The Second Peace Summit. What Do Ukrainians Expect from This Summit and How Did They Evaluate the First One?

Only a month has passed since the first Peace Summit in Switzerland, but Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s team is already actively preparing for the next forum.

Returning from the United States of America, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced at a press conference on Monday that in the coming months (July-September) three meetings at the level of ministers and security advisers will be held based on the results of the Swiss Summit. He also confirmed: political leaders on Bankovaya Street plan to hold the second Summit before the presidential elections in the United States of America.

And although Ukraine’s Western partners make it clear that “conferences and diplomacy” are not the best way to achieve peace, in Kyiv, it seems, they have even greater hopes for the second summit than for the inaugural one. Although, as the first rehearsal of the Peace Summit has already shown, inflated expectations lead to great disappointments.

The summit in Switzerland did not achieve the three main goals set by Kyiv. In Bürgenstock, it was not possible to rally the Global South around the Ukrainian Peace Formula, while the Formula itself did not become the main and only peace plan of the international community to end Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine. And, alas, there is still no need to talk about Putin’s complete isolation (although he is very limited in his contacts with foreign leaders).

Many states of the Global South, dependent on both China and the Russian Federation, not only continue to cooperate with Moscow, but are also increasingly vocal about the need to directly involve Russia in discussing ways to end the war in Ukraine. Initiatives for this were even heard from the rostrum of Bürgenstock.

China, while Ukraine and its partners were preparing the Peace Summit in Switzerland, managed to reshape its 12-point “peace plan” into a “joint” with Brazil “Peace Plan for the Global South” and, together with Russia, began to actively attract supporters to this alternative “peacekeeping” platform. Putin publicly supported Chinese initiatives that essentially proposed freezing the war, lifting Western sanctions against both the Russian Federation and its accomplices, ending Western military assistance to Ukraine and our country’s refusal to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Prime Minister of Hungary, currently presiding over the European Union, Viktor Orbán visited several capitals on a “peacekeeping mission” promoting Chinese-Russian plans.

It is against this background, despite considerable skepticism even from partners = both the closest and most loyal, and the most powerful, but absorbed in their own elections = that Kyiv continues to prepare the second Peace Summit.

As part of a large social study that ZN.UA conducted together with the Razumkov Center, we not only asked Ukrainians how they assessed the results of the forum in Switzerland, but also asked them: is it necessary to hold a second Peace Summit, is it worth inviting Russia to it and does it make sense for Ukraine to take part in Chinese “peace initiatives”.

Peace Summit – take-2. Is it necessary to carry it out?

From the statements of both representatives of the presidential team and Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself, we can conclude that the second Summit should be decisive: almost stopping the war and bringing long-awaited peace to Ukraine.

They started talking about the World Summit 2 in Kyiv even before the opening of the first one – apparently, presuming very modest results from the debut. In Bürgenstock, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that preparations for the next forum “will last months, not years,” since “we do not have time for long-term work.” Why all this work was not done in the year and a half that passed from the promulgation of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula to the Peace Summit in Switzerland, and now the “decisive” forum is being prepared in a hurry, the presidential team does not explain.

Although Western partners are transparently hinting to Kyiv that “any meeting must be carefully organized, with clearly defined goals and controlled expectations,” there is no talk yet of a “clear” or at least any definition of goals and “controllable” expectations.

Nevertheless, after Bürgenstock we asked the Ukrainians: “Does Ukraine need to initiate a second Peace Summit?” The majority of respondents (61.4%) supported the intentions of the president of their country, answering “Yes.” (Fig.1).

However, before that we asked them another question. Reminding fellow citizens that of the 10 points of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula, only three were submitted to the Bürgenstock Summit – on food and nuclear security, as well as the exchange of prisoners. We asked them if they believe that this summit has brought Ukraine closer to the end of the war and peace?

Almost half of the respondents (47.7%) answered “No” (Fig. 2). And only a third of respondents (33.9%) said “Yes.” It was difficult for 18.4% of the social survey participants to decide.

