Our state is still far from healthy; at this very moment, we are lying on the operating table with our heart exposed. And yet we already carry within us a genetic code that blocks authoritarianism. This cannot be undone, even if someone once again thinks they have the world by the tail. Not the world—and not by the tail.
We are hardly going to regret the fact that Yermak let Zelenskyy down and their house of cards has collapsed. One can only regret that it happened insanely late. We cannot bring back the national strength that slipped through our fingers, nor the kilometres of our land that have been abandoned, nor the lives lost as the price of the alliance between the president and the head of his office—the price of their joint personnel selections and the decisions they made or failed to make, whose absence the country felt acutely.
Yermak should have resigned much earlier. And, fundamentally, a person so unprepared for such a volume of power and state responsibility should, a priori, never have taken this post. Nevertheless, the separation of the Siamese twins occurred only when the president had no other way to save himself—to leave history of his own accord, rather than be expelled from it.
Why has Yermak still not received a notice of suspicion? Has the system he built for Zelenskyy really collapsed, rather than simply wobbled? Will Yermak’s departure become a chance for Ukraine to reformat power and bring the president back within the constitutional framework? Will we, having flipped the negotiation board—now without “extra questions from partners to Ukraine”—be able to exit the war knowing exactly who and how will rebuild the country?
Operation Midas: the shattering follow-up
We reported that the heads of NABU and SAPO had warned the president about potential suspicions concerning Andrii Yermak and Rustem Umerov the day after Umerov was summoned for questioning—and two days before searches targeted the head of the Presidential Office. The data came from several independent sources, including within law enforcement, and were clearly of public interest. At that stage, publication could no longer influence the course of investigative actions, but it was crucial for assessing the president’s political behaviour after learning that his closest associates might be implicated in corruption. The president then decided to appoint Yermak and Umerov as heads of the Ukrainian negotiating delegation. His desire to save his people by bringing them into the negotiation team speaks for itself.
On the morning of 28 November, NABU detectives, with the authorisation of SAPO chief Oleksandr Klymenko, arrived in the government quarter to conduct searches at the residence of Andrii Yermak, chief of the president’s staff. According to updated information, the searches took place in the apartment of his parents in the government quarter, where he spends the night. (But not always, since Yermak could spend the night either on Bankova Street or in the government complex in Koncha-Zaspa, in the house next to the president’s.) There were no searches at his workplace or at his actual residence on Bankova. Yermak himself also stated that the searches were taking place at his home. Before NABU and SAPO officially confirmed what was happening, the Ukrainska Pravda newspaper, whose journalist was on the scene, was the first to report the detectives’ visit to Yermak. After that, a number of outlets accused NABU of leaking information and practising double standards.
However, it is objectively not in NABU’s interest to leak such information, as this could damage the operation. The fact that certain media have the resources to conduct 24/7 external surveillance of the government quarter and of key figures in NABU cases is the work of journalists, not “double standards” by anticorruption bodies. A leak is the transmission of confidential procedural information. Observing public movements is professional media activity.
On the same day, our sources reported that the National Anti-Corruption Bureau was preparing a notice of suspicion for Andrii Yermak. It may be linked to his interest in one of the houses of the Dynastiia (Dynasty) cooperative. According to our information, this connection may have been captured on recordings made in the apartment of the main star of Operation Midas—the president’s friend, Tymur Mindich. We are talking about houses on the territory of the former Soniachna (Sunny) recreation base. As Bihus.info established back in the summer, a company associated with former deputy prime minister Oleksii Chernyshov is building four large mansions on eight hectares of land on the banks of the Dnipro river.
At the time of publication, a notice of suspicion had not yet been served to the now former head of the Presidential Office, Andrii Yermak. There are several explanations for this. NABU does not always serve notices of suspicion on the same day as searches, even though it tries to follow this rule. For example, in the case of the president’s close associate, Chernyshov learned about the essence of the anticorruption bodies’ claims only four months later. But the status and scale of the head of the Presidential Office—whom the president dismissed without waiting for an official suspicion—objectively oblige NABU not to drag its feet with the document. All the more so because, according to some sources, the suspicion was already prepared by the time the searches began. If that is true, what prevented it from being served?
