What Happened to Macron and What Can Ukraine Expect Now?

Anatomy of the initiative

Two years. It took approximately that much time for the topic of sending units of the armed forces of Western countries to Ukraine to become a subject of substantial discussion among politicians and the media. This required an electric shock in the form of statements by the French president, who at first did not rule out such an option during a press conference after the Paris meeting dedicated to increasing aid to Ukraine. This signal was confirmed at his meeting with the leaders of French political parties and during his visit to the Czech Republic. Emmanuel Macron said there were no restrictions or “red lines” on France's support for Ukraine. He called on the allies not to be “cowards” in relation to Russia and to exert “maximum effort” in providing assistance to our country, which is still awaiting the arrival of additional Western weapons necessary to resist the Russian onslaught.

Such an evolution of the position of a politician who, even after the start of Russia's large-scale aggression, tried to hold telephone talks with the Kremlin dictator and urged “not to humiliate Russia” is no accident. It is based on the advent of Macron's appropriate awareness of the threats that Putin's Russia poses to Europe and France, as well as the criticality for Ukraine of the situation that has developed on the fronts of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the possibility of its acute deterioration in the near future (according to his assessment, by summer).

The French president expressed his current views on the war in Ukraine in a TV interview last Thursday. The most important, in my opinion, are the following statements: 1. This war, responsible for which rests squarely with Putin, is an existential threat to Europe and France. 2. Russia must not win this war. If Russia wins this war, trust in Europe will drop to zero. 3. If Russia wins, the lives of the French will change. France will no longer be safe. Europe will not be safe. 4. Those who set restrictions on aid to Ukraine choose defeat, not peace; capitulation of Ukraine will not bring peace; wishing for peace means not leaving Ukraine in trouble. 5. France and Europe must be strong and ready to respond to escalation by Putin.

A turning point for Macron, according to his advisers, was a visit to Sweden, where he saw firsthand how concerned the politicians there are about the possibility of Russian aggression against their country. Added to this, along with the disappointment in telephone diplomacy, were cyberattacks by Russian hackers and the exposure of a Russian disinformation network in France, threats to French aircraft in the Black Sea region and provocations by the Russian Navy, Russian plans to destabilize Moldova and the death of Aleksey Navalny. Taken together, these caused the mutation, according to the expression of the French newspaper Le Monde, of “a dove into a hawk.”

Other reasons for Macron's noticeably renewed vigor on the Ukrainian “front” can be noted. The first of them is related to purely domestic political considerations some months before the elections to the European Parliament (June 2024). The president is faced with the task of weakening the position of his main rival, Marine Le Pen's National Rally, which is significantly ahead of the presidential Renaissance in polls of potential voters. Macron is counting on the fact that the internal French debate on Ukraine policy, the main event of which was the discussion of the agreement on French-Ukrainian security cooperation in the National Assembly and the French Senate, will create an opportunity to expose the ties of Le Pen and her political power to Putin. This, for its part, should discredit them in front of the French public, which for the most part continues to have a negative attitude towards the Putin regime and supports Ukraine.

It cannot be ruled out that by putting forward the mentioned initiative and stimulating the discussion within the anti-Putin coalition, the French president is trying to put additional weight behind his ambitions to occupy the vacant position of the informal leader of the European Union. For this reason, he works on contrast, contrasting his dynamism and determination with the procrastination and hesitation inherent in Olaf Scholz's political behavior. True, for the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that Macron's struggle for leadership in the EU and his veiled criticism of the “indecisive Scholz” are unfortunately inconsistent with the actual amount of aid to Ukraine from France. According to expert estimates, Germany's aid to Ukraine is almost eight times greater than French aid. In addition, Germany provides most of the finances to our country in the form of grants, while France provides loans, which Ukraine will then have to repay.

Macron sees a proactive approach to the Ukrainian issue as a convincing argument in favor of the implementation of his idea regarding Europe’s strategic autonomy, especially against the background of the strengthening of neo-isolationist sentiments in the United States. According to the information of Macron's advisers, he was impressed by Donald Trump's call to Putin to “do whatever he wants” with those countries that do not make sufficient contributions to strengthening NATO's capabilities. The Eurocentricity of the French leader is largely motivated by his belief that only leadership positions in Europe can ensure France a place among the main figures of world politics.