The way of thinking of compatriots is sometimes very difficult to understand and explain. Sociologists talk about the ambivalence of Ukrainians. Here, you can compare for yourself.

Let’s say why half (51.1%) of those who could not decide on the answer to the question “Did the Peace Summit in Switzerland bring Ukraine closer to the end of the war and peace?” believe that it is necessary to hold a second summit. One can still somehow guess about this: perhaps they do not lose hope of figuring out why these summits are needed.

Why the overwhelming majority (71.5%) of those who saw the end of the war at Bürgenstock are in favor of holding a second summit is also quite understandable: they hope to become even closer to peace.

But why did 10.9% of Ukrainians from the same number of respondents say “no” to the option of holding a second Summit? Do they really think that we are already close enough to peace?

The reasons for those 20.7% of Ukrainians who are disappointed with the results of the first summit and therefore do not see the point in holding a second one are understandable. But what motivates those 58.1% of our fellow citizens who believe that the summit in Switzerland did not bring Ukraine closer to ending the war, but are in favor of holding another peace forum? Will Hope be the last to die? Do they hope the next summit will be more successful? Perhaps these are questions for social psychologists. But be that as it may, the president has the support of Ukrainian society for holding the second Peace Summit.

Is it worth inviting Russia to this summit?

And preparations for the Summit are in full swing. In any case, the head of state convinces us of this. The schedule of upcoming meetings to develop “action plans”, announced by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky, is as follows: late July-early August – Qatar, energy security; August – Turkey, freedom of navigation/food security; September – Canada, humanitarian issues of prisoner exchange and return of children.

“After these three points, if they work,” the head of state shared his plans, “a complete plan for the implementation of all points (of the Peace Formula. – T.S.) will be ready. “I set the goal that in November we would have a fully prepared plan.” “If we implement these three points, if the plan on our part and on the part of our partners is fully prepared, I believe,” Volodymyr Zelenskyy said, “everything will be done. We will be ready to bring the second summit as close as possible. And I think that representatives of the Russian Federation should be there.”

What do Ukrainians think about Russia’s participation in world summits? Answering the question: “Do you think it was right to not invite Russia to the Peace Summit in Switzerland?”, the majority of Ukrainians (60.4%), despite the fact that, unfortunately, it was not possible to achieve complete isolation of Russia, nevertheless they answered “Yes.” (Fig. 3) A little more than a fifth of respondents (22.3%) do not consider this decision to be correct. Another 17.3% were unable to decide on their answer.

As for inviting Russia to the next Peace Summit (if it is held), Ukrainians’ rejection of such a development of events is noticeably lower than in the previous case. Although there are still more opponents of such a decision than those who agreed with the possible presence of representatives of the aggressor country at the second Peace Summit – 42.5% versus 35.6% (Fig. 4). Every fifth Ukrainian (21.9%) found it difficult to decide on the answer to this question.

Even at the final press conference in Bürgenstock, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy said about Russia’s possible presence at the World Summit 2: “This will indicate that they want peace. Their presence there will indicate that they have decided to end the war."

What exactly should change and make the Russian leadership want, if not peace, then at least participation in a peace forum initiated by Ukraine? Why will the Russian Federation suddenly agree to consider at it “action plans” drawn up not in Moscow for the implementation of the points of the Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Formula? Or what exactly should at least force the Russians to do this? There were no explanations from the team of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on this matter. Nor was it said what Kyiv’s actions would be if Russia rejected the invitation to the second Peace Summit.

By the way, the Russian Foreign Ministry already stated last week that Moscow will not participate in such events where there is a “conscious disregard for other initiatives to resolve the Ukrainian crisis” and called the Ukrainian Peace Formula “a dead end and an ultimatum.” By “other initiatives,” one must assume that they mean Russian or, at worst, Chinese.

Does Ukraine need a plan developed by China?