As well-informed interlocutors note, on the day of the searches the president had a meeting with the heads of NABU and SAPO. Several sources confirmed this fact to us. As for the claim that an understanding was allegedly reached at the meeting—that Yermak would not receive a notice of suspicion in exchange for the Security Service (SSU) refraining from pursuing SAPO head Oleksandr Klymenko—only one source maintains this. At the same time, eyewitnesses maintain that Oleksandr Poklad, First Deputy Head of the SSU, was fully poised to launch an operation to remove Klymenko from his post. It is therefore reasonable to assume that NABU had to rush the searches at Yermak’s place in order to get ahead of the SBU. In the event of Klymenko’s suspension and the absence of a first deputy (Andrii Syniuk had resigned voluntarily so as not to interfere with the investigation into his possible involvement in leaks), the duties of the chief anticorruption prosecutor would fall to Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko. That would have permanently blocked NABU’s path to Yermak.
As for the suspicion against Klymenko and its potential “trade-off” for Yermak, this version can exist only as long as NABU has not served Yermak with a suspicion. The heads of the anticorruption agencies have not commented publicly on the delay. Yet this version does not fit into the broader picture in which the heads of NABU and SAPO crossed their Rubicon of fear long ago. Their consistent actions in relation to high-ranking officials confirm this. Klymenko has repeatedly stated in public that any falsified suspicion against him would have no practical weight.
At the same time, there is an opinion that by dismissing Yermak, Zelenskyy cut against the grain and essentially took a move to dismantle the system. In that light, such a favour to the president on the part of the anticorruption bodies may have its logic. “Sometimes, to achieve greater goals, you have to enter into certain understandings,” experienced observers reflect. “The trouble is, it is always hard to know whether this is truly an exceptional case and whether it will become the first step toward a destructive tradition,” others add. “If we follow this conspiratorial logic, in order to secure such ‘exchanges’ the president’s security forces could churn out five cases a month and bargain with NABU. That is simply impossible and looks more like an attempt to sow distrust in the anticorruption bodies out of thin air, when NABU and SAPO have quite different, real problems,” a third group concludes.
What NABU and SAPO are doing now is unprecedented and critically important for the state. No, the war is not a reason to halt anticorruption processes; on the contrary, it nudges the governance system onto a strengthening track. No, the actions of NABU and SAPO do not hinder negotiations; they signal to partners that institutions in Ukraine are functioning and that we are not Russia. Reinstating the rules in wartime is a measure of our resilience and of our clear understanding of just how deeply corruption damages the country.
At the same time, it is extremely important for NABU and SAPO to stick to restrained, legally precise communication. In the pursuit of justice, it is easy to cross a line that will create risks for the case in court or develop a sense of self-inflation. That, too, can be fatal.
Why the system has really collapsed
One of the first versions circulating online had it that Yermak would allegedly remain close to Zelenskyy, but far in the shadows. Because without Yermak, Zelenskyy supposedly cannot manage not only the country, but even himself. I will have to please (or disappoint) supporters of this scenario: Zelenskyy and Yermak parted on very bad terms. Witnesses speak of a scandal, recriminations, insults and even tears. And this happened not on the day of the searches, when the “roof” over the negotiating team finally sprang a leak, but the day before.
In recent months, Yermak had been looking for ways to stay on and preserve the system. According to our information, he did indeed have contacts with Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and he warned the frontrunner in the presidential polls that he might receive an offer from the president to become prime minister. However, sources say that when Zaluzhnyi met Zelenskyy during his most recent visit to Kyiv, the question of changing his status as ambassador to the UK did not come up.
It is hard to say what exactly the now diplomat Zaluzhnyi wanted to convey with that philosophical photo he posted in the midst of the corruption scandal at home. But something suggests he certainly did not regret refusing to become prime minister and save Zelenskyy and Yermak. Whether Zaluzhnyi understands the reasons behind the unfolding drama in Ukrainian politics and, more importantly, whether he knows how to shield himself from those who love to build endless schemes and systems is a subject for another, no less serious conversation. One that will involve very different photos and very different signals we will have to deal with if the general takes command of the state.
