Why Ukraine needs civilian control over the army to win

The need for democratic civilian control over the security and defense sector is not always obvious to everyone, but it is a necessary thing. It is not about the interference of civilians in the affairs of the military, but about the fact that the army should serve society. And for this, the civilian government elected by the people in free elections must have proper control mechanisms over the security forces. But, of course, it is correct to use them.

Questions arise: to what extent is it expedient to intervene in defense affairs? What and which people depend on the performance of tasks in this area? What should and can be democratic control over the army during war? All this is not about intervention, but about how democratic civilian control, in particular parliamentary control, can strengthen the defense sphere.

 

Democratic civilian control of the defense forces – what it is and why it is needed

Why should the civilian government control the army at all? As the history of the formation of military dictatorships shows, the army without democratic control becomes a self-governing institution and can seize power. Therefore, democratic civilian control is designed to ensure the rule of law, actions consistent with legality, accountability and transparency of security and defense sector bodies.

However, when we talk about parliamentary control over the security and defense sector, we are talking not only about what happens in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations, but also about their political and administrative leadership.

According to the Ukrainian law, the general political leadership of the defense sphere is carried out by the president. The Minister of Defense of Ukraine is responsible for military, political and administrative leadership. Therefore, their activities in this area are also subject to democratic control. And they, like the highest military officials, bear political and legal responsibility for their decisions and actions in the field of defense.

Only under such conditions can civilian control strengthen the national security of the state and its Defense Forces of Ukraine.

All countries need this control. The weaker the democracies and the more powerful the combat potential of the army, the more reliable the control should be.

The cornerstone of democratic civil control is the activity of the parliament. In our Western partners, parliamentarians pass the necessary laws, have a decisive influence on the approval of military budgets, control spending, influence participation in peacekeeping operations and work on recommendations to improve the security sector.

The newest Ukrainian state began its formation with the fact that the former departments of the Soviet Union became Ukrainian. The new structures of an independent democratic state (both civil and military) were to become fundamentally different in nature, but this essence could not be expected to change overnight.

To understand what is the problem with civilian and in particular parliamentary control today, a brief excursion into history is needed. After all, for 32 years, the wording of the Constitution was changed, various laws came into force and expired. And until the beginning of the invasion of the Russian Federation in 2014, the state of the army was not a priority either for the parliament or for society in general.

 

Parliament and the army: how the patterns of their interaction changed

The modern history of democratic civilian control over the sphere of defense can be conventionally divided into three stages. The first – from the gaining of independence to the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996. At that time, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine had a decisive influence on the security sector (at least de jure). The Parliament of Ukraine approved the most important strategic documents, appointed the Minister of Defense of Ukraine and the military leadership.

The second stage – after the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996. The President received the powers of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and general leadership in defense matters. And he appointed the Minister of Defense and the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine without the approval of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The role of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is to annually approve the share of the state budget for defense needs and determine the maximum number of Ukrainian Armed Forces.

After the changes to the Constitution of Ukraine in 2004 and the transformation of Ukraine into a parliamentary-presidential republic, proper parliamentary control was formally born, and with the coming to power of Viktor Yanukovych and the return to the original version of the Constitution of Ukraine, it disappeared as a phenomenon. "The appointment of defense ministers with Russian citizenship, namely people like Dmytro Salamatin and Pavlo Lebedev, is a consequence of the lack of parliamentary control," Ihor Kozii notes.

The thing is not only in the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996, which allowed the president to independently appoint the minister of defense. In general, the authorities after 2010 were oriented towards close cooperation with the Russian Federation, and the parliamentary majority behaved accordingly. Thus, the parliament ratified the Kharkiv agreements, which provided for the extension of the stay of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, and later approved the reduction of the army and funds for its maintenance. As a result of this destructive activity, in 2013 the number of soldiers in the Armed Forces of Ukraine decreased to the lowest figure in the history of independent Ukraine, namely to 165 thousand people. Today it is already obvious that the vertical of Viktor Yanukovych's power controlled the destruction of the Defense Forces of Ukraine.

The third stage of democratic civilian control over the sphere of security and defense begins in 2014. Representatives of the Ukrainian Parliament returned the 2004 Constitution of Ukraine and restored formal opportunities for control. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine again acquired the authority to appoint the Minister of Defense of Ukraine and control his work. And in 2018, the parliamentary majority focused on Euro-Atlantic integration adopted the law on national security, according to which the introduction of democratic civilian control based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) models began.

 

What changed after 2018

According to the current law on national security, compliance with the principles of democratic civilian control over the functioning of the security and defense sector and the use of force is one of the main principles that determine the order of state policy formation in the spheres of national security and defense.

In this Law, they tried to implement three main principles of control: subordination of the military to civilian power; civilian responsibility for the level of efficiency of law enforcement agencies; accountability of both civilian authorities and the military to civil society.

First, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine became a civilian who is exclusively engaged in political and administrative leadership in this area. The law also divided the functions of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Before the adoption of the law on national security, he exercised direct leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and planned their use. According to the law, the direct leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the General Staff is responsible for planning their military use.

Secondly, the law describes the mechanisms of control that is carried out by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and civil society.

Despite the prescribed mechanisms of democratic civilian control, there is an idea in the mass consciousness that the army is the responsibility of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine. How true is this? In addition, does the parliament have the ability to monitor the state of affairs in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in order to strengthen them?

One of the key problems of democratic civil control in the state is institutional. The President of Ukraine, who is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, is beyond any control. Parliament did not control the president under any circumstances in any field.

The lack of this control sometimes leads to the society's misunderstanding of the decisions made by the president due to the lack of proper public argumentation. In particular, it refers to the dismissal of the Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who, according to previous polls, was trusted by 92% of citizens, and 72% of respondents would have a negative attitude to his resignation from the post. So, obviously, such a decision should be better communicated, at least to reassure society.