On the other hand, he cannot fail to understand that the attitude of the Allies to his new strategic approaches will largely depend on their support by Germany and the effective functioning of the Franco-German tandem. Coordination of positions regarding Ukraine was in the center of attention of the participants of the “Weimar Triangle” meeting on March 15. In this context, the extent to which Macron was able to compensate for the negative impression made on the German chancellor by the barely veiled mocking remarks of his French colleague in Paris on February 26 is significant.

Currently, it can be stated that the overwhelming majority of France's partners and allies did not support Macron's most radical proposal regarding the possibility of sending units of the armed forces of Western countries to Ukraine. Judging by the statements made, the position of the Baltic countries is the most favorable to the French one; the Czech Republic and Poland are favorable, but more vague.

The French side itself made an important clarification: in any case, units of the armed forces of the partner countries will not take part in hostilities, carrying out demining, cyber defense, and weapons production tasks on Ukrainian territory. During a speech in the parliament, French Prime Minister Gabriel Attal emphasized that France supports Ukraine, but does not “wage wars with Russia and completely rejects the logic of escalation (apparently, hostilities — Oleh Shamshur).” Macron himself called Russia an “adversary” in a TV interview, but, like the prime minister, he emphasized that France is not at war with Russia or the Russian people, and assured the French that “we will never conduct offensive actions, we will not take the initiative.” I would advise those who are preparing to meet French combat units in Odessa to pay attention to all this. As for considering the issue of the possibility of their deployment in Ukraine at the French Defense Council in June of last year (this, too, was reported by Le Monde), it does not contradict the usual practice, when military specialists present to the state leadership the maximum number of options for behavior in a certain situation.

The parliamentary debate and Macron's televised interview became landmark events in the intense discussion about the forms and limits of the aid that the countries of the anti-Putin coalition are ready to provide to Ukraine to combat Russian aggression. Let's try to make conclusions about the intermediate balance.

Let's start with the positive things. It consists in the fact that both President Macron’s statements and their further discussion (despite the rejection of his “most revolutionary” proposals) showed an understanding in Western capitals (with the exception of Budapest and Bratislava) of the exceptional acuteness of the current military-political situation and the catastrophic consequences of even a partial victory Putin not only for Ukraine, but also for the entire democratic community. In contrast to the possibility of deploying units of the allied armed forces in Ukraine, the calls of the French president to exert maximum effort in providing assistance to Ukraine did not cause objections. It is also important that the topic of the presence of units of the armed forces of Western countries in Ukraine ceased to be a taboo or a possibility that Western officials categorically rejected.

Another positive aspect of the moment Macron has created is that it has enabled politicians to remind the citizens of Western nations how high the stakes are in this war for them, for their way of life and for their stability. This task is extremely important in view of the ambiguous dynamics of sentiments regarding the continuation of active support for Ukraine, which is observed in Western societies. As the example of the United States shows, the lack of a systematic dialogue with society significantly complicates or completely blocks the adoption of political decisions necessary to continue supporting Ukraine.

Evaluating the “earthquake” caused by Macron's initiative from the point of view of its impact on the informational and psychological confrontation between Ukraine and its partners, on the one hand, and Putin's Russia, on the other, it must be recognized that the public promotion of initiatives not agreed upon even with the closest allies can significantly reduce the positive effect from them. Apparently, the attention of the Russian leadership was drawn not only by the substance of the French president's proposals, but also by the fact that at this stage they were rejected by the key states that support Ukraine. In my opinion, calculations to put pressure on Russia by creating so-called strategic ambiguity regarding the involvement of Western armed forces in Ukraine are also unrealistic: this effect could have been achieved if the corresponding wording had been made public immediately after the start of Russia's large-scale aggression. Now, as they say, the train has already left: Putin has drawn the necessary conclusions from the previous statements of Western leaders that their military will never appear in Ukraine.

In order to improve the situation at the frontline and prevent the Russian forces from breaching its defenses, Ukraine does not need statements or even useful discussions with very uncertain (even in the long term) practical consequences. Military aid is needed — in time, in the necessary volumes and of the necessary type. It is necessary that the correct rhetoric is constantly transformed into concrete actions, and the announcement of the creation of another coalition has the effect of operational acceleration of the supply of weapons and equipment crucial for the Armed Forces. Specific “superpowers” of our partners are needed. The oscillation over whether or not to supply Ukraine with certain types of weapons seems almost grotesque and does not correlate well with public statements about Russia's “increasing belligerence.” The factor of time now weighs more than ever.

Read this article in Ukrainian and russian.