So what allows us to claim that the system has fallen with Yermak’s departure?
It is not just about the resignation of Yermak, who has declared that he has been slandered and that he will go to the front (one wonders whether the State Security Administration guards he unlawfully enjoyed all this time, without being on the list of protected officials, will go with him). The point lies in the combination of four factors which, taken separately, would not have shaken the system but truly brought it down together.
First, there is total exhaustion with stupidity and greed in all circles and at every level of power. From the law enforcement institutions to the army. From customs to ministers. People are tired. Tired of being powerless. Tired of constantly having to put their neck on the line. Tired of having to share. Tired of never knowing what the new rules will be tomorrow. Tired of being loaded with responsibility while no one protects you. It was a system in which state decisions were made by two actors, while everyone else was merely treated as objects.
Second, there is Mindichgate. The anticorruption bodies destroyed the untouchability of the “masters of life.” When Chernyshov, Shurma, Mindich and, as a bonus, Halushchenko came under fire, it became clear to everyone that “Akela had missed his kill.” And, most importantly, that before carrying out his command—the way people previously rushed to do in competitive haste—now you had to think very hard. The first signal to the system came in the summer from people with cardboard signs. After the publication of the Mindich tapes, only a fool would blow through red lights.
Third, there is the clause about holding elections 100 days after signing a peace agreement. This is an important psychological moment. When you know that this government will end at some point, but do not know when, that is one thing. But “100 days” is a finish line already drawn: it becomes visible and tangible no matter when the agreement is signed. And you begin to conduct your politics with that finite distance in mind — thinking deliberately about how to pace yourself in order to survive it. You accelerate, slow down, shift to a walk, take a sip of water…
Fourth, Yermak’s resignation. Zelenskyy ate the pâté, and Yermak slaughtered the fluffy little rabbits. That is why a huge number of people—from Servant of the People faction leader Davyd Arakhamia and former chief of staff Andrii Bohdan to businessman Seyar Kurshutov (stripped of citizenship), anti-corruption activist Vitalii Shabunin, opposition MP Yaroslav Zhelezniak and oligarch Vadym Stolar—had reason yesterday to uncork a bottle of their favourite drink. People who live on entirely different planets felt that life in the country was changing.
In what direction? There are several possibilities. But what is certain is that the country woke up in a completely different history, where a completely different system of power will be built.
How long will this last? How will the “pie” be divided? Who will control the process so that it does not slide into chaos—in the sense that there may simply be no one left in the parliament to vote?
Reformatting power and a chance for the future
According to people in the president’s inner circle, a serious blow has been dealt to his inner foundation and his world is genuinely changing. Many believe that the starting point of the system’s reboot will be the appointment of a new head of the Presidential Office. But it is not so important who exactly will lead the office—Mykhailo Fedorov, Yuliia Svyrydenko, Kyrylo Budanov, Pavlo Palisa or Denys Shmyhal. Those are just shades. The main point is that such a degree of power concentration, unquestioned and unchallengeable, will no longer exist in this country for the remainder of Zelenskyy’s term.
Let us, however, assume that among the figures listed above, the president does settle on the last one. Several points then need to be outlined.
First, on the one hand, the current defence minister Shmyhal is hardly a newcomer. He spent almost five years heading the Cabinet of Ministers, within which Mindich and Co were building their schemes. Under him, the government lost its agency and became fully subordinated to Yermak. On the other hand, it was bureaucrat Shmyhal who held together the extremely complex organism of the Cabinet, which suffered clots, haemorrhages, aneurysms, strokes and heart attacks. The president’s friends drained its blood, forced it to drink, smoke, take drugs—and Shmyhal still had to do something with that body. To keep it breathing. So if our institutions still function at all, the record in the employment book should go to the former prime minister.