Another example of the imperfection of democratic control is the way the president of Ukraine absolves himself of responsibility for the adoption of the law on mobilization. After all, the question of the need for mobilization is not the responsibility of the military, but of the civilian political leadership. Troops need to be replenished not for the army, but for the state, for its survival.

The third negative consequence is the interference of the president in the internal affairs of the army in violation of the principle of unity of command. There are known cases when he assigned tasks to the subordinates of the Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine directly, although he should have acted exclusively first by communicating with the latter. For example, the president instructed not only the Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine, but also the Commander of the Naval Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to prepare a set of actions to continue the work of the "grain corridor". Or gave a separate order to the commander of the Air Force of Ukraine to counter Russian attacks.

 

What parliamentary control over the army can and should be

If we talk about parliamentary control, then it is carried out by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, parliamentary committees, the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, the ombudsman and representative for the protection of the rights of military personnel, temporary special and investigative commissions, people's deputies as subjects of legislative initiative.

Parliamentary control in Ukraine means control over defense spending, political and managerial decisions of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the highest command, as well as public involvement in decision-making in this area.

Currently, the financial control of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is quite formal, because when voting for the state budget, people's deputies do not see detailed expenditures on the security sector. The problem is not that the deputies do not control the country's defense budget, but that the budget is drawn up in such a way that they cannot control it. People's elected officials pay even less attention to how this budget is executed, that is, how effectively public funds are spent.

Considering the fact that the future of our country depends on the effectiveness of spending limited funds on defense, it would be logical to expand the possibilities for controlling such expenditures. For example, the Congress of the United States of America – the federal legislature – is the primary body of civilian control over the Armed Forces. Its representatives approve military doctrine, army reform plans, and the defense budget. This is a large document with an assessment of the current state of the defense sector, a list of possible threats in the field and possible ways to overcome them, and not just some paper with rows and columns of numbers.

Another tool of parliamentary control is a summons to a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine or a specialized committee of senior officials in the field of defense. In this context, it was instructive to call the previous Minister of Defense of Ukraine, who is Oleksii Rieznikov, to provide clarifications regarding the procurement of food for the military. According to the results of this discussion, those defense purchases that do not directly affect the defense capability and security of the state were declassified. And later, the government decided that procurement of non-lethal needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will take place through the Prozorro system. This is an example of how democratic civilian control of defense works and how valuable it is in times of war and under limited financial resources.

Temporary special and investigative commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are a tool that people's deputies also use, although not too actively. For example, on February 2, 2024, the report of the temporary investigative commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the investigation of possible violations of the legislation of Ukraine in the implementation of public procurement during martial law was registered for six months of activity.

 

How can democratic civilian control over the defense sector be improved now

• Open the work of the parliament (at least partially).

The Parliament has been working in closed mode since the quarantine, that is, since 2020. Television broadcasts of the plenary sessions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, access of journalists to the sidelines (in a format agreed with security) and an hour of questions to the government are the minimum for society to have an idea of what is happening in the government in general and in the field of defense in particular. After all, mass media is also one of the tools of democratic civil control.

• Open the work of parliamentary committees.

Restoring the open work of parliamentary committees, including the defense committee, is another step that could improve democratic civilian control. For this purpose, the committee has a rather wide list of mechanisms. Its representatives can monitor the implementation of the defense budget of Ukraine, hold hearings, submit requests to the president in accordance with the constitutional procedure, interact with the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine and the Commissioner for Human Rights, send materials for response to authorities, listen to reports, etc.

• Introduce the institute of the military ombudsman.

 The military ombudsman is a specialized institute for the protection of the rights of servicemen and their families. It can become an additional mechanism of control over the observance of the rights of defenders of Ukraine on behalf of the citizens and the parliament.

Why is this so important? The Armed Forces of Ukraine is currently the largest employer in the country. And all the problems of military personnel should be taken care of by the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights, in whose office works a separate representative who specializes in the system of the security and defense sector. It is expected that they do not cope with a lot of complaints about payments, vacations, treatment, Military Medical Commissions of Ukraine, etc. In order to ensure the protection of the soldier's rights, the military ombudsman must be independent, and therefore not belong to the structure of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The creation of the post of military ombudsman was announced by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine in the fall of 2023, and was supported by the president. However, the idea was never put into practice – it deprives Ukrainian servicemen of additional legal protection enjoyed by their counterparts from many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. 

Conclusions and challenges

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia, the ineffectiveness of the Russian Federation was noted more than once. What are the dynamic protection of tanks made of egg trays and cardboard bulletproof vests worth. Bloomberg, citing sources, informs: corruption in the Chinese army has led to the fact that rockets are filled with water instead of fuel. These are examples of how a system degrades without proper democratic and civilian control.

Western armies are well-armed and soldiers are well-trained, not only because they are rich countries, but also because states have mechanisms to control defense finances, political and military leadership decisions, and the means to protect the rights of the military. Ultimately, this gives the average soldier adequate support and decent treatment from his commanders, which affects his motivation to defend his country.

The existence and effective operation of mechanisms of civilian control over power structures is necessary for Ukraine to survive in a long and exhausting war, after which the Russian Federation will not cease to be our neighbor. It is also one of the conditions for integration into the Euro-Atlantic security bloc. And the one-year national program for accelerated accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines as one of the priorities "strengthening of democratic civilian control over the Armed Forces of Ukraine."

Here it is important to note that the improvement of civilian democratic control is constantly being worked on even in the states of stable democracies, so there is no ready-made recipe for success. The main rule is the balance of the branches of government. In a balanced system, one institution controls another, and this is concrete work, the result of which is an abuse-proof security and defense sector and protected military personnel. And therefore this means the formation of an effective army.