After Orbán’s “peacekeeping” initiative and his several foreign trips, during which the Chinese “peace initiatives” were in the suitcase of a Hungarian traveling salesman under the “peace plan” named after himself, the chief diplomat of the European Union, Josep Borrell, clearly laid out all the main points in the position of the European Union: “There is no other plan for Europe other than Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s plan. This is the only plan for us, for Europeans.”

But, alas, not for the Chinese, Brazilians, Indians, Saudis, South Africans and many other representatives of other continents. Even Switzerland, the hotelier of the first Peace Summit, made it clear at its end that it was not only the Ukrainian peace plan that was on its table. Its Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis said that he would discuss the results of the forum “with those on whose doors we knocked” (with the countries that were absent at it or did not sign its final communiqué - primarily, apparently, China, Brazil, India). Even on the final day of the Bürgenstock Summit, the head of Swiss diplomacy suggested that Russia could conduct parallel negotiations on ending the war in Ukraine, and China could lead these processes. At the same time, Ignazio Cassis noted that Switzerland would welcome alternative efforts to establish peace.

China is calmly and systematically, without fuss and unnecessary information noise, creating such an alternative platform for discussing “peace initiatives” on the “Ukrainian crisis.” China has long had its own plan and even a joint plan with Brazil, the support group of which has been encouraged to recruit applicants and remains open - mainly from the non-Western world – in defiance of the Western one. It is still unknown which of these two camps there will be more “peacekeepers” in. But Chinese active participation in ending the war in Ukraine, depending on Beijing’s plans and intentions, can either help us (which is unlikely to happen) or do a lot of harm (which is much more likely). Ukraine and the Russian Federation are just balancing weights on the scales of China in its global confrontation with the United States. The Russian “weight” for Beijing is still, alas, much heavier than the Ukrainian one.

It cannot be completely ruled out that at some stage Ukraine will be invited to take part in a “peace conference” under the auspices of China. There is a very large part of the world that listens to the voice of Beijing. Therefore, we decided to find out the opinion of Ukrainians on this matter.

But although two-thirds of Ukrainians, as the ZN.UA study showed, are fully aware of how important China’s role is in influencing Russia and, consequently, the Kremlin’s decision to continue or stop the war with Ukraine, our fellow citizens do not bother to deeply study Beijing’s position. So, to our question: “Do you know the content of China’s peace initiative, the format of which it agreed with the Russian Federation and proposed to Ukraine?” only 7.5% of respondents answered, “well known.” (Fig.5) Another 39.5% of Ukrainians “know something about it.” And more than half of the respondents (53%) were completely unaware. But there is nothing to be surprised by this state of affairs, because a year ago, during another social study commissioned by ZN.UA, it turned out that at the time of the survey, in total, more than half of our fellow citizens – 56% – had no idea about the content of the peace plan of the president of their country. In addition, 28.4% heard about it for the first time from interviewers...

However, lack of awareness did not prevent more than half of the respondents from giving a clear answer to the ZN.UA question: “Should Ukraine take part in China’s peace initiative, the format of which it agreed with Russia and proposed to Ukraine?” Only 17.4% of respondents answered “Yes”. (Fig. 6) Those who believe that Ukraine should stay away from Chinese “peace initiatives” turned out to be significantly more: 40.2% said “No.” And almost the same number (42.3%) of survey participants honestly chose “hard to decide.”

Orbán's "letters of happiness"

Viktor Orbán, either inspired by Hungary’s presidency of the European Union, or stimulated by one of his friends (Putin? Xi Jinping? Both?), of course, did not care about the opinion of Ukrainians. As well as the rules and treaties with the European Union. This caused extreme irritation in Brussels and most European capitals. They repeatedly disowned the “peacekeeping mission” of the Hungarian prime minister, emphasizing that Orbán did not have a mandate from the European Union to conduct such “diplomacy.” And we would not have paid special attention to this “head of the diplomatic corps of European politics” (as his subordinates call him) if not for his epistolary work.

