Russia’s attack on the Okhmatdyt clinic and other civilian and medical infrastructure facilities in Kyiv, Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih has burned the souls of millions of people around the world who empathize with Ukraine’s tragedy. It would seem that the images of our children suffering and the video of rocket launches, which on the same day were laughingly filmed by Russians sitting in a boat somewhere in the Caspian Sea, rule out the possibility of any dialog with the aggressor. Whom to talk to? Inhuman creatures? However, as soon as another acute pain from the consequences of the missile strikes was relieved, the topic of negotiations on peace/armistice/freezing the war returned to the information space. And this is another form of torture that Ukrainian society is subjected to: thinking about possible peace options with an enemy who wants you gone. Publicly states this and, just as openly, kills.
The grave situation on the frontline, provoked by the long absence of arms deliveries by partners, has turned the war into a protracted mode, with Russia betting on Ukraine’s exhaustion. “While the fat man grows thin, the thin one starves to death.” The meaning of this proverb is well known to Putin. The Russian dictator also knows the reasons for the progressive “thinness” of democratic Ukraine, including the problems of the corruption-ridden state machine under the manual control of the Presidential Office, which, unlike the Russian one, has not started. The ground for Russian psychological operations, capable of blowing up the six times smaller Ukraine from within, does not even need to be prepared. We are doing everything ourselves.
Given the impossibility of re-electing the government (martial law) and President Zelenskyy’s reluctance to overhaul the government qualitatively, the opinion that Ukraine needs to stop, catch its breath, hold elections and get ready for a second strike by the aggressor has sparked a wide discussion in the intellectual community. In the course of which there were those who are convinced that a respite will give Russia the opportunity to catch its breath and regroup. But the fact that Ukraine will qualitatively reset the government and use the time to its advantage is not a given. “Moreover, a ceasefire or a freeze will distract the West and we will never get its attention back. We need to marshal our forces and keep fighting for ourselves,” say opponents of the talks on freezing the conflict.
It is clear that the negotiation topic is being discussed everywhere: from the kitchen of the ordinary Ukrainian, whom President Volodymyr Zelenskyy talks to every night in his video messages (the approval rating of the head of state has dropped by 30% in two years), to the Oval Office. The latter may or may not change its master as early as November, opening a large window for negotiations on the fate of Ukraine. However, a small window may open before November.
A number of statements made by President Zelenskyy after Ukraine’s unsuccessful Peace Summit suggest that the negotiation processes have intensified. According to foreign media, the Presidential Office is planning a second round of negotiations before the presidential election in the United States and possibly with the invitation of Russia. Obviously, the Ukrainian head of state has moved away from his Peace Formula: Ukraine worked off launch of this missile in the Summit declaration by three steps/points out of ten. Zelenskyy has already announced a new peace plan, “which will take several months to develop.” Next came the president’s public position on the possibility of negotiations through an intermediary in the format of the grain deal concluded in Istanbul. Another important signal was the president’s public reference to the referendum, which he is ready to hold in order to “rely on the will of the people when making decisions.” According to a number of experts, this is the right technological move by Zelenskyy, who risks signing the negotiation outcome, which may not meet the inflated expectations of the society and bring his approval rating tumbling down. Let us not forget that getting carried away by the victory marathon of United News and sitting in a warm bath is dangerous not only for presidents, but also for nations.
One can perceive in similar vein the appearance in the media of posts by bloggers with more than a million subscribers about the need for peace, as well as pseudo-sociological surveys, according to which “almost every second Ukrainian agrees to the loss of lands seized by Russia in exchange for the ‘freedom of choice’ to join NATO and the EU, keep the army and independence – ECFR.” Connoisseurs of political consulting argue that the wave of such opinions and “studies” will nothing but grow, “helping the authorities to encourage Ukrainians to get used to the idea that negotiations with Putin are possible.”
The situation is greatly complicated by the lack of understanding of what Ukraine wants. There is no domestically formulated framework of what victory means for us, which would be initialed by both the authorities and the people. Nor is there an honest discussion about what is realistic and what is unrealistic in the current circumstances. Ukraine is still publicly focused on retaining and returning all the territories along the 1991 border. And our president declares that he will never give up Crimea. However, Zelenskyy made an unexpected remark recently during a speech at the Ronald Reagan Institute, saying that “when you talk about territory, you have to realize that we need to save people and the state above all.” The West, on the other hand, has long considered further European integration of Ukraine, preservation of democracy and vibrant cooperation with NATO, possibly short of accession, as a victory. Even at the expense of losing part of its territories.
