Why Did Trump Win And What Are The Risks For Ukraine Now?

Donald Trump's return to the White House has turned from a “terrifying” probability into a harsh reality. The “best president” in US history has not been deterred by his opponents' accusations of incompetence, narcissism, authoritarianism and even fascism. Nor was he prevented by numerous run-ins with the law.

A detailed analysis of the reasons that allowed Trump to return to Pennsylvania Avenue is yet to come, when the entire array of election statistics becomes known. In particular, the extent to which he managed to break up the Democratic electoral coalition by increasing his support among black men, Hispanics and young Americans. One way or another, Trump won an extremely convincing victory over Kamala Harris despite a very intense election campaign. Compared to 2016, he won a majority of votes nationwide. Trump can also add a landslide victory for the Republicans in the Senate race to his political “basket.” The final balance of power in the House of Representatives is still unknown, but here, too, the Republicans have a chance to retain their majority.

It is already clear that the “Trump phenomenon” cannot be reduced to a coincidence, the specifics of the US electoral system or the miscalculations of rivals in the election race, such as Joe Biden's remark that Trump's supporters are “trash.”

The success of Donald Trump's “system” reflects the political, social and cultural polarization of American society based on deep socioeconomic shifts.

Radical demographic changes are taking place: the ethno-racial composition of the population is changing; new generations of Americans (the so-called millennials and Generation Z) are increasingly influencing the life of the country; the proportion of immigrants is growing. Accordingly, the composition of the electorate is changing — in individual states and in the country as a whole.

These processes are taking place against the backdrop of important structural changes in the US economy. The process of its deindustrialization continues, causing the degradation of entire sectors. As a result, the fragmentation of society is increasing, dividing it into those who have taken full advantage of the opportunities of the “new economy” (for example, IT and other advanced technologies, service sector workers concentrated in large urban agglomerations) and those who have found themselves on the margins of social and economic life. The income gap within American society is growing, the usual social “elevators” are not working well and, to some extent, the new elites and the majority of the population live in parallel worlds with different social and cultural values.

The basis for the political career of the winner of the current presidential race was the fact that he was able to correctly understand the mood of uncertainty and even fear of his key electorate, consisting of lower middle-class white Americans without higher education, who are very sensitive to the destruction of their usual way of life and threats to “traditional values” from liberal elites. The super-rich Trump has managed to create an image of an outsider and become the voice of the mood of the deep, “real” America, voicing simplistic, demagogic (for example, his promise to immediately end inflation) but understandable answers to the pressing issues of everyday life. Recently, the narrative of being a victim of “politically motivated persecution” has been added to this, which has only strengthened the emotional connection between the candidate and his fan club.

I would like to quote analysts from CNN, which is opposed to Trump, which tried to determine what makes him attractive to some voters: “If the ideology of urban [United States] citizens is not much different from that of London, Paris or Berlin, the spirit of pioneering still lives on in the great middle America. Here, guns, God and traditional white values define the culture and fuel the sympathy of conservative evangelical voters for the former president. This is where Trump's slogans ‘Make America Great Again’ and ‘America First’ in foreign policy resonate. The fact that his behavior and policies are disgusting to moderates and liberals on the East and West coasts and in the media only increases Trump's popularity.”

During the election, he managed not only to mobilize his base but also to motivate those voters who usually do not participate in voting despite sharing his views. On the other hand, Kamala Harris apparently failed to win over Republicans who dislike Trump but are not ready to support political opponents. The majority of American voters prefer the former president in addressing their priority issues, such as the economy and immigration.

Trump was favored by a kind of nostalgia among the American public for the standard of living during his term, i.e., before the Covid pandemic. The Democrats were not helped by arguments referring to positive macroeconomic indicators and the strengthening of US leadership in the global economy, a significant decline in inflation and the adoption of important laws in the interests of American workers and the middle class. All of these were offset by American dissatisfaction with rising prices for basic goods, fuel and housing. The overwhelming majority of Americans believe that the situation in the country is miserable and that the United States is developing in the wrong direction: these sentiments correspond to the extremely pessimistic, almost apocalyptic rhetoric of the Republican candidate's campaign speeches.

Trump managed to squeeze the maximum political dividends out of the immigration crisis, turning it into the main element of attacks on Harris, who was appointed by Biden to be responsible for streamlining the situation in this area. He successfully promoted the statement that the current administration was directly responsible for the crisis, as it failed to reduce the number of illegal immigrants and overcome the chaos at the border. Throughout the campaign, the candidate himself and his team members stoked the negative emotions of ordinary Americans in every way possible, regularly using offensive, openly xenophobic language and often spreading fake information about immigrants. A significant number of Americans support Trump's intention to carry out mass deportations of illegal immigrants.

It must also be noted that the Democrats' strategy of turning the next election into a referendum on Trump's personality and policies, highlighting the threats that his return to power would pose to American democracy, its institutions, and individual freedoms, with an emphasis on further restrictions on women's “reproductive rights,” has not proven effective. Democrats have also made significant efforts to compromise Trump's intellectual capacity, to portray him as a mentally unbalanced, unpredictable person who does not meet the requirements for the office of the US president, unlike Harris, who they tried to present as a carrier of change, a representative of a new cohort of political leaders.

I think that the very near future, after the inauguration of the new president (January 20, 2025), will show whether, as political opponents claim, the program of Trump's new term will be determined by the ultra-conservative and authoritarian ideas formulated in Project 2025, a document prepared by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank close to Trump. It will also be clear what his phrases about a “presidency of revenge,” his desire to “be a dictator on day one” and to confront “enemies from within” are really worth.