Western media have already detailed the contents of several letters from Orbán to the head of the European Council, Charles Michel, in which the Hungarian dove of peace informed his colleagues in the European Union about his negotiations with the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, China and Donald Trump. From them, in particular, we received another confirmation that the “Istanbul” draft of a “peace treaty” between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in the spring of 2022 is still on Putin’s table and that he is not averse to reviving it.

ZN.UA has at its disposal a copy of the first of these letters, dated July 2 and written after Orbán’s meeting with the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy. It indicates that not only publicly, but also behind closed doors, the top leadership of Ukraine still insists that there is no alternative to the Ukrainian Peace Formula.

In the letter, Orbán informs his colleagues that “Ukraine intends to proceed according to the logic of their Peace Plan and transform the discussions on different peace plans into a single-track process focusing exclusively on the Ukrainian proposal.” Orbán also notes that in Kyiv “they are aware that this process is futile without China’s participation and that China’s participation is contingent on Russia’s engagement.”

In addition, Orbán reports that “As regards the outcome of the war, the President of Ukraine is confident.” “He is convinced that the Russian armed forces will be compelled to call for a general mobilisation in the middle of the next year the latest, which will result in internal destabilisation.” According to the Hungarian Prime Minister, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy considers that “the Ukrainian forces stable, prepared and able to maintain combat effectiveness even in the long term if Western arm supplies are continuing.” And what subsequently surprised Putin very much: according to Orbán, Volodymyr Zelenskyy believes that “that time is on the side of Ukraine and not on the side of Russia.”

As the head of the Hungarian government, who came to Kyiv with a ceasefire proposal, writes, Volodymyr Zelenskyy considers this possibility as “extremely doubtful”: “His earlier experiences with ceasefires concluded with Russia are rather negative. A ceasefire would carry the risk of a frozen conflict, erode sanctions and undermine the position of Ukraine at the peace negotiations.”

As the Hungarian visitor testifies, the Ukrainian president did not approve of the “limited ceasefire initiative” e.g. for a period of 3 weeks or 2 weeks in connection with the Paris Summer Olympics that would allow resumption of hostilities in case of adverse developments.”

As Orbán writes, Volodymyr Zelenskyy considers that “a realistic option is that instead of ceasefire certain areas are excluded from military targets in a negotiated way.” According to the author of the letter, the President of Ukraine thinks that “Russians would be ready to agree on such arrangements as they did in the case of grain corridors.” And the next step could be “to exclude energy infrastructure. “According to Orbán himself, “the feasibility of such a scenario is questionable.”

The letter from the Hungarian “peacemaker” ends with his conclusion that according to his point of view, “the chances for the success of establishing peace with European participation are diminishing as the United States of America presidential elections are approaching”: “A Republican victory carries the risk of a quick agreement between Russia and the United States of America without European involvement. It is also becoming more likely that the United States of America will pass on to Europe the financial burden of supporting Ukraine. This consideration should prompt us to secure a place for Europe at the negotiation table before the presidential elections in the United States of America. In my experience, appropriate European leaders could meaningfully negotiate on this with President Zelenskyy.”

Let us recall that in his subsequent letters to the head of the European Council, Orbán also called for negotiations with China on a “peace conference on Ukraine” and the resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia. In addition, he also asked for a “political offensive” in the Global South, in the eyes of which the European Union had “lost respect” for its position on the war in Ukraine. In addition, the Hungarian Prime Minister, having returned from overseas, where he met with the ex-President of the United States of America, expressed confidence that Donald Trump “after winning the election will not wait for his inauguration, but will immediately be ready to act as a peace negotiator. He has detailed and well-founded plans for this.”

Echoes of Bürgenstock

In general, as we see, the “peacekeepers” popped up from everywhere, like mushrooms after rain. Let us remember here at least the Prime Minister of India. After an unforgettable hug with Putin, Narendra Modi, who, despite even a personal invitation from President Zelensky, did not find the opportunity to honor the Peace Summit in Switzerland with his presence, suddenly announced India’s readiness to “provide all possible support” for the “quick restoration of peace and stability.”

