongoing. The leak, organized by the suspects, became a huge breach through which vast amounts of information were siphoned off. It is unacceptable for an unauthorized person to obtain data and use it in the interests of a suspect.

A search is one of the key investigative measures for obtaining important evidence. If the suspect knows in advance about the upcoming search, they will naturally take steps to conceal the evidence. Data leaks are particularly dangerous in pre-trial investigations involving influential persons.

According to preliminary estimates, data in dozens of cases has been compromised. These are investigations involving billions in losses, in which influential figures and high-ranking officials are involved. It is difficult to imagine that in a civilized country, an outside group could track the progress of an investigation against such people.

IV: How can the damage be assessed?

SK: We are currently conducting a huge amount of work to assess the scale of the damage. Important evidence may have been lost in a number of cases. We are now trying to understand the extent of the damage to each case and where the lawyers interfered. But the paradox is that the activities of this group were partly made possible by loopholes in the Law on Access to Court Decisions, which allows judges and law enforcement officials to access any decision from the Unified State Register of Court Decisions (USRCD). All you needed to access it was a login and password (Only from March 1, 2025, authorization in the USRCD will be carried out through the Electronic Court system, which requires an electronic key or token. — Inna Vedernikova).

What is the result? Third parties not involved in the pre-trial investigation obtain full information about the investigation strategy using illegal methods of access and taking advantage of the fact that decisions on searches, arrests and other investigative and procedural actions must be entered in the register. Therefore, the law needs to be changed.

Anyone who has access to this register, whether legally or illegally, can see this data. How can we talk about an effective investigation under such conditions? For NABU, this case is a matter of principle: it must show how a colossal leak of information occurred in a number of investigations.

IV: This is the second data leak under your watch. Last year, there was a scandal involving the case of Yurii Holik, when information from NABU was leaked to the Presidential Office. Suspicion then fell on Hizo Uhlava, whom you ultimately dismissed. Are these two cases comparable?

SK: No, they are incomparable in scale. We work with influential figures who have their own security services and know how to protect their data. Obtaining information in such an environment is a serious challenge that requires highly skilled and creative detectives. There are several types of information leaks.

Firstly, there is the human error, which includes accidental carelessness or procedural violations and, unfortunately, isolated cases of misconduct within the agency. It is impossible to eliminate such risks in a large institution completely, but we are working systematically to minimize them.

Secondly, there is a wide range of participants. Pre-trial investigations involve not only detectives, but also experts, the State Financial Monitoring Service, state auditors, banks and other agencies to which we send requests. No one can guarantee that data will not leak at some stage.

IV: Incidentally, the organizer of the crime still claims that the process is ongoing and that he has his own people not only in the courts but also in NABU. Does your Internal Control Department respond to such statements?

SK: There is always a party to the case claiming that he or she has his own people in NABU. But this is just empty talk. One of the persons involved did indeed cross paths with NABU detectives in his previous job, but that does not mean that he is in contact with them.

Looking at the bigger picture, we have many former employees of the police, the Security Service of Ukraine and the tax police. These people have experience and may know the persons involved. There are cases when detectives themselves declare a conflict of interest if their former colleagues are among the suspects. Then we remove them from the investigation team to avoid leaks. But there is no evidence of the influence of the organizer of crimes committed by the group of lawyers on processes in NABU.

If someone really has their own people in NABU, why create complex systems for accessing the registry? People associated with the suspects could send them the data anyway.

But theoretically, it is possible for employees to pass information to third parties. This is a difficult part of our work, but we are countering it. Our task is to identify such people because they have operational experience and can successfully conceal their activities.

IV: “Catch me if you can?”

SK: Yes. That is why we restrict access to information and prevent data from being passed on to third parties. However, the technology used by the group of lawyers made the leak global. This is the third level of information leakage. Right now, we're looking into other facts alongside the main investigation. We're analyzing cases of illegal access to search or arrest warrants, temporary access to items and documents. We'll figure out if there were leaks in the departments for each specific case.

IV: So you want to confirm your suspicions about leaks during the investigations by comparing them with the facts of illegal access to the register in a specific case?

SK: Right you are. It is always clear when you arrive for a search whether the person involved has been warned or not. And we recorded this.

IV: How much time do you need to assess the damage, as you said, in several dozen cases?

SK: It's a lot of work, considering that we have also established facts of keys of various judges, officials and law enforcement officers who accessed the registry having been compromised.

IV: Are you saying that it wasn't just judge Voloshyn from the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv who “shared” his electronic key and password?

SK: Yes, and I'll explain why. But first, let me mention an important detail. A login and password are one thing, but a so-called hard key (flash drive) is something else entirely. To accurately record the fact that information has been transferred, you need a “hard” key. If you have it, you can determine exactly who transferred the data. Without a “hard” key, it is difficult to make a claim. Therefore, at this stage, we cannot say for sure that the judge in question shared his password and electronic key. There are also assistants whom judges often trust to enter information into the register.