And this is understandable. Because the solution to the issue of Russia’s war against Ukraine is a major issue only for Ukraine. For everyone else, it’s part of the game. Putin is still interested in the big picture he had in his mind on the eve of the full-scale invasion, when Russia started rolling out ultimatums on NATO and so on. The dictator is thinking about consolidating a multipolar world, lifting sanctions, renewing relations with the West, etc. And no matter how you look at it, he is also stressed by the war. Because there is an economy that, albeit still standing, has sagged badly. There is China, whose leash is tightening around Putin’s neck more and more with every day of the war. There are many things that can break Russia’s strategy of a protracted war of attrition and push Putin to negotiate.
The West also has its own grounds and reasons for stopping the war. Because in addition to nuclear-armed Putin, there is nuclear North Korea, there are relations and global competition with China, there is Israel, Hamas, Iran... For the West, Ukraine is indeed an important piece of the puzzle, but only a piece. Everything combines into a much bigger picture, where the place and role of Ukraine, which continues to fight devotedly for itself, have not yet been definitively defined.
That is why the negotiations never stopped. They may have been deeper, brighter, more articulate or less so. But they constantly went through Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Relations with the Russians were maintained by the State Department, the CIA, Ukraine through the Main Intelligence Directorate, and Yermak through the Foreign Intelligence Service. Back in February 2024, there was a story about the intensification of Istanbul-based negotiations. But, according to our sources in the Presidential Office, its head Andrii Yermak then interrupted the intensified communication, explaining that it should continue after the Swiss Peace Summit, which would strengthen Ukraine’s position. It seems that the strengthening of positions did not work out as expected.
At the same time, against the background of the recent trip of the self-proclaimed mediator-slash-negotiator Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary, conspiracy theories about Putin’s letter with peace terms, which was handed over to the Americans by Russian Interior Minister Kolokoltsev, were actively discussed on social media. We know nothing about such a letter and whether is was handed over. But we know that such proposals were made by a number of Russian negotiators. Nonetheless, it cannot be said for certain whether they were serious in the winter of 2024 or whether these were attempts to deceive and dull the vigilance of the Ukrainian side. What we do know is that, according to Putin’s plan, Ukraine should be fully disarmed, abandon hopes of joining NATO and stop being an anti-Russian project.
Where are our people in this global story? Our people are in their own reality. To the best of their abilities, they hold the sky above their land. Ukrainians die, lose, are afraid, fall, use breathing technique to pull themselves together, rise again, form their own opinions and at the same time are divided and even upset in their views on what is happening to them and the country. Here is a person who, when asked about the key condition for negotiations, categorically responds to sociologists: “Only the borders of 1991!” And then says tiredly in the kitchen: “I don’t give a damn about the borders of 1991, let it all end as soon as possible...” And if everything ends with borders other than those of 1991, he will be the first to shout on social networks that everyone is a traitor and that everyone has surrendered everything. And all three of these personalities seem to fit into one average Ukrainian.
Let’s delve deeper into ourselves. Surprise ourselves and draw conclusions about ourselves. To do this, let’s look at the specific figures that the Razumkov Centre received during a sociological survey conducted from June 20 to June 28, 2024 at the request of ZN.UA. We asked Ukrainians when it is worth starting negotiations with Russia and whether it is worth starting them. We specified how the negotiations should end. We also asked our people for the first time about their attitude to each of the points in Putin’s peace ultimatum.
The results are quite interesting, including in the regional context. Sociologists studied the sentiments of the center (Kyiv, Sumy, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovograd and Vinnytsia oblasts); the west (Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi and Volyn oblasts); the east (Luhansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts); the south (Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. Crimea is currently occupied by Russia).
We should also note at once that people representing the rear part of Ukraine were interviewed. The main part of passionate volunteers or those who were forced to join them are at the frontline. It is impossible to survey the opinion of the army, which bears the brunt of the war and has the right to have the most significant, if not decisive, voice in negotiations with Russia. Therefore, it is impossible to consider the results of the study as the opinion of the whole country. This is the opinion of the home front. And when analyzing the figures, we will keep this in mind.
