Are you expecting a powerful preparation fire and a counteroffensive? It won't happen. Everything has already started.

War analytics

In almost six months, the war of russia against Ukraine has gone through two completely different stages.

Another failure of the hybrid strategy

At the first stage, the russian army actions seemed strange. The campaign was planned on a large scale and covered huge areas in the north, east and south of the country, all of which seemed implausible before the start of the aggression. The aggressor’s troops advanced in marching columns pulling together military units along with units of the russian National Guard. Seized maps of the russian mid-level commanders contained no instructions for an offensive, but rather marching plans suggesting zero threat of any hostile encounter. They had no information about possible actions of the adversary, as if such adversary did not exist at all. The enemy launched adventurous and unprepared airborne assaults without any support, particularly in Hostomel and Vasylkiv, which soon were exterminated. There were no military intelligence and logistic support for the troops.

Actions of the aggressor’s troops at the initial stage of this war were based on neither military art fundamentals nor on the provisions of the russian military rules.

So, what was it? Simultaneous insanity of the aggressor’s military leadership?

Consciousness of their military was indicated by the decision to end the military adventure in its original design, by saving the group of forces in the north from complete defeat by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and by reducing the front-line military activity to the maximum possible, as they believed, extent.

If the aggression was planned without relying on provisions of the military science, as those were understood by the russians or set out in their governing documents, then what kind of grounds were used as the basis for this plan?

The russian aggression in its initial format was planned based on the hybrid warfare tenets. The main role was obviously given to the fifth column inside our country. And it could not be just about a bunch of marginals in different cities of Ukraine. Such stake did not pay off in 2014 either in the cities of southern Ukraine or in Slobozhanshchyna. And the occupation of part of Donbas was made by the joint forces of russian army and russian mercenaries. It certainly did not happen unattended by the local marginals and a lot of money and time was spent on preparation and organization of that even before 2014. But in general, they were not the ultimate force to rely on when starting aggression under such a scenario. Just remember the Girkin's open despair in 2014 over the reluctance of local men in Donbas to fight.

Based on the actions of the russians, they had GUARANTEES that there would be no resistance to the invaders and that Kyiv would surrender without any organized resistance. Would surrender just like the south of Ukraine had surrendered, where the Armed Forces of Ukraine as well as the local population were deprived of any capacity for armed resistance to the occupiers. Such conditions could not result from a betrayal, let alone any mistake, of individual officials or executives. Such conditions were created as a result of conducting large-scale hybrid operations. And the so-called "special operation" did not only rely on them, but was the pinnacle of their implementation.

Determination of the military – starting with the Commander-in-Chief and down to the lowest-level commanders, with unheard-of courage of soldiers, overwhelming readiness of volunteers, as well as of the entire population to defend the cities and villages of Ukraine – foiled the plans of the aggressor in the north and east of Ukraine and soon stopped the enemy in the south as well. It is worth noting importance of the decisive step of the President of Ukraine, who, in the circumstances of a critical situation around the capital, made the courageous decision not to leave Kyiv.

It is not our aim to analyze the hybrid details of the first stage of aggression in this article. We only note that the first stage of aggression was planned and carried out as the final phase of a strategic hybrid operation.

That was also indirectly confirmed by the facts of organizational decisions and arrests among the top management of the FSB, which took place in russia after the failure of occupiers' actions at the first stage.

Military retro performed by the Russian armed forces

The second stage of this war was conducted by the aggressor in accordance with their sustained understanding of the war and in accordance with requirements of the russian governing military documents.

Briefly, and somewhat primitively, that could be described as follows – creating an advantage by concentrating forces in a certain direction, inflicting a fire suppression on the enemy and then using its results for incursion. As a result – possession of a certain part of the area.

Ideally, the goal of such actions should be a breakthrough into the enemy's defense and development of in-depth offensive. But the aggressor never managed to achieve such a result.

What the russian army demonstrated in the second stage of the war was neither operational art nor tactics of the Second World War. This was the World War I, without any exaggeration. The so-called Brusyliv breakthrough of 1915, when the russians broke through the front simultaneously in several directions and advanced dozens of kilometers deep, looks now like an unmatched warfare masterpiece against the background of the awkward actions of the modern russian army.

And once again, the courage and skill of the Armed Forces of Ukraine should be noted. Demonstrating unwavering resilience in battles with and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, which greatly outnumbered the Ukrainian troops, they skillfully escaped the threat of besiege as soon as such threat reached a critical limit.

As a result – the military aggressor was finally exhausted and its offensive capacity had been depleted. The enemy stopped, having not completed the task of reaching the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. As they say – the bubble has burst.

Thus, in the second stage of the war, the russian offensive actions were built on the principles inherent in the military art of the middle of the last century, at their best.

Modern Type War or “Ukrainian Steppe Storm”

What's next? We look forward to the transition by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the counteroffensive and liberation of our land.

Associations come to mind – the 19^th of November in 1942, Stalingrad, powerful preparation fire destroying the enemy's defensive line and the troops of two fronts breaking through the defense... Again – the conceptual framework of military art back in the middle of the last century.

The war has changed. It is built on other principles and other concepts are being implemented.

The principle of simultaneous fire strike affecting the entire depth of the enemy’s operational structure. Concepts of the battlefield isolation (destroying the enemy's tactical reserves before their deploying into the battle) and isolation of the combat area (destruction of operational reserves). The combination of these and other features of modern military art allows to implement the concept of so-called non-contact warfare, when the positional war disappears and the line of contact between the warring parties is erased to some extent. In such a war, the line between offense and defense is blurred. By destroying the enemy's reserves before they even enter the battlefield, the side that successfully implements such actions clears the space for advancing with minimal losses of its troops.