Now there is a “hard” key, which is a good preventive measure. But before that, there really was a global scheme, and we started by analyzing other data. For example, one judge has made 1 million 174 thousand (!) requests to the USRCD over the past few years. And we found out that such volumes of requests are not an exception. And this is a disaster. I initiated a meeting among law enforcement officials to show the scale of the problem.

IV: Are you talking about the entire law enforcement system and all courts?

SK: Yes. The issue of leaks is much broader than one criminal case. At this stage, it is already clear that the situation with illegal access to court decisions by various individuals goes beyond the scope of the current investigation. This is a major risk. The problem is much bigger and requires the involvement of the entire law enforcement system because it concerns not only NABU but also other law enforcement agencies.

IV: So, it turns out that the crimes committed by a group of lawyers are just the tip of the iceberg? Judging by the number of visits to the registry from their group, your “model judge” is a record holder.

SK: Yes. Lawyers are not the only ones who downloaded information from the registries. And we managed to document it. They turned out to be probably the most advanced users, creating a bot and fully automating the process. They were mostly interested in our cases related to top-level corruption. The rest is a long-standing problem. Some law firms, through which one can obtain information from the register for money, have been working hard in the country's law enforcement market for a long time.

Moving on: there is data showing that 1,084,000 requests were made using the passwords of various officials, 1,072,000, 557,000... This indicates systematic use of the registry to obtain data. We randomly selected a small portion of the registry's users. And I'm talking about the record holders.

IV: How did you compare everything?

SK: We compared the number of requests and then checked that the registry with the keys of these officials was accessed from different IP addresses. That is, if one judge made more than a million requests, the question arises: why did he access the registry from 5,830 different IP addresses?

IV: Spectacular...

SK: Yes, we are currently sorting through this information, preparing everything and will pass it on to law enforcers, the cyber police. We need to respond urgently and close this loophole through which information can be leaked to suspects.

IV: Are you seriously thinking that you will make the law enforcement agencies happy? The system is rotten to the core, and it seems that everyone is comfortable living off such lucrative leaks.

SK: Let's not generalize. There are people who do their job honestly everywhere. Plus, we have a fact that now cannot be ignored. Law enforcement agencies will have to respond.

IV: Let's be specific about the methods of protection. If we are talking about legislation, on the one hand, you are in favor of closing the register, and on the other, you are saying that judges should not enter data on pre-trial investigations into the register. This is exactly what the High Council of Justice allowed and what the Supreme Court overturned.

SK: It is up to the legislator to decide which path to choose — to close the register completely or to give us the right not to enter data into it until the investigation is complete and the case is referred to court.

Based on several cases, we can say that search warrants or secret investigative (search) actions can be entered into the register no earlier than five years after they are announced. The publication of the facts of a court judgment in the closed segment of the USRCD in 2021 can be used by the persons involved in the case or those who assist them, even several years later, as it provides extensive information to those who understand it.

IV: And this right should apply not only to NABU and SAPO but to the entire law enforcement system?

SK: Yes. Otherwise, it won't work. We propose several options. One of them is when an investigator or prosecutor issues a ruling to, so to speak, classify a specific court judgment. The duration can be limited by law.

IV: Do you understand the potential for abuse in an unreformed law enforcement system that the authorities use as a political lever to put pressure on both opponents and businesses?

SK: Did I say that there are no problems in the law enforcement system? But in this case, we are discussing the possibility of illegal access to search warrants through corrupt connections — either in court or through a judge's key. A search is an investigative action that no one should know about. Or are you suggesting that lawyers be called and warned that their client is about to be searched or arrested? Maybe then the lawyers will share their defense strategy with the investigators? A criminal investigation cannot turn into a circus.

IV: The bar community's reaction to your proposal to close the register has been negative.

SK: Yes, we have read the articles and comments. That is why I am trying to paint a realistic picture for you. It is time to take off the rose-tinted glasses and stop the manipulation.

IV: There is a bill, No. 7033-d, proposed by Denys Maslov, head of the relevant parliamentary committee, which would close this loophole.

SK: Yes, but it contains provisions that are not supported by some non-governmental organizations. They concern crimes committed by military personnel. The bill also contains several articles relating to pre-trial investigation bodies that could be useful. But it has been a year since the bill was passed in the first reading, and there has been no progress. We tried to solve the problem in a different way. There is a plan to implement our obligations to the EU. I proposed to the government committee to include in the plan a provision restricting access to the register of court judgments. At that time, there were no suspicions against lawyers, but I already mentioned this.

IV: Was the issue of forensic examination also discussed?

SK: That is an even more complicated issue. It is the last outpost of the system and has a significant impact on investigations.

