Surviving in the Dark: How Ukraine Protects its Critical Infrastructure

War teaches a lesson the hard way. But not everyone...

On Sunday, a missile and drone strike on the energy sector led to the de-energization of one million people. Albeit huge, this figure is less than one tenth of what was two years ago, in November 2022. Back then, at the peak of the attacks, the number was as high as 12–13 million, and the power grid fell apart for hours into isolated pieces that were frantically stitched together.

The same was intended now, but the Russians were not allowed to repeat it. The work of the air defense also had an effect, intercepting most, though not all, of the missiles and drones. The constructed shelters also worked: the effect of the strikes became weaker and countermeasures more effective. But the main thing is the experience and courage of people. In Odesa, unfortunately, two substation dispatchers died. One of them had recently returned from the frontline and died here, on duty.

However, the generation capacity did suffer. A missile hit the engine room of the Dnipro hydroelectric power plant in Zaporozhizhia, 50 km away from the frontline; missiles hit the dam of the Kremenchuh hydroelectric power plant. Thermal power plants in the east and west of the country were also damaged. According to DTEK's calculations, the thermal power plants have been shelled almost two hundred times since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. During the latest raid, Burshtynska and Ladyzhynska TPPs were bombed out of service again.

Let us repeat that: the goal was and still is to bring the system tumbling down. First of all, its connectivity, the possibility of energy transmission from the west of the country to the east. Russians are well aware of our energy system and its pressure points. The substations were the main target of the attack. They hit them with no expense spared, with groups of missiles. Somewhere we shot down all of them, somewhere there were single missiles breaking through, and in some instances groups of 3–4 missiles reached their targets.

Air defense drip-fed to Ukraine by the West is not enough for everything. F-16s can work on flying cruise missiles and shot down about a dozen of them.... But there are only five of these jets for the entire central and western Ukraine. This is what the partners in general and the mighty North Atlantic Alliance in particular have accomplished in terms of Western air power for almost three years of scaremongering around Russian “red lines.”

The key goal of the strikes was to destroy the substations that receive power from nuclear plants. Then the latter would be forced to shut down themselves. Further on, a cascade of shutdowns would happen all over the country, especially since maneuverable generation is also targeted.... In November 2022, the Russians succeeded, even though for a couple of days.

For now, the substations and nuclear power plants have survived, albeit with obvious difficulty. It is also worth remembering that the system has been under attack for more than two years. Despite repairs, the damage is piling up. Even before the shelling, the generation system was periodically reeling from the shock.

Immediately after the strikes, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued an assessment of the consequences of the massive shelling: “Several (high-voltage) electrical substations on which the nuclear power plants depend have been damaged, resulting in the failure of four major power lines.”

It estimated that in the first hours after the raid, only two of the nine operating power units (South Ukraine, Rivne and Khmelnytskyi NPPs) were operating at full capacity, while the other six had reduced production to between 40 and 90 percent of their maximum.

Frankly, the rapid analysis is overly detailed given the circumstances. It will certainly be taken into account by the Russians when planning their next strikes. Especially since it ends with a completely inarticulate mumble: “We call on the parties to the conflict ... to adhere to the seven key principles of nuclear safety, especially the fourth, which requires a guaranteed external power supply for all nuclear facilities.”

In fact, there were no special expectations. In the third year of the full-scale war, the IAEA recently noticed the military equipment of the Russian troops at the captured Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Moscow directly promised to withdraw it from the plant, saying that it kept the vehicles there by its own permission and solely for the sake of “fixing the crimes of the Ukrainian armed forces.”

Since the fly-in blasts of Russian cruise missiles at a Ukrainian substation does not exactly constitute a crime by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, all they will be able to do is record the blast itself.

The sad joke is that this fall our Ministry of Energy suddenly started believing that the IAEA could cover several of our key substations from strikes by sending its observers there. The project resembles an imitation of violent activity. The mission at the Zaporizhzhia TPP does not prevent the Russians from shelling Nikopol from the opposite bank. Moreover, if the observers have the opportunity to immediately assess the methodology of preparation for the missile strikes, the work of air defense, the consequences and the progress of recovery measures, we can get quite an official group of spotters near the substation.

And in return we will be enriched with a new portion of “appeals to the parties to the conflict to adhere to... key principles of nuclear safety” and blah-blah. And maybe... the deep concern.

The situation is complicated by the fact that Energoatom and its friend, the Ministry of Energy, have long ignored the need to build shelters at the plants. Instead, they have projects to build dozens of reactors someday, with tens of billions of hryvnias in kickbacks right now. And as for the plants, well, come on, who in their right mind would shoot at nuclear power plants.

