In the British diplomatic tradition, referring to Sir Austin Chamberlain, the Chinese curse “may you live in a time of change” is well known. Chinese scholars, however, contest it. In their opinion, the real, closest Chinese wisdom is “it is better to be a dog in times of tranquility than a man in times of chaos.” One way or another, we live in a time of chaos, a time of change.
The bad news is that the entropy of closed systems, i.e. the measure of chaos, is only increasing, as it should. The good news is that entropy reaches its maximum when the system reaches equilibrium, which in the language of geopolitics means the balance of power. This is evidenced by recent historical experience: wars, which are just the embodiment of chaos, come to an end and are followed by a more or less long period of peace, when the forces of the parties are balanced.
The question, as always, is in the details: when and how the balance of power is established, and what kind of balance it will be.
The most stable geopolitical equilibrium, of the states well known to us, emerged after World War II. The transatlantic system of mutual deterrence created then, as well as the mechanisms of interaction that lasted until the end of the Cold War, were so carefully constructed that even numerous attempts to destabilize the system (i.e., to add external energy to it in the form of wars in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, endless conflicts in Africa and permanent clashes in the Middle East) did not achieve their goal. And only the suicide of the “evil empire,” backed by Kissinger's “ingenuity” in supporting the rise of China, was able to upset the post-war balance.
The euphoria about the “end of history” and the erroneous assessment of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR, whose economy could probably have survived for some time based on China's model if it had not drowned in the ideological swamp, played a cruel joke on Western countries. Back in the 1990s, the moment was missed when the side that seemed to have lost in the Cold War began to think about revenge and started building an updated design of its part of the “balance.” Instead of bringing the disintegration of the last of the empires to an end, Russia was recognized as a member of the UN without joining the organization and, moreover, was given a seat in the UN Security Council without any legal grounds for it; the disarmament of Ukraine in exchange for the Budapest Memorandum took place by agreement between Russia and the West; Russia started to form integration politico-military projects first in the former USSR and then outside it; even under Yeltsin, relations with China became strategic.
At the very least, the West should have perceived Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and two Chechen wars as an impending catastrophe for itself, but it did not. President Clinton welcomed the rise to power in Russia of a career Federal Security Service officer. Both before Clinton and after him, wishful thinking was presented as reality, chaos grew and the final destabilization of the system due to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 made it impossible to go back. The only question was when and where a new war would be initiated as a tool for forming a new balance of power, only now according to the Kremlin's model. Georgia turned out to be an insufficiently large victim; Ukraine became the main target. The West could have recognized the impending catastrophe in time, but even Putin's Munich speech of 2007 was not heard.
From this point of view, the assertion of the Kremlin ideologists of the new fascism that Russia is at war in Ukraine not with Ukraine, but with the West, and that it is not interested in land, but in a new redivision of the world, is quite understandable. The only trouble is that they are unable to formulate what this redivision will be, what the new balance of power will be based on and between whom it should be built. The verbiage of Russian strategists about world majority, multipolarity, family values and Russia as the last hope of humankind does not even make for a freshman essay, let alone a strategy.
That is why China, new and powerful — though it has not fought since the Korean War — has been summoned for help. It is China that is now putting forward geopolitical concepts, formulating the terms of the future balance, and it is for this reason that China, not Russia, is of concern to the United States. Recently, Putin tried his best to show that BRICS is his party and that he still has influence on something. But the only important event in Kazan was the meeting of the leaders of India and China, who agreed to reduce tensions on the disputed border. This is important because India is a serious argument for building a future balance. If China is able to avoid the “USSR trap,” which was the substitution of economics for ideology, it will be extremely difficult for any US president to negotiate with it.
Defeating Russia is not an easy task, but its solution will strengthen the West's position in the future redivision of the world, and this is the argument that should work in the dialog with our partners. The panicked decision to bring in North Korean soldiers for war against Ukraine is a colossal folly, the consequences of which are bound to backfire on Moscow. Israel has already shown Iran what the latter's threats to wipe the Jewish state off the face of the earth are worth. Kim Jong Un should pay attention to this precedent; he, too, has become too loud in threatening neighbors near and far, and now he has entered a war that is not his own.