The possibility and terms of negotiations
We are being killed for the third year. And as scary as it may sound, the war has become a backdrop not only in countries where you cannot feel it with your skin or see it with your own eyes, but also in Ukraine itself. The threshold of our pain is growing. Therefore, even after the Okhmatdyt strike, the survey data are relevant.
So, ZN.UA asked Ukrainians: “Do you think the time has come for Ukraine and Russia to start official peace talks?” A relative majority of rear Ukraine — 44% — thinks that it is time that official peace talks with Russia started. Another 35% think it is not. Many are in the gray zone of the undecided — 21%. And here it is very important to take into account the regional cross-section. Because this first question already clearly shows the trends that persist throughout the survey.
Quite predictably, the center oblasts stand closest to the average indicator for Ukraine, but in an upward direction: almost half (49%) of residents of Central Ukraine would calmly accept information about the beginning of official negotiations with Russia. It is also not surprising that the lowest figure among those who are ready for negotiations is observed in the west of Ukraine — 35%. And this is also worth noting because the residents of the western part of Ukraine demonstrate a distinct duality of, on the one hand, high expectations of the outcome of the war and, on the other hand, their role in turning these expectations into a reality. We are going to see this again later.
And now it is important to say that it is not the west that is most unwilling to negotiate, but the east, which is attacked by Russian guided aerial bombs every day. Only 33% of the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine are ready for negotiations, and almost as many — 34% — are opposed to them. And almost as many — 32% — are undecided. Already here you can feel how people from the east of Ukraine are being torn apart from the inside. They have had it the longest and most and want negotiations the least? Why? Because they want back what is theirs?
And now another telling figure from the south of Ukraine, which is also becoming a tendency. 60% of residents of the south believe that the time for official negotiations with Russia has come, which is almost 16% higher than the Ukrainian average. Let’s remember this.
And let us move on. As we remember, there is no articulated Ukrainian official position that would indicate readiness for negotiations. It is sweepingly moving from the public demands of the 1991 borders to the Istanbul nominally initialed documents of 2022. Behind the scenes, the Russians may be flexible. But publicly too. Putin made his position on Ukraine clear the day before the Peace Summit in Switzerland, saying that Russia could end the war under certain conditions, which both the Ukrainian authorities and Western partners rightly called an ultimatum. Tellingly, 59% of Ukrainians paid attention to this statement by Putin. But what did they think?
“Do you think Ukraine should agree to fulfill such conditions put forward by Vladimir Putin for the sake of Russia ending the war?” ZN.UA asked Ukrainians for the first time and received a rather eloquent answer to the Russian dictator.
First, among the concessions that Ukrainians may be ready to make, there is definitely no withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the territory of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts within their administrative borders. 83% of our citizens will not agree to this.
Secondly, Russia cannot count on Ukrainians agreeing to officially cede these regions to the aggressor. 84% are against it.
Third, 77% of Ukrainians cannot agree that all Western sanctions against Russia should be lifted.
As for the fact that Ukraine’s neutral, non-aligned and non-nuclear status should be enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine, opinions differ: 58% are against, 22% are favor. Now let’s look at the regions: only 9% of residents of western Ukraine allow of such changes in the Constitution. Among those in the center, 25% have given their consent; in the east — 23%. And we remember the sentiments of the south, don’t we? And for good reason: 39% of residents of this region are ready to support Ukraine’s neutrality. (If we look at this figure in terms of age, southerners aged 60+ are more inclined to neutrality.)
We can assume that by putting forward an ultimatum Ukraine will never accept, the master of the country ranked first globally in terms of gas reserves and seventh in terms of oil reserves is demonstrating that he is set for a long war. The hundreds of thousands of military and civilian deaths already, including children, show that Putin has opened the doors to his personal Hell and is very definitely trying to drag Ukraine and the rest of the world into it. This is the global plan of a dictator who is ready to do anything for the sake of leaving his mark in world history. Statements about openness to peace talks are a bluff and some kind of an excuse for China.
Therefore, ZN.UA asked Ukrainians: “The Russian president constantly states that he is ready for peace talks. To what extent do you agree with the given thoughts regarding such statements?”