This way and that, Turkish leader Recep Erdogan, who is trying on the peacemaker’s wreath, also recently spoke again with “his friend” Putin (in Astana on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit (SCO) on July 3–4), announced his readiness to lay the basis for a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine, and then facilitate a peace agreement between them.

In this atmosphere of indefatigable, but so far fruitless “peacekeeping,” one can understand the leadership of Ukraine in its desire to “bring discussions on various peace plans into a single track” and focus it on the Ukrainian Peace Formula. It’s not a fact that for this it is necessary to hold a summit again, but since it is already planned, we think it will be useful for the team of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to get acquainted with how Ukrainians assess the results of the first World Summit, what they consider as the achievements of the Swiss forum and what flaws they saw. Working on mistakes is always useful.

The respondents of our study had the opportunity to choose two of the proposed answer options and they said that the greatest achievement of the Peace Summit in Switzerland was that it was possible to hold it at all. These (by the way, confirmed the assessment of ZN.UA) turned out to be more than a fifth of respondents – 22.3% (Fig. 7).

Almost a fifth of respondents – 19.2% – did not see any achievements of the Summit at all. It is curious that 12.9% who did not see the achievements of the summit had no information about it at all: straight from the Soviet classics – “I haven’t read it, but I condemn it.” (Where Ukrainians mainly received information about the Peace Summit in Bürgenstock and its results can be found in Fig. 8.)

More often than others, Ukrainians named the main achievement of the Summit as “attracting attention to Ukraine in the world media (19.9%); “the inclusion in the Summit communiqué of a clause that all prisoners of war should be released through a full exchange (19.1%) and “a demonstration by the Russian Federation that many countries around the world support Ukraine’s peace initiative” (19%).

Other answer options proposed by ZN.UA were not particularly popular among respondents. Only 13.4% of Ukrainians are impressed by the “large number of countries that agreed to take part in the Summit”; for the rest, this number (92) probably did not seem so impressive compared to the total number of the members of the United Nations (UN) (193) to speak of it as "victory of Ukrainian diplomacy."

The option “Inclusion in the Summit communiqué of a clause according to which the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant should be transferred to the control of Ukraine and operate under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)” was chosen by only 10.4% of respondents. Perhaps Ukrainians have already become accustomed to the permanent nuclear threat (after all, a year ago, in a poll commissioned by ZN.UA, “radiation and nuclear safety” was named among the three most important points of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s peace plan by as many as 33% of respondents). Perhaps they don’t believe in the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this process, whose Secretary General Rafael Grossi completely ignored the summit in Bürgenstock.

By the way, last week the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution with much clearer and stricter wording on the security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities than the Peace Summit communiqué: the resolution demands that the Russian Federation urgently withdraw its military personnel and other unauthorized personnel from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and immediately returned the station under full Ukrainian control to ensure its technical and physical safety. However, both the Summit communique and all resolutions of the United Nations (UN) on the Russian war against Ukraine taken together - all these documents, alas, do not have the slightest influence on the aggressor, who does not even care about the fundamental provisions of the Charter of the United Nations (UN).

The majority of Ukrainians (59%) believe that the most significant drawback of the Peace Summit is that “the Summit did not consider ways to stop the war and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine” (two answer options could be chosen) (Fig. 9). At the same time, it was quite unexpected that among respondents who believe that the Summit brought Ukraine closer to peace, the percentage who named the above drawback as the most significant is even higher, namely 62.2%. What then is “closer to peace” for these Ukrainians remains a mystery.

Our fellow citizens were also disappointed by the fact that “out of the ten points of the Peace Formula” of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Summit participants were only interested in food security, nuclear power plant safety and humanitarian issues.” A third (32.4%) of respondents noted this option as the biggest disadvantage of the Summit. Only 6.7% of Ukrainians were completely satisfied with the forum held in Switzerland and did not find any flaws.

