Breaking Down Russia’s Daily War Costs in Ukraine

Do you know how much Russia is paying for Putin’s ambition to reshape the world order, restore the Russian Empire and etch his name into history?

War is an expensive endeavor. Costs escalate quickly when it drags on for years, spans vast territories, involves extensive equipment and hundreds of thousands of personnel, and takes place under economic sanctions and low oil prices.

According to Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, as cited by ZN.UA, the Kremlin is spending 13.1 percent of Russia’s GDP—or 68 percent of all federal budget expenditures—on the war against Ukraine. In other words, two out of every three rubles are used to pull the trigger on Ukraine. For comparison, in 2021 Russia allocated just 3.6 percent of GDP to defense. Additional funds are drawn from regional budgets for contract signing bonuses, medical rehabilitation for the wounded, etc.

On average, Russia spends $857 million per day on the war. That’s $25.729 billion per month, or $308.757 billion annually. Since February 2022, Russia’s total war expenditure has reached approximately $1 trillion (!).

Where do Russian taxpayers’ rubles go?

According to the Main Intelligence Directorate, the largest share of annual spending—$143.7 billion or 47 percent of total war expenses—goes to fulfilling the state defense order ($77.6 billion), maintaining and developing the defense-industrial complex ($32.1 billion); purchasing arms and ammunition from North Korea and Iran ($22.3 billion), constructing military infrastructure, including fortifications ($11.6 billion). In short, nearly half of all military expenditures go toward weapons production and procurement.

The second-largest spending category is support for Russia’s strike force operating in Ukraine, totaling $103.6 billion annually (or 34 percent of total costs). This includes combat losses of weapons and equipment ($38 billion), ammunition and hardware used ($42.5 billion), use of high-precision weapons ($14.9 billion), fuel and lubricants ($8.1 billion).

A significant share of the budget is spent on sustaining personnel.

According to the Main Intelligence Directorate, until recently, 972,400 Russian troops were engaged in the war against Ukraine, including senior and high-ranking officers (44,300), junior officers (43,100), warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers (885,000).

Based on this force size and combat intensity, personnel costs amount to $50.7 billion per year, or 16 percent of total war spending. This includes one-time signing bonuses ($10.18 billion), salaries ($27.147 billion), food ($1.1 billion), uniforms and protective gear ($1 billion), weapons provision ($848 million), combat training ($2.12 billion), compensation for injuries and deaths ($8.27 billion).

According to the Main Intelligence Directorate, average monthly salaries in the so-called “special military operation zone,” including combat bonuses, are as follows: senior/high-ranking officers — 330,000 rubles (~$4,100); junior officers — 277,000 rubles (~$3,400), sergeants and soldiers — 225,000 rubles (~$2,800). A one-time payout for a fallen soldier is 5 million rubles; for injuries, 1–4 million rubles.

Signing a first contract with the Ministry of Defense grants a federal bonus amounting to 400,000 rubles and a regional bonus at an average of 2 million rubles. These large sums strain regional budgets. According to Important Stories, a Russian investigative outlet, 374,200 to 407,200 people signed such contracts in 2024. As a result, 10 regions have cut contract-related payments for 2025.

A notable budget item are payments to North Korean soldiers. This is the first time Russia is officially paying one of the world’s poorest countries for manpower. Ukraine’s military intelligence reports that Moscow paid $525.6 million for the deployment of 12,000 DPRK troops in Russia’s Kursk region; an additional $60 million was paid for casualties among these forces.

Another cost comes in the form of maintaining the so-called “new territories”—the temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine—which draws $10 billion annually from the Russian federal budget.

All of this adds up to astronomical expenses.

It’s not political pressure or sanctions—but money and economic conditions—that could force the Kremlin to pause the war, even if not end it outright.

This is likely the basis for Andrii Yermak’s recent optimism: the head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office told ambassadors that “there is hope the fighting will stop within two months.”

Guns or bread?

Ukraine has found an unexpected ally: Russia’s depleted federal budget, increasingly buckling under the weight of rising military costs.

After the full-scale invasion, the Russian government managed to keep the economy afloat—even achieving growth, largely driven by war-related spending. But signs of slowdown are now undeniable. Forecasts suggest GDP growth will shrink to 1.3–1.5 percent, far below previous levels. Economy Minister Maksim Reshetnikov has warned that Russia is teetering on the edge of recession.

Having earlier “cooled” the economy, Russian authorities are now trying to “reheat” it. Last week, the Central Bank slashed the key interest rate from 20 to 18 percent to stimulate loans and boost activity. But this also risks causing accelerated inflation, a weaker ruble and lower returns on savings. Current annual inflation is hovering around 9.4 percent.

Meanwhile, the federal budget is under pressure from surging expenditures (especially on war), falling oil and gas revenues and depleting sovereign reserves. As of mid-2025, the budget deficit hit 3.7 trillion rubles (~$47 billion) or 1.7 percent of GDP—six times higher than in the first half of 2024. Liquid assets in the National Wealth Fund have dropped significantly since February 2022.

According to Central Bank head Elvira Nabiullina, the financial resources that allowed Russia’s economy to grow during wartime have now been exhausted. As ZN.UA previously noted, Russia now faces a crossroads: end the war and conflict with the West or continue the so-called “special military operation” and risk irreversible damage to the economy. Some Russian elites are signaling a shift toward ending the campaign.

Putin, however, is eager to sit at the table with Trump and Xi Jinping as a peer among “superpowers” to divide the world. And the situation on the front, where Russian forces are steadily breaching Ukrainian defenses and seizing new kilometers of territory each day, clearly serves as an argument for Putin in favor of choosing guns over bread. Moreover, Ukraine’s economy is in worse shape, with fewer resources, despite spending only a third as much on the war.

Still, the financial burden may compel Putin—who seeks to go down in history, if not as the restorer of the Russian Empire, then at least as the reviver of the USSR, following in the footsteps of Peter the Great, Catherine the Great and Stalin—to slow down and listen to Trump with his new deadline: not to end the war, not to abandon the plan to dismantle Ukrainian statehood, but merely to take a breather—to save the Russian economy, replenish the budget and rebuild the military-industrial complex for a prolonged confrontation with the West. And once he has regained strength, to resume hostilities against Ukraine and the West in a few years.

For the Kremlin, it would be a tactical pause, not a strategic retreat. In Russia, unlike human lives, money still matters. And spending nearly $1 billion a day is incredibly, unbearably costly. The more expensive this war becomes, the higher the chances that Putin’s ambitions will collapse, along with Russia itself.