In whatever context we view the current chaos in international affairs, it is important to realize that almost every state, even a mere observer, sees the situation in its own way. What is obvious to us does not seem so to the UN Secretary-General and a significant number of states that are confined to their own problems. The BRICS summit, which was a failure for Russia, is seen very differently from Africa or Southeast Asia. Advanced democracies should pay attention to it: it is no longer possible to avoid reforming the world system, and they should offer a seat at the table to developing countries — formerly passive, but important from the point of view of modern geopolitics.
Half of the world's wealth is now generated in Asia, and Africa is the most important continent in terms of resources and development prospects. More and more middle powers are becoming self-reliant and are concerned about the constraints created and maintained by developed countries in previous historical periods. The neophytes of global politics still find it difficult to articulate what exactly they are dissatisfied with and how exactly a new world should be built. However, talking about the future in itself is attractive for them; it creates an illusion of involvement. Hence the “queues” to join BRICS, SCO and other meaningless structures. It is high time for adults to take responsibility and reform, first of all, interstate institutions and international security structures, to make them more inclusive. But for this, of course, we still need to survive January 20, and this is a daunting task.
International relations experts say that in terms of development strategies, states fall into two categories. One formulates goals, thinks in advance about the contours of the desired future and then moves forward using the available resources in the most optimal way. They believe that spontaneity and initiative lead to success when well supported by preparations and logistics. Others operate differently. They do not model the future or only partially model it. When faced with a certain challenge, they are forced to act under strong external pressure. It is not difficult to distinguish such states. Those who know how to build strategies move faster and more energetically towards the goal. Those who react to circumstances beyond their will are usually slow in their actions and often simply avoid radical solutions. This tends to be the case for countries that are vulnerable and have to follow circumstances rather than create them.
The number of the former is extremely limited — the United States, the EU and China —and they will serve as centers of attraction if they formulate their vision of the future in an attractive way for other countries. Russia, which presents the structure of the world order in the form of Dugin's “expanding empire” and Karaganov's “state-civilization” concept, can attract only outcasts and untouchables. Everyone else will keep a sanitary distance (as the recent BRICS summit showed), and this means the imminent civilizational collapse of Putin's system.
At the same time, the West, represented by the US and the EU, has yet to fill the conceptual vacuum in international relations with its own vision of humanity's collective future. The art of modern strategizing also lies in the skillful and optimal use of all available resources to achieve the goal. This is especially true when resources are limited and the war assumes a David vs. Goliath form.
One such resource that the West must skillfully use is collective security mechanisms. The other side does not yet have such instruments, although the existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between Russia, North Korea, Iran and China are already a kind of prototype of a future military alliance. The longer the war lasts and Ukraine remains outside NATO, the higher the chance that a new “Warsaw Pact” will emerge on the other side, only with a different capital in its name.
The scariest dimension of any war is, of course, the battlefield. But this is understood by those who have a relevant historical memory or are relatively close to the front line. For the rest of us, war is often just one event on the evening news. It doesn't have to be that way for those who think and/or make decisions. In these technological times, it is not difficult to obtain the necessary amount of information and analyze future scenarios based on the worst case scenario: as the Japanese say, live as if you were already dead.
Strategies aimed at eliminating the worst-case scenario are the most correct ones, no matter what “rational” arguments arise to contest them. The statements “Ukraine cannot be admitted to NATO because there is a war there,” “we cannot give permission to strike deep into Russian territory because it will escalate” and the like are nothing compared to the danger of having a new world order after the unjust ending of the war — not just with a different geopolitical center on the other side, but with a military bloc with as many nuclear countries as there are in NATO and where the price of human life equals zero.
The clock of history has an uneven rhythm. And while Russia's aggression against Ukraine could still be predicted, no one foresaw the entry of North Korea into the war or the supply of Iranian drones. As long as doubts torment the indecisive and erroneous assessments serve as the basis for policy making, entropy continues to grow. Indeed, we live in a time of change.