The overwhelming majority — 76% — are convinced that Putin allows for the possibility of peace only on his terms. Therefore, it can be stated that Ukrainians do not have any illusions in this matter. At the same time, the west of Ukraine practically mirrored the statistical average (75%). The center distinguished itself by the fact that it is more inclined than others not to trust that Putin will make any concessions to Ukraine (84%), and the residents of the east (73%) believe in it a little less than the residents of the west. And only the south, it should be recalled, is more ready for negotiations and Ukraine’s neutral status than others, and more hopeful that an agreement can be reached with Putin: 38% of residents of the south disagree that Putin will only negotiate on his own terms. In comparison, the national average of those who disagree with this statement is 14%. Do you feel the difference?
It is also interesting to see which factor people consider to be the one that could push Putin towards negotiations and concessions. And here China is beyond compare. 65% of Ukrainians believe that the longer the war and sanctions continue, the more dependent on China Russia becomes. Which, of course, it does not like. That is, China with its peace plan, which does not suit either Ukraine or Russia, still, according to Ukrainians, strongly restrains Putin and will sooner or later force him to negotiate. Ukraine’s regions were surprisingly united in their assessment of China’s role, except for the slightly lagging south (60%). Most of its residents believe that Putin is willing to bargain because the war is costly for Russia’s economy: 59% compared to the Ukrainian average of 47%. The role of the dictator’s entourage, which seeks to return to Western markets, and Putin’s fear of going to The Hague as push factors for negotiations were rated much lower by respondents.
And here, perhaps, we should only specify that the largest number of people who do not know how to evaluate Putin’s statements is in the east (20–45% — a stable gray zone). Perhaps it should be remembered here again that the war in 2014 started precisely in the east. Over the ten years of drama experienced by the residents of this region scattered all over the country, they have erased any feelings about the words of the Russian dictator. Only pain remains.
Now about the format of official negotiations. It is already abundantly obvious that Putin does not read the forecasts of Oleksii Arestovych, former out-of-staff adviser to the Presidential Office, or conspiracy theorist under the nickname “General SVR.” Therefore, in the near future the Russian dictator is not going to be overthrown, nor is he going to transfer power to a double or die. Therefore, if no “black swan” comes to Russia, sooner or later negotiations will have to be held with Putin. This, however, is forbidden by the decision of the National Security and Defense Council and the decree of President Zelenskyy, which put this decision into effect. This is also why, speaking about the possible format of negotiations, President Zelenskyy insists on the participation of mediators.
In this regard, we asked Ukrainians a question: “In October 2022, President Zelenskyy issued a decree on the impossibility of holding negotiations with Vladimir Putin. Do you think this decree should be canceled for possible peace talks with the Russian president?”
Here are the results. 37% of Ukrainians believe that the presidential decree should not be canceled, which, in principle, correlates with the number of those who do not want to negotiate with Putin. However, even here, the figure of the south in favor of abolishing the decree is almost 10% higher than the Ukrainian-wide average. (32% of all are in favor of abolishing the decree, compared to 41% of residents in the southern oblasts.) Let’s take note of it and move on.
So, assuming that the Ukrainian authorities do launch official negotiations with Russia, it is important to understand what minimum acceptable conditions Ukrainian society is ready to start with. That is why sociologists asked respondents the following question: “Which of the conditions do you consider to be the minimum necessity to conclude a peace agreement with Russia?”
Here, too, the answers are emblematic: half of Ukrainians (51%) insist on the liberation of Ukraine from Russian troops within the borders of 1991. 26% can agree to stop the war along the border line of early 2022, and only 9% are ready to recognize the border along the frontline at the time of the agreement.
And what about our regions? The west insists on the 1991 borders the most — 59%, while the east and the south, from which Russia has already torn off pieces, insist on this less (39 and 40%, respectively). Who in the end is closer to reality and is a topic for a separate study. By the way, it is the east (13%) and the south (10%) that are more supportive of having the border along the frontline. But there can hardly be the same motivation here. The east is simply tired of the decade-long war, while the south is still under the illusion that it is possible to reach an agreement with Putin by making certain concessions. The center, as usual, is closest to the average, whereas the west (5.6%) are stably determined to drive a hard bargain and does not intend to accept the current position.
Returning to Ukraine’s possible concessions to Russia, we asked Ukrainians: “If it were up to you, what would you be willing to give up during negotiations with Russia?”
The question was primarily related to the territories and the pro-Western vector of Ukraine’s development. So, the majority of Ukrainians (61,1%) are not ready to compromise on anything mentioned by sociologists. And here we will immediately observe the first paradox: Ukrainians are ready to negotiate (44%), but are not ready to compromise on anything (61.1%). Because only 14% of respondents can agree to give up the pro-Western vector and only 8% are ready to give up territories.