No less important, if these fears are justified, is how effectively American democratic institutions will be able to resist the authoritarian impulses of Trump, who is entering his new term of office better prepared and even angrier than in 2016. Much also depends on the new composition of the US Congress. The main thing in this respect is whether the so-called divided government, when at least one of the houses of Congress is controlled by the opposition party, will continue to exist.

Those who, like us, are watching the drama of the American elections from the outside, of course, are mainly interested in what the foreign policy of the old new US president will be and how it will affect Ukraine.

At the moment, the answer to this question can only be very approximate, given that the bulk of Trump's foreign policy statements have been aimed at scathing criticism of the current administration and promoting the idea that “If I had been president, this horror would not have happened.” When trying to outline the contours of the new administration's foreign policy, one must take into account the personality of the president, who is characterized by a tendency to be guided by emotions, personal preferences, and intuition in the decision-making process, often without taking into account the opinions of experts. This factor is even more important than during Trump's first presidency, given the extremely limited presence of “adult” competent people in his current environment who can convince the president.

Nevertheless, let's try to assess what the president-elect's positions on important foreign policy issues look like now, based on statements by Trump himself, vice presidential candidate James Vance, who often seems to act as an interpreter of the president's words, and a lengthy article in the authoritative Foreign Affairs magazine by President Trump's latest national security adviser, Robert O'Brien, who is expected to be the secretary of state or defense in the new cabinet.

The slogan “Peace through Strength” is increasingly being used to describe foreign policy in general, which should neutralize accusations of Trump's opportunism and isolationism by political rivals. O'Brien writes that Trump's policy is based on a return to realism in accordance with President Andrew Jackson's postulate: “Be focused and strong when circumstances demand it, but avoid unnecessary action.”

US foreign policy will remain China-centered. Compared to Biden, Trump plans to pursue a tougher line aimed at separating the American and Chinese economies, including the possible introduction of a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods (tariffs are seen by Trump as an effective means of negotiating pressure) and tighter export controls. In contrast to Trump's previous statements, which could be interpreted as an unwillingness to commit to Taiwan's defense, O'Brien writes about a reaffirmation of the commitment, but links it to an increase in Taiwan's defense spending.

The main direction of the Middle East policy is to put maximum pressure on Iran by tightening sanctions against its oil and gas sector. Containing Iran is the key to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Support for Israel remains unchanged.

A crucial story (for Ukraine as well) is how transatlantic relations will unfold. On the one hand, at the end of the presidential race, the winning team made some efforts to refute accusations that Trump was committed to isolationism and did not pay enough attention to ties with allies: “America first does not mean America alone.” Vance was adamant that the Trump administration would fulfill its NATO commitments. At the same time, the new administration is firmly insisting that NATO allies increase their contribution to strengthening the Alliance's combat capabilities. According to O'Brien, “America's defense of Europe is contingent on Europe doing its part,” including helping Ukraine. He even called for our country's immediate admission to the EU, but said nothing about joining NATO.

No less than the curtailment of security cooperation and the reduction of US involvement in NATO, European partners fear the resumption of trade conflicts and new tariff wars, the possibility of which Trump himself “transparently” hinted at in a number of his speeches.

Now about the Ukrainian issue. If we analyze all the often contradictory statements made by Trump and his inner circle, we can draw the following conclusions.

Perhaps for the first time, during Vance's interview with CBS, Trump's team actually admitted that Russia's invasion of Ukraine took place (Trump never publicly retracted his earlier words about Putin's “brilliant” decision to seize Donbas). At the same time, he emphasized that Putin is an adversary, but not an enemy: The United States is not at war with Russia. It is worth noting that despite the very harsh characterization of the Russian dictator, the current administration has also repeatedly emphasized that it is not at war with Russia, which is defined as a “threat” in the US National Security Strategy.

Trump believes that US spending on aid to Ukraine is excessive, so a significant reduction in its volume seems quite realistic, especially given the mood among Republicans in the US House of Representatives. The president-elect opposes its continuation on a gratuitous basis: he does not rule out its implementation in the form of loans or if such assistance is financed by European countries (O'Brien writes about this).

The central part of Trump's “peace plan for Ukraine” is to achieve an end to the war through negotiations between the Ukrainian and Russian sides. He regularly evades discussing the parameters of the plan. Vance did it for him: a ceasefire, a demilitarized zone along the contact line, the actual continuation of Russia's occupation of the occupied territories and Ukraine's non-accession to NATO. Those Western analysts who called the proposals voiced by Vance “Putin's plan” were right, as they could not be more contrary to Ukraine's national interests.

I believe that Trump will make every effort to end the war in Ukraine under any circumstances, without caring about our problems or long-term strategy. He desperately needs to free his hands to act on the Chinese direction and within the United States. In this context, military assistance to Ukraine may become a hostage to the new president's “peacekeeping” scenarios.

Thus, Trump's return to the US presidency poses real risks for Ukraine: he does not believe that Ukraine can win, and he will not make extra efforts to achieve that victory. Could his behavior be influenced by factors such as his unwillingness to be seen as a “weakling” or “Putin's henchman” in the eyes of the Americans and the world, as well as the Chinese trace in Russia's war against Ukraine? This cannot be ruled out, but it is also impossible to predict, given Trump's volatility.

To a large extent, our relations with the new old president and his team will depend on the willingness of the Ukrainian side to offer its own solutions to pressing problems and to strengthen the domestic component of the “victory plan.” Reforms, especially the effective fight against corruption, will remain on the agenda of bilateral relations. This issue is especially important because it is used as a killer argument by those trying to justify the reduction of US aid to Ukraine. It is possible that someone in Kyiv now hopes that Washington will pay less attention to Ukraine's democratic development, from press freedom and judicial independence to anti-corruption institutions. But even if the democratic component of bilateral relations is less important to the Trump administration than it was to its predecessor, it is certain that any slip-up by Kyiv will be used against Ukraine.