IV: Is it true that Maria Zelinska, head of the Lviv Research Institute of Forensic Expertise under the Ministry of Justice, where records on search activities were transferred from the lawyers' office after the Center for Forensic Expertise under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is no longer working?

SK: To the best of my knowledge, it isn’t.

IV: But the institute did its job properly, probably because there was no pressure from the Ministry of Justice? According to our information, the relevant deputy minister and the expert who made the report were threatened, including with military service at the frontline.

SK: I cannot comment on that.

IV: And how can the outpost of the system be destroyed?

SK: There are several approaches. The first is to create an independent forensic institution for pre-trial investigations conducted by NABU, with guarantees of independence for its head. This could be a pilot project that could be used by the defense, NABU detectives and SAPO prosecutors. We have proposed this option and see no rational explanation for the refusal to go down this path.

IV: Why do you think you are not being heard?

SK: Good question. I believe the Ministry of Justice, as the main body shaping policy in the field of forensics, needs to become the flagship of reform. The model used to create NABU could be applied to establish the independence of the new forensic institution in terms of salaries, budget and the selection of its head and staff. Make it independent, including from the Ministry of Justice.

IV: Earlier, there was talk of creating such a body within the anti-corruption institutions.

SK: That would be ideal, but it has been criticized. It would be better if the expert body were completely independent, including from NABU and SAPO. This would guarantee the integrity of the process. At the same time, the new institution should not deal with minor cases and focus on major investigations instead.

IV: And what should be done with the old dependent institutions?

SK: We need to realize that the reform of the forensic expertise institution is long overdue and start taking concrete steps. Especially since expert examination is an important tool for Ukraine's post-war recovery. Infrastructure projects are already underway in many regions, where there are violations and damage needs to be assessed. If we want to fight corruption effectively, the reform should have started a while ago.

IV: What, in your opinion, is preventing lawmakers from starting it today?

SK: A lack of political will. The problem needs to be recognized at the highest level, and the attempts to influence the decisions of expert institutions, including our investigations, must be abandoned. However, I do not yet see a deep understanding of the situation. But I very much hope that the “lawyers' case,” which highlights the key problems of the system, will play its part. The same applies not only to expert institutions within the Ministry of Justice but also to other bodies, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security Service of Ukraine.

IV: The problem is that the parts are written at the Presidential Office. And if the Ministry of Justice shows even the slightest resistance, Mr. Tatarov keeps the Ministry of Internal Affairs in a stranglehold. Do you think that after the Americans, who oversaw NABU and the anti-corruption authorities in general, canceled corruption monitoring and deprived you of your magic umbrella, where you could always hide and ask for protection, NABU will be able to maintain its independence?

SK: We continue to maintain normal relations with both the US and Europe. We recently met with the ambassadors of the G7 countries; they are well aware of our problems. But the fight against corruption is not something that America or Europe primarily need. We need it. It is a matter of survival for Ukrainian society. Therefore, our main support is civil society. It can achieve its goals and control the actions of the authorities. It was society and journalists who made the government resolve the problems with food procurement in the defense system. It is the public that influences personnel policy and is capable of initiating change even within the government.

IV: Will society protect your detectives who are investigating the case of the lawyers from the criminal case opened by the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) at the request of the UNBA board?

SK: The SBI's job is to investigate crimes committed by law enforcement officers, including detectives. Let them investigate.

IV: So you are completely confident in your legal position and the jurisdiction over the entire case?

SK: Absolutely.

IV: Some people are convinced that the NABU is also gradually turning into a monopoly. They say, “Eight out of ten suspects really do have something to be charged for, but two do not. If NABU gets is claws into someone, it won't let go.” Especially since, during martial law, officials sometimes have to break the law to speed up the process. That is why many professionals refuse to go into government. And those who need it to enrich themselves are in no hurry either. They see that the Presidential Office easily gets rid of corrupt elements. It means they were not very good at hiding it — like, for example, former deputy head of the Presidential Office, Andrii Smyrnov.

SK: This is a commonplace narrative used to weaken NABU. And it is gaining momentum in certain parts of the media. Our response? Effective investigation and open communication. There is no other recipe. A fair balance is determined by the High Anti-Corruption Court, which, incidentally, has handed down quite a few acquittals. The High Anti-Corruption Court is not NABU's puppet court.

And the assessment that “if NABU gets its claws into someone, it won't let go” perfectly demonstrates that it is impossible to negotiate with us.

NABU is a fairly mature structure that still needs to develop to become more effective and systematic. We really need the parliament's help to promptly eliminate legislative gaps that hinder our work. We understand that we are in an aggressive environment with a high risk of information leaks, pressure and attempts to influence us. We are looking for ways to minimize these risks. Such a struggle requires additional resources and time. That is why the public often criticizes NABU. But this criticism motivates us. Because we are on the same side. Ultimately, our main employer is the Ukrainian people.