The absence of China at the Summit, as well as the fact that Brazil (present only in observer status), India, Saudi Arabia and other countries that could encourage Russia to peace did not even sign the final document at Bürgenstock, a fifth of our fellow citizens (20.2%) consider the Summit to be the greatest drawback.

The most common opinion among survey participants about Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s goal when initiating the summit was “to increase support for Ukraine in the world.” This answer option was chosen by 29.8% of respondents. (Fig. 10) Another 22.4% of respondents believe that the main thing for the president was “to demonstrate to Russia that the majority of countries in the world support his Peace Formula.”

Those who think that the purpose of the Summit was “to open the way to peace negotiations with Russia” are only 8.4%. Although the word “negotiations” is increasingly appearing in the Western media and slips into the comments of local politicians. That is why we devoted a separate part of our social research to it.

Only 13.6% of Ukrainians believe that the purpose of the summit was “to increase pressure from the world community on Russia.” Although this was precisely what numerous representatives on Bankova Street repeatedly emphasized, informing the public about the desired results of the upcoming summit.

We really got “increased pressure”. True, thanks not to the Peace Summit, but to the Group of Seven (G7), the United States of America and the European Union. The decision on the frozen assets of the Russian Federation, new restrictive measures and the expansion of secondary sanctions were made by representatives of the Collective West without reference to the forum in Switzerland. The Global South, despite the efforts of Kyiv and its partners, did not put pressure on Russia. Neither before the Peace Summit, nor after. The bet of political leaders on Bankovaya Street on the Global South did not play a role in forcing Russia to peace and putting Putin in international isolation.

Just as the expectation that the Peace Formula of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy after the summit in Switzerland would become the “international mainstream” – a non-alternative plan to end the war in Ukraine – did not materialize.

What, then, motivates the political leaders on Bankova Street, rushing to organize a second Peace Summit without achieving any significant successes at the first?

Of course, there is a lot of information that we do not know. We do not know the details of the unpublicized meetings between representatives of Kyiv and Moscow, the details of the non-public conditions put forward to each other, the promises and the limits of the possible compromises discussed.

But such obvious intensification in the preparation of the second Peace Summit in the absence of significant results from the first raises many questions. It is clear that, observing the ups and downs of the presidential race in the United States of America and fearing that after November 5, the Americans will not have time for Ukrainian problems for a long time, Kyiv may strive to hold this forum before the elections in the United States of America. But why? To do what? What are the prerequisites for the success of a hastily planned event? Especially considering that representatives of Bankova Street, including the president himself, have repeatedly made it clear that the second summit should be decisive. Why, at the three meetings announced for the next two months in Qatar, Turkey and Canada, will only the three points of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula already discussed in Bürgenstock be discussed? Where will the “action plans” for the remaining seven points of the Ukrainian peace plan, which are much more important for ending the war, come from in the remaining time until November? Who will work on them and where? Why were all these “action plans” not prepared before the first summit, although working groups for their development had already been created and there was much more time than now before November 5? Again, taking into account the vague and toothless communique of the Swiss summit in relation to the aggressor Russia, which, moreover, was not even signed by all its participants, on which are based the expectations voiced by the Ukrainian authorities that the second summit will be a prologue to the “end of the war” and a just and lasting peace"?

Who, how and with what will force Russia to peace if the leader of the Collective West does not give Ukraine consent to at least strikes on Russian military airfields - even after the aggressor’s attack on the largest Ukrainian children’s hospital “Okhmatdyt”, and the leader of the Global South is planning his own “peace conference” based on a plan providing for the loss of Ukraine not only of territories, but also of sovereignty? What do we not know, but the President of Ukraine knows, who is so confidently intensifying preparations for the second Peace Summit? Ukrainians also have the right to know this.

 

The survey was conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Center commissioned by ZN.UA from June 20 to June 28, 2024. During the survey, 2,027 respondents aged 18 years and over were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.