However, here again it is worth paying attention to the regional aspect. Quite expectedly, residents of the west (65%) along with the center (65%) have the highest rates of unwillingness to give up anything (territories, Western vector of development), if it depended on them during the negotiations. At the same time, if we consider those who are ready to cede territories, it is easier to give them up for the residents of the west (11%) and more difficult for the east (4%) and the south (7%). This is understandable because the displaced people who have already lost their land and their homes and those people who now live closer to the frontline are not ready to make such gifts to the Russians. They want to get back what is theirs. However, the kinship feelings of the east and the south noticeably diverge in answering the question about the possibility of abandoning the pro-Western vector of development — 12% and 24%, respectively. (The average figure across Ukraine is 14%.) The south is more ready for negotiations and more ready to give up the pro-Western vector than others. And this is all within the framework of the southern trend that we have already outlined.
Do we go all the way?
You remember that we outlined the first paradox: ready to negotiate, but not ready to make concessions. It is logical to assume that in order to overcome this existential gap and gain the right to dictate their terms, the Ukrainians need victories on the battlefield. And not only at the expense of British Storm Shadow missiles, which the new UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has now promised to allow us to use to strike military facilities on Russian soil, but also through the willingness of Ukrainians themselves to win such victories with weapons in their hands. In other words, by fighting for their country. However, before we come to the second paradox that emerged in the course of the study, we should find out whether Ukrainians believe that Russia can be defeated militarily. Therefore, sociologists asked them the following question: “Do you think it is possible for Ukraine to win a military victory in a war with Russia?”
So, 66% of our country’s residents are of the opinion that Russia can be defeated on the battlefield. That, of course, deserves respect. At the same time, 16% of Ukrainians no longer have such a belief, and 18% are hesitant.
Here, too, the regions did not differ much in the magnitude of their faith. The west believes in a military victory the most (69%), which, as we remember, is the least ready to negotiate with Russia. (This line is still worth keeping in mind.) And who is steadily more doubtful than the others about Ukraine’s military power? Right, the south: 25% of residents of this region do not believe in a military victory. As we have already said, the average indicator of non-believers in the country stands at 16%.
Here, of course, another question is closely related: what our people understand by Victory, which sociologists did not ask this time. But in a certain sense, Ukrainians gave their answer to it above, with 51% of our compatriots insisting on the need to return to the borders of 1991, 26% saying they are ready to agree to the borders of 2022 and only 9% tolerating the border along the frontline at the time of signing the agreement. And here we come up against the reality and the unwillingness of our authorities to at least start a discussion with society about this in order to conclude the necessary social contract before the negotiations begin, whenever the window opens for them. Here it is worth repeating one thing: the West sees our victory primarily as an orientation towards the EU and NATO, even at the expense of losing territories. In such a situation, understanding how and why people think can help the authorities find the courage to have an honest conversation with society. The latter will not remain silent if it is not satisfied with the terms of peace. The president’s short and evasive remarks to foreign audiences that “when you talk about territory, you must understand that we need to save people and the state above all” are not enough for a substantive conversation with society.
In this regard, we asked respondents a specific question: “Do you think that if the Ukrainian leadership is forced to sign a peace agreement with Russia with borders along the current frontline (thus renouncing the occupied territories), would this lead to civil resistance inside Ukraine?”
With a minuscule number of Ukrainians ready for the scenario of leaving the border where it is going to be at the time of signing the agreement, half of the country (49% of respondents) quite expectedly predicts civil resistance if the authorities decide to take such a step. At the same time, the other half of the country is also in two minds, where there are those who do not expect a radical turn of events (25%) and those who hover in their thoughts (25%) when answering this question.
Once again, the response from the south, where the percentage of those who will not go to rallies in case of unacceptable peace conditions is the highest at 33%, is not surprising. (The average figure for Ukraine is 25%). Perhaps now is the right time to ask the Ukrainian authorities a question: what’s going on in our south oblasts? After all, the point is not that it will not go against Zelenskyy; rather, it should be asked if it is loyal to Russia. Don’t you feel it? And this is not an accusation, but a call to look for reasons. A call not to delay finding out what the region is thinking; a call to work with it, help and talk honestly about everything. In other words, a call to become a strong state and not to remain a weak government thinking only about a second term of office. It is unlikely that the president’s approval rating and the referendum on the terms of peace, on which his entourage has probably placed its abet, will save the country.