So what if the industrial zone of the South Ukraine NPP has already been hit, and regular overflights of cruise missiles and drones into its neighborhood are almost routine. As a result, only recently were they forced to at least mark the beginning of defense work. Facepalm...

And, yes, the enemy knows whether or not these very works are being carried out at stations with thousands of employees and hundreds of contractors.

As a result, NPPs will pass this winter with a minimum set of protection and maximum loads, as they did in the past years. They will not have the time to drastically change anything. Oh, wouldn’t it be a good thing to have a Power Plan in addition to Zelenskyy’s Resilience Plan?..

Mass strikes on Odesa were also to be expected. It is traditionally difficult there with its own generation (once the main supplier was the Moldovan state district power plant, a thermal one), and the region is highly dependent on the inflow of electricity from outside. The Russians tried — unsuccessfully — to knock out the South Ukraine nuclear power plant by shelling local substations, and also hit the nearby Ladyzhyn TPP (in Vinnytsia region). The situation with electricity in the region has become difficult again. Everything is being restored and will be restored, but it is clear that in winter near the sea generators will not be superfluous.

The project of connecting a couple or three Turkish ships with generators is underway, which will yield about 350–400 MW of power. The project is moving forward, infrastructure is being prepared for it. Ukrenergo, Naftogaz, Odesaoblenergo are involved in the work; even the rules of the energy market have been adjusted for the project. We will see what the results will be. So far, one thing is clear: it is an expensive thing; the Turks have charged an absolutely atrocious price; a year's lease of these vessels is quite on a par with their cost, but you can't buy them, you can only lease them.

The Russians, in turn, are desperately trying to disrupt the work of the port and since the end of September Odesa port and ships on its roadstead have been regularly bombarded with ballistic missiles. The Patriot has been deployed there and is shooting down a lot of them. But not everything. Whether the Russians will hit Turkish-flagged vessels, having a flow of oil ships through the Bosporus Strait, is a question.

Frankly speaking, the use of a couple or three Neptune missiles at Novorossiysk or Tuapse would clearly defuse the situation at sea.

In general, the situation in the country, taking into account the war, is a three with a small plus on a five-point scale. Interruptions for a few hours are hard, but not catastrophic.

The question is what happens next. It's getting colder outside and consumption is rising. In summer, the system took 13–14 million kW of power; in winter, it is 17–18 million. Roughly, we need two more Khmelnytskyy NPPs. In addition, in winter, solar generation decreases sharply, from five to seven times, and its share is now significant.

The hole of 3–4 million kW will have to be covered by demand regulation, i.e. by shutdowns. If we add that most of the load is unplugged consumers: water supply, transport, factories working for defense, then the population does not get much. So the forecasts that there may be no light for 12 hours are more realistic than ever.

First of all, everything depends on the density of shelling and the effectiveness of countermeasures. A lot depends on the air temperature. We will not consider a cold winter, but even with an average one, it will be a problem to find those 18 million kW.

A part of it will be covered by distributed generation of all kinds. According to the Ministry of Energy's estimates, it is currently about 900,000 kW. In fact, this is the capacity of a large nuclear unit or two small ones.

We managed to agree on the increase of the import capacity to 2.1 million kW (before it was 1.7 million, and we wanted 2.5 million). By the way, one of the targets of the last raid was a substation in Mukachevo, which provides the very import.

And remember about the maximum insulation of houses, apartments, purchase of inverters and other “points of indomitability”, up to the preparation of firewood.

A lot depends on the gas supply system. Roughly speaking, one kilowatt of gas is a saving (taking into account the efficiency factor) of a couple of dozens of kilowatt-hours of electricity. The shelling of our underground gas storages is not accidental (now for the fourth time, the Russians have hit the western Ukrainian Bilche-Volytske UGS).

There are serious issues with communication. In general, the position of the Cabinet of Ministers is correct. As the Prime Minister said, “The Cabinet does not give any forecasts as to what the situation with electricity in winter will be. This primarily depends on the intensity of Russian attacks.” However, the Presidential Office is very fond of good news, and fables that it will be possible to pass the winter without power outages are well received there.

There is a war grinding on, and it is not very smart to focus on the “it will be very warm and without shelling” scenario. Nor is trying to gag anyone who highlights the issues.

The goal of the Russians is dark cold cities with drones and missiles, hordes of bots at all levels screaming that everything has been sold abroad and we need to surrender.

Actually, the wave of “everything has been sold” is being unleashed right now. It's nonsense, but there will be those who believe it. And the better the communication is, instead of trying to silence the issues, the fewer of them will be.

Read this article in Ukrainian and russian.