Implementation scenario of this concept was delivered in the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, although aviation played the decisive role in defeating the enemy in that war.

Be reminded that the defeat of Saddam Hussein's army that captured Kuwait did not begin with the offensive (counteroffensive) of the ground troops. It was preceded by the Desert Storm operation, which inflicted damage to the entire depth of the enemy’s operational structure. At the same time, the operational tasks were fulfilled in terms of destroying the air defense system, the aviation group, the command and control system along with the logistics system.

Strikes were also made on the ground forces of the enemy. At the same time, in the initial phase of the operation only up to 15% of the available strike force resources were allocated to inflict damage to such ground forces of the enemy.

The coalition forces gained complete fire superiority over the enemy.

Desert Storm operation lasted 39 days. The following ground operation of the military coalition – Desert Sword – lasted 4 days and ended with the complete enemy’s defeat and surrender.

Waging such a war requires primarily all of the modern high-tech weapons.

This is the kind of weapons we receive from our allies. Effectiveness of its use is impressive and it strengthens the confidence that victory over the enemy is inevitable and lies just around the corner.

In addition to high-tech weapons, conducting such modern war according to the above principles requires the cutting edge techniques of planning and conducting operations. It has not been spelled out in our governing documents and has not been studied in our military educational institutions. And this is natural, since a year ago we would have never dreamed of having such weapons soon.

But we are convinced that our military leadership, primarily those in charge of operations and strategy, will overcome this challenge. There is also critical importance in the help from our partners, who definitely accumulated experience in conducting modern warfare, both during trainings and in the military operations they had to conduct.

In our opinion, which is based on the analysis of the latest information updates, the counteroffensive actions of our Armed Forces have already begun. And they have not begun with preparation fire along the front edge of the enemy's defense, but with striking the entire depth of its operational structure.

The priority has been given to the operational task of destroying the enemy's logistics system.

It should be emphasized that we are not talking about destruction of individual warehouses, no matter how big or important they may be. We are talking about the destruction (elimination) of the logistics system itself.

Along with destruction of the existing warehouses and bases, communication lines intended for the supply of material resources, unloading stations, rear control points and other elements will be taken under fire control. Fire strikes will cut off the enemy's attempts to restore the logistics system. Presumably, special operations forces will also be engaged in executing this task while acting along access and evacuation routes.

Accomplishment of this key objective will finally destroy the enemy's ability to make offensive actions.

Unfortunately, the scarcity of necessary weapons does not allow us to perform the tasks in a short timeframe but at the large front scale. Therefore, we may soon face the aggressor's attempts to resume further actions in specific areas.

But the approach chosen by our command is correct. Sustained destruction of the logistics system will increase proportionally to the arrival of additional means of fire.

At the same time, the enemy is powerless against highly maneuverable high-precision strike systems. Its only way to fight those is to use subversion and sabotage teams, and we must be prepared for their increased activity.

Along with the strikes on the logistics system elements, the operational task of disorganization (destruction) of the enemy's control system is also addressed. Almost every day we receive reports about having another command and control nodes targeted, and then we find messages in russian social media with confirmation of death of commanding officers in such compounds and units of the aggressor.

Recently, such enemy's command quarters and logistics centers have started scurrying around our land like rats, looking for salvation in a safe place. But there are none of those and there will be none of such for the enemy.

And here we note again that it’s not just the matter of military command units of the enemy but rather entire control system: command posts, communication centers, mobile Internet system and other elements. In addition to physical destruction of the cites, this task requires the use of EW means to suppress communication lines and other measures.

We describe these purely military issues in a simplified manner while detailing some of them to emphasize that the matter of planning and conducting a modern war is difficult, despite its external simplicity, and delivers high efficiency of the results.

The listed operational tasks are priorities for us to address.

Next, but equally important, is the operational task of destroying the enemy's air defense system in the occupied territory. This will enable the extensive use of aviation – both, the one we have today and the one that will come as aid from our partners. This will increase our firepower and accelerate the demise of our enemy. That's when the time and turn for dealing with its joint forces will come. This does not exclude striking such forces at earlier stages, including today. All such operational tasks are solved and will be solved taking into account priority of each of them at different stages of the operation development.

Thus, as can be seen from current events, the third stage of the war has begun. In the course of its implementation, certain offensive activity of the enemy in individual directions cannot excluded, but the essence of this stage will be in defeat of the aggressor and liberation of our land. There are some indications that our next operation is built on modern tenets of military art and will be based on use of modern high-tech weapons.

Commanders need to move away from attempts to “liberate another village of Ivanivka, Bohdanivka or Petrivka today” without any plans and prospects for developing the offensive. Oftentimes, settlements liberated this way return to enemy control after a short period of time. And our actions in this case turn into unjustified losses of human life and material resources.

It certainly does not relate to cases when such offensive actions are dictated by situation in other areas of the front.

Politicians should not demand immediate daily successes from the military. Our military has proven that they know their business perfectly and they understand what to do, when and how.

The enemy is also aware of its nearby end. The only thing that can save it is the truce and transfer of military aggression into the negotiation process. Now russia has a vital necessity to consolidate the captured territory and gain time to prepare a new phase of aggression. Without a truce, the aggressor’s defeat will be quick and unescapable.

Armistice under any pretext, such as export of grain, exchange of hostages and prisoners and so on. This approach is described in the so-called Gerasimov doctrine, which provides for active actions to be followed by putting forward proposals of conflict resolution and peace finding. All the so-called “hybrid forces” of the kremlin, in other words – its agents both in Ukraine and abroad, will be cast to pursue the goal of obtaining such armistice.

But we already learned the lesson in 2014 and we will not allow a repetition in 2022.

We believe in our Armed Forces! Together to the victory!