All the more so since the problems aren’t just there. They are everywhere. Here is the second paradox: the majority of Ukrainians want the 1991 borders back, but a critical minority believes that it is shameful to be a draft dodger during the war. Right now you and I are entering another troubling area of research, where we cannot do without the power of the state. Otherwise, we risk being left without it. So, ZN.UA asked Ukrainians a direct question: “Do you think it is shameful to be a draft dodger now, during the war?”
Yes, you have read it right: 46% of Ukrainians believe that it is not shameful to be a draft dodger! Only 29% think the opposite, 25% are undecided. Do you want to go by regions? The leader is the south (60%), which largely fits in the context of the already outlined sentiments of the region, which is ready for concessions and does not insist much on the borders of 1991. But the west! It ranks second with 48% of those understanding draft dodgers while having a hard anti-negotiation stance and wanting to return all Ukrainian lands. But who is going to make it happen, fellow citizens?
And this is despite the fact that tens of thousands of residents of western Ukraine and southerners have died for the country, have been maimed for the country, and are fighting for the country. Let’s also bear in mind that we are now analyzing the mood of the rear and potential army.
Do you know who condemns draft dodgers the most? 37% of older people (60+) believe that it is shameful to be a draft dodger during the war. But 50% of the youngest respondents (aged between 18 and 29) think there is no shame. Their parents (50–59 years old) are probably of the same opinion: 52% of people of this age can understand draft dodgers. What are we going to do about it? Both in the south and in the west... The issue of draft dodgers certainly overlaps with mobilization. We will have a separate discussion on this topic, but I will allow myself to give a few remarks to illustrate the point.
In the west, people claim that most of their acquaintances are trying to evade military service by all means — 17% — while the average figure for the country is 15%. There are also more open criminal cases under this article of the Criminal Code. In the south, 13% of respondents said that almost all of their acquaintances were draft dodgers, with the national average being 9%. What is this all about?
“This is about people,” says Yevhen Holovakha, Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, corresponding member of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, when commenting on the results of the survey. “It is understandable that some things do not add up in the mass consciousness. They do not always add up in the minds of scholars! But I was really surprised by society’s attitude to draft dodgers. My old formula of immoral majority works again: the majority is not ashamed. But 30% of Ukrainians are ashamed and about the same number, a little more than 30%, according to our data, are ready to take up arms to defend Ukraine. This is, of course, a coincidence, but quite a symbolic one. And now look at another figure in our survey: 69% believe that Ukraine will win if the West helps us with human resources (more on this below). And here again we see a symbolic coincidence of the percentage of those who are not ashamed of the evaders and those who consider Western human resources as a condition of victory. But here it is hardly appropriate to say that people are guilty of hypocrisy; this is just the way they are. There are no others, and there will be no others.
The 1991 borders, no shame to be a draft dodger, but let’s go protest if the terms of peace don’t suit us?
“Yes!” continues Holovakha. “After all, people know that they won’t go to jail for taking to the streets. Ukraine, thank God, is not Russia. But protest is not a war. In fact, the consciousness of Ukrainians has always been defined by ambivalence. I have already shown this in the early 1990s. We have partially overcome it. Regionally and politically, there is no longer a dividing line between west and east in relation to the European Union, NATO and Russia. But new forms of ambivalence have emerged, an obvious duality of consciousness: people sincerely want to return everything as it was within the 1991 borders, but mostly not with their own hands. Because it is my brother, my brother-in-law, my son, my husband... In humane terms, it is quite understandable. But there is a risk: there will come a time when there will be no people at all who will want to go to war. We must realize that this is not only our problem. No country has a passionate majority. Ukrainians have already, in my opinion, turned out to be incredibly patient and courageous. Remember how many European countries were ready to surrender to Hitler. And Putin is the modern-day Hitler.”
According to Holovakha, it is not so much Ukrainians themselves that are in trouble as the state: “If the state assesses the current situation as an existential challenge, as a threat to its existence, it has the right to declare a general mobilization. The authorities can severely limit the budget. Introduce ration stamps. And people will join the army; otherwise, they simply will not survive. This is a challenge for the government. And it must solve these problems fundamentally. Otherwise, we will lose this war.