Second, behind Shmyhal stands the head of the Servant of the People faction, Davyd Arahamia, thanks to whom the prime minister held on to his chair for so many years. And a whole host of “magnet people” who know how to attract money to their hands. But in his orbit there are also those who are still capable of changing magnetic fields. Shmyhal entered the Ministry of Defence in opposition to Rustem Umerov and Oleksandr Kamyshin, having allied himself with Fedorov. And if, in the defence industry, Shmyhal and Fedorov were primarily interested in results and only secondarily in money, Umerov and Kamyshin had the opposite priorities. And that is unmistakably a substantial difference.
What scales Zelenskyy will use to weigh this choice is an open question. It is quite possible that the already toxic conspirator Arahamia will outweigh Shmyhal’s managerial qualities and candidacy, and these will be brushed aside. And that, for example, Budanov’s reputation will be placed at the centre—as that of a man who could pull the office and the president up to his level. What happens then to the Defence Intelligence Directorate, which is “a state within a state,” is another question.
In any case, the immediate task for the Presidential Office is to get its house in order and restore the office’s functionality. The next step will be the return of real agency to the parliament: the budget vote will be its first test. Not only in terms of whether the “Servants” will continue to receive payments, but also whether MPs—should those payments stop—will be capable of uniting to support the president and act in the country’s interest. Even if some are already looking to leap into what they believe is a more promising political carriage.
Inevitably, we will see a reformatting of the government and a shift of the centre of gravity toward the Cabinet. The quality of this reboot will once again depend on the parliament, where opposition factions will also play their role. It is still difficult to predict in what format their interaction with the ruling party—now going through a deep crisis—will continue. But for the opposition, this too is a test: of active, not merely declarative, love for Ukraine.
Perhaps it is precisely now that both the president and Valerii Zaluzhnyi should return to the conversation that was planned but never took place. You can imagine for yourself what kind of prime minister the former commander of the Ukrainian army would make. But any senior public office that Zelenskyy could offer him would lift people’s spirits. Because today Zaluzhnyi enjoys more trust than anyone else.
…Finding ourselves in the midst of overlapping crises—in foreign policy, domestic politics, military sphere and energy system—we are left with only two anchors gripping the ground beneath us: the Armed Forces of Ukraine and President Zelenskyy. Paradoxical and dramatic as that may sound, these are the only forces holding the country’s line. And they demand unwavering, unconditional support from every branch of power and from society at large. The parliament must therefore reach an agreement. It must pass the budget and ensure a proper reshuffle of the Cabinet of Ministers. It must remove from power those on whom the system rested. Whether it’s done according to Zhelezniak’s lists or NABU’s suspicions is less important. (According to our information, the anti-Yermak front will not calm down until Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Kuleba and head of the State Financial Monitoring Service Filip Pronin are dismissed.) The parliament must also act fairly in relation to NABU detective Ruslan Mahamedrasulov, who took part in Operation Midas and is being held in a pre-trial detention centre thanks to the efforts of the SSU and Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko. What matters is to act. Because we are building our future right now.
Ukraine’s bifurcation point is not the juncture where the size of the territory we retain is determined. It is the point at which we decide what we will build on this land and whether we can change the quality of what we have been building so far.
The earliest stirrings of this change are emerging right before our eyes. They are incredibly fragile: under altered circumstances, NABU could be crushed. If nothing changes, NABU and SAPO, having played their part in history, may fail to make it through the hell and high water ahead and end up destroying themselves. But if change becomes deliberate rather than emotional, then by preserving independent anticorruption agencies we will, if not curb corruption, at least be able to keep it under control. And that, in turn, would allow us to bring into power people who think not of enriching themselves, but of the country’s glory.
And even if their own glory is on their mind as well that is a different quality of power, when people enter politics to achieve something, not to get rich. This is what we can create. Our country is full of people who have long since “stagnated,” but could be of great use to it. They are beginning to breathe again. They are beginning to allow themselves the thought that they might enter public service. They had rejected that idea long ago. Now they may start to consider it once more—for there might be someone not only to listen to them, but also to hear them.
Out of today, a new Project Ukraine may be born.
Not Anti-Russia, not pro-Europe and not pro-America.
A project called Ukraine—one that will finally be built up, rather than torn apart.