On 5 December 2025, the International Court of Justice issued a procedural order declaring the Russian Federation’s counterclaims in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide admissible for further consideration. Ukraine has been granted until 7 December 2026 to submit its written response, while Russia may file its objections by 7 December 2027. The decision was adopted by a vote of eleven to four.
This news immediately became part of the broader information noise. Russian state propaganda portrayed the ruling as supposed “international recognition” of its narrative, while within Ukrainian society a legitimate question arose: does this decision have any legal implications for Ukraine’s position or for the consideration of the case on the merits?
The short answer is no – at this stage, it does not. The longer – and more important – answer lies in explaining why.
What the Ruling Actually Means
This concerns a purely technical and procedural stage of the proceedings. The ICJ has not assessed any facts, evidence, or legal characterisation of the parties’ claims. Its review is strictly limited to issues of procedural admissibility. In other words, the Court has merely allowed a party to submit its arguments within the framework of the proceedings – just as it does for any participant in an international dispute.
This point is essential: the admissibility of a counterclaim does not imply that it is adequate, credible, or factually grounded. There is no “threshold of common sense” at this stage that filters submissions based on their plausibility or moral integrity. The Court does not dismiss claims because they appear cynical or detached from reality; it examines only whether they satisfy formal procedural criteria.
It is precisely this feature of international adjudication that can render such mechanisms vulnerable to abuse.
Why Nothing Substantive Has Changed
On 26 February 2022, Ukraine submitted its application requesting the Court to establish that Russia had abused the Genocide Convention as a legal pretext for the use of force.
To date, the Court has not proceeded to consider issues relating to the establishment of facts or the legal qualification of the parties’ actions in the context of genocide. However, it is important to recall another significant decision: on 16 March 2022, the International Court of Justice delivered its first ruling in this case, ordering the Russian Federation to immediately cease its military operations in Ukraine. Russia’s open disregard of that order once again calls into question the good faith of its subsequent procedural actions, including the submission of counterclaims.
It is essential to understand that all current developments represent movement within a long, complex, and inherently slow procedure. No new legal conclusions have been reached, no shift in the Court’s position has occurred, and no “turning point” in the case has taken place.
Accordingly, the question “Has the Court believed Russia?” is flawed at the level of its formulation. The Court has not evaluated the substance of the claims at all.
A Tool, Not an Argument
At the same time, another aspect must not be overlooked: counterclaims of this nature almost inevitably become instruments of political and informational manipulation. For the Russian authorities, the objective is not to prevail in court. Rather, it is to construct in the public sphere the illusion of “two equal narratives,” a “dispute between parties,” and supposed “legal ambiguity.”
Within propaganda discourse, the phrase “the Court admitted the counterclaim” is readily transformed into “an international judicial body is examining Ukraine’s alleged genocide.” Legal nuance disappears, replaced by a convenient political narrative.
This does not suggest that the ICJ misunderstands the situation in Ukraine. It demonstrates that the Court’s procedural neutrality does not protect its actions from distortion outside the courtroom.
What Must Be Clearly Stated
At the level of judicial proceedings, nothing of substance has changed. Ukraine continues to hold a strong legal position. Russia’s allegations of “genocide” remain entirely unsubstantiated. What lies ahead are years of written pleadings, legal argumentation, and sustained juridical work.
At the level of public discourse, however, such counterclaims will continue to be deployed as a smokescreen. This is precisely why it is crucial to clearly distinguish law from propaganda and to avoid attributing political meaning to procedural decisions.
The International Court of Justice is not a tribunal of public opinion.
Its technical steps should not be interpreted as assessments of factual reality.
A Systemic Strategy, Not a Situational Reaction
It would also be a mistake to underestimate Russia’s legal strategy. It is not a reactive measure prompted by the full-scale invasion of 2022, but rather a long-term, systematic approach developed since the beginning of the war in 2014. Over the years, Russian state bodies, affiliated structures, and quasi-judicial institutions have deliberately produced extensive bodies of so-called “evidence” that fail to meet basic investigative standards, yet are presented as legally significant materials. These materials have never been intended to establish truth; instead, they function as tools of information warfare, both domestically and internationally.
Today, this strategy has taken on an even more dangerous dimension. Russian authorities systematically initiate fabricated criminal proceedings, stage sham trials, bring politically motivated charges, and issue “verdicts” in blatant violation of the right to a fair trial. These actions are not designed to substantiate a legal position but to undermine trust in international justice itself. Their aim is to create the false impression that international judicial mechanisms are discredited, politicised, or incapable of distinguishing law from propaganda.
In this sense, counterclaims, pseudo-legal documents, and procedural manipulations are not arguments but instruments of a broader strategy of lawfare. The objective is not victory in court, but the erosion of the very criteria of truth, responsibility, and institutional legitimacy – so that in the public sphere, law appears as merely one more “version of events,” placed on the same footing as outright disinformation.