It is obvious that Russia does not want negotiations, as confirmed by the conditions that Putin is publicly putting forward to Ukraine. Therefore, there is nothing to do but resist. There is an opinion that the West can stop supplying us with weapons. But after the occupation of new Ukrainian territories, the army from the occupied regions will march to the West together with the Russian army. Russian occupiers will mobilize all former draft dodgers without talks and protests. The occupiers will have no draft dodgers. I think the West already realizes this. That’s why it will never give up on us. And Trump, if he wins, will not give up; otherwise, he will be denied support by the Americans themselves, most of whom support aid to Ukraine. Ukraine’s problem is to overcome its domestic problems,” the sociologist concluded.
Indeed, to continue to resist requires not only a belief in victory, but also an understanding of what might be the basis of victory. Or the reason of losing. Therefore, sociologists asked Ukrainians: “Do you agree with these statements?”
So, 82% of respondents believe that Ukraine can defeat Russia if Western partners give enough weapons. And this is the highest percentage of hope. There is certainly progress here: we have emerged from the crisis of disagreements between both Democrats and Republicans, which allows Ukraine to count on $61 billion from American partners. Even if it is within the framework of a defensive, not offensive strategy.
Another 76% of Ukrainians (and this is the second highest figure) believe that victory is possible if Ukraine builds its own powerful defense complex and puts mobilization in order. Here it is exactly about the need to overcome the domestic issues. It is not only armies, but also state machines that are at war. A strong defense industry will not grow on its own. However, there are not only institutional problems (corruption, concentration of power in the hands of the Presidential Office, lack of agency in the government and parliament), but also the obvious inability of the authorities to punch above their weight. And this is our main trap.
69% of those who believe in victory think that it is possible only if the West helps us with human resources. This figure was mentioned by Yevhen Holovakha, but we should elaborate on it a bit in the regional context. Does it surprise you that 77% of people in western Ukraine are waiting not only for foreign weapons, but also for foreigners themselves? The least hopeful for the human resources of partners are in the east (60%) and the south (57%), where hostilities are raging.
As for Ukrainians who do not believe in the possibility of defeating Russia and the reasons for it, the numbers are unanimously low. 19% of respondents believe that Ukraine will not be able to defeat Russia because the human, economic, financial and military-technical potentials are not comparable. The leaders here are the south and the east with 25 and 23%, respectively. Even fewer Ukrainians — 13.6% — think that victory is impossible because Putin has more effective allies.
Let’s draw some preliminary conclusions.
Firstly, Ukrainian society obviously bears the brunt of the war, but has no opportunity to form a real picture of the situation, including the plans of its authorities and allies. The state does not have a clear information policy based on reality, not on its silencing. The lack of understanding of the ultimate goal of the war, the absence of a social contract on how we see and accept victory, gives Russia the opportunity to sow doubt and sway us from within, on the one hand, and prevents international partners from hearing the consolidated voice of a warring Ukraine, on the other.
Secondly, the survey has confirmed the ambivalence of Ukrainian society. Most Ukrainians on the home front are willing to negotiate with Russia, but are not willing to give up anything. Most insist on the 1991 borders, but feel no shame for draft dodgers. Most live with those who do not want to serve in the army, but they will join together in civil protest if they are not satisfied with the terms of peace. And this is a serious challenge for both the warring state and society. Because it is either appetites that must be tempered or courage and sacrifice that must be reinforced.
Thirdly, there is the regional aspect. Each region of Ukraine has its own thoughts and experiences about the war. These depend on how close the fighting is, how long the region has been grappling with the war (which has been going on for ten (!) years), what sentiments and the influence of what political forces were strong there before the war. Therefore, the central government should keep a watchful eye on both Kharkiv and Odesa. Both Kramatorsk and Ternopil. Both Kyiv and Mukachevo. And not just tighten the leash of military administrations around the necks of communities in order to get local budgets at their sole disposal. This is not what the regional policy of a unified state looks like and certainly isn’t about victory.
Fourth, Ukraine has to marshal its forces in every respect; otherwise, our draft dodgers will be mobilized by Russia. This is about the fate of the country that each Ukrainian and the authorities should be responsible for. The authorities, which, faced with the impossibility to hold elections, are obliged to reformat the government and interaction within the system of state administration. Our state machine should finally get off the handbrake of the Presidential Office and drive in the right direction and at the right speed. And this is the personal responsibility not only of the president and his entourage, but also of all political elites, who have found it very convenient to hide behind Yermak’s back for the sake of their own vested interest.