All wars are similar. Tactics, weapons, and equipment change, but the strategy of waging war remains the same at all times, namely, overcoming enemy resistance by all available means.
The Central and Entente countries entered World War I with infantry, cavalry, and light artillery firing shrapnel shells. And there were many battleships and heavy cruisers on the seas.
During the war, which became a trench war, heavy artillery played a major role, which led to a “shell crisis” in all the warring countries and an urgent restructuring of the economy that would be oriented toward the military sphere. The role of metalworking and the chemical industry increased, and the machine tool industry began to develop rapidly.
The use of the newly created aviation industry, airships, radios, the first tanks, destroyers, submarines, chemical weapons – changed the course of combat operations, and at some stage gave an advantage to one side or the other of the warring countries. But the main, most important role was played by the efficiency of public administration, the ability of government officials to mobilize the economy for war, to mobilize society, scientists, production workers, engineers, the military, in general, everyone who could be involved in the execution of military tasks.
In World War II, the degree of mobilization of states increased even more. The newest fighter planes, armadas of bombers, hundreds of thousands of tanks, guns, millions of tons of ammunition, the first cruise and ballistic missiles, radars, the atomic bomb – all this is the result of a seven-day work week, working 10-12 hours a day under continuous bombing. All this was done for the victory of the country.
There was not, is not and there will never be any panacea, a technical miracle, an ideal miraculous type of weapon capable of changing the course of the war. The course of the war is changed by hard work in battle at the front and hard work in the rear. If the rear leads an idle life, when there is not enough ammunition, tanks, guns, drones at the front, such a rear is doomed to occupation.
The bold statements of our politicians and officials about the rapid growth of drone production in Ukraine have little correlation with the real situation at the front, because there is still an acute shortage of shells, tanks, guns, and concrete for the construction of fortifications; There are not enough soldiers and there is a catastrophic shortage of talented commanders. There are not enough drones at the front.
An increase in the production of drones by tens of times can only temporarily calm the worries of the average person until he receives a summons, gets to the front line and sees everything with his own eyes. Because drones – and we are talking primarily about short-range radio-controlled FPV copters – are certainly needed on the front line. They partially compensate for the lack of artillery and shells. But FPV copters themselves – no matter how many there are – are not capable of giving our troops a strategic advantage and turning the tide of the war.
Thus, FPV copters are like the first aircraft models and the first tanks during the First World War: they can provide temporary tactical advantages on the battlefield, cover the shortage of ammunition, compensate for the shortage of personnel, but drones cannot change the course of war in the same way that weapons like "M142 HIMARS" and "ATACMS" can.
Of course, we need a lot of drones. But we need a lot of different drones. When TV presenters report to the population suffering from military actions that the production of drones has increased tenfold, this is deceit. We still have an acute shortage of reconnaissance drones like the DJI Mavic, and this is a popular weapon in war and one of the main types of weapons. In addition, there is no adequate Ukrainian alternative to such a drone as the DJI Mavic. We have a catastrophic shortage of kamikaze strike drones as the ZALA Lancet enemy drone with a range of 15 to 45 km, where the enemy feels at ease. And domestic alternative solutions either did not justify themselves or are not produced in the required quantities. There are absolutely not enough long-range drones to hit targets deep behind enemy lines.
The increase in drone production “tens of times” means in reality an increase in the number of Chinese drone kits imported into Ukraine for the screwdriver assembly of racing drones, which, after installing homemade ammunition on them, become “strike drones” and improve the karma of our leaders.
To assemble such drones, special and complex conditions are not required – a table, a chair, a soldering iron and a simple set of tools. It is possible to learn how to assemble FPV drones in two to three days, sometimes in two to three hours. And the average assembler, sitting in the kitchen, can produce up to 10 copters per day at a cost of 500–600 dollars. This is important work for a fighting army. But this is not the production of drones. It is no coincidence that even Ukroboronprom State Concern has already mastered the assembly of this type of weapon.
But the production of reconnaissance drones, attack drones of the “ZALA Lancet” type and long-range attack drones of the “Shahed 136” type is a completely different matter. It requires large initial investments, tens and hundreds of millions of dollars, a lot of expensive equipment, thousands of square meters of production space and, most importantly, highly qualified specialists. And there were practically no such people who are well versed in this issue before the large-scale invasion in Ukraine, and now it has become especially difficult to find them, because many of the specialists have long been taking part in military operations or are engaged in similar industries.
It is not surprising that our politicians and officials comment on this topic very carefully, and all attempts to promote themselves using the topic of “launching a Ukrainian suicide bomb into mass production,” which we have been hearing for the second year now, are being crushed by reality. After all, if the enemy attacks our rear every night with dozens of long-range strike drones, and we produce, as those in charge solemnly report, “dozens of drones per month,” then the difference in production volumes is at least 30 times! And this is complete powerlessness, professional incompetence and outright sabotage during the war.
In truth, the situation with drones in Ukraine has remained virtually unchanged during the year of full-scale war. The main bonuses, as always, are taken by private companies close to the authorities (just as construction companies close to the government profit from war). Companies close to the government sell Ukrainian drones to the army at clearly established international prices as part of the annual state defense order, have undeniable reservations for employees, have the ability to relocate production, have money, resources and capabilities...
In addition, companies close to the government make good money and develop at the expense of large volunteer foundations, which have long been firmly connected with those in power and are happy to finance procurement programs for “the most required types of drones” worth hundreds of millions of hryvnias for various secret structures. In these structures, financial reporting and application results (technical effectiveness) are securely hidden under the heading of secrecy.
The remaining hundreds of small manufacturers, at their own risk (and expense), develop unique drones (which are very difficult to sell to anyone). In addition, these manufacturers develop and produce fuses for attack drones and bombs, warheads (not filled with explosives) and engage in screwdriver assembly of attack FPV copters. If it were just as easy in Ukraine to assemble 155-mm shells using a screwdriver, then, of course, our craftsmen would also assemble them.
There has never been any state policy in the field of drone production. The state does not analyze trends in the development of combat drones, does not predict the army’s need for drones, and does not formulate technical requirements for drones. In addition, it is worth noting that the state does not announce competitions for the development and production of drones, does not finance scientific and development work, does not invest in the development of the production base, does not train specialists, does not reserve specialists needed by the industry, and does not recall them from the front.
Individual government officials, leaders and individual structures are doing a lot to help the front, such as the “Army of Drones” by Mykhailo Fedorov. But all this is just temporary and forced solutions that only allow us to cover the most necessary, critical needs for drones. There is no systematic work; just as it does not exist in other defense industries related to the production of ammunition, weapons, and military equipment.
The situation with drones in Ukraine is critical, as is the situation with all other military products. There is no single government body that would be responsible for implementing state policy (which also does not exist) in the production and use of drones. There is no state personnel policy, that is, personnel for the industry are not trained, specialists are not recalled from the front. No enterprises for the production of drones are being built at public expense. And our enemy is building such enterprises.
The situation with drones clearly reflects the state of affairs in the entire defense industry of Ukraine. The state has withdrawn itself from resolving this issue. Individual weak attempts of Ministry of Strategic Industries of Ukraine, introduction of Mykhailo Fedorov's initiatives, individual departmental decisions, growth points created by volunteers cannot lead to a significant increase in the production of drones, other types of weapons and military equipment. Ukraine remains critically dependent on supplies from abroad, on decisions made by our Western partners, while government officials do not consider it necessary or possible to orient the country’s economy primarily towards military needs, considering such a transfer “a sign of a totalitarian regime.”
How to solve the problem? The recipes have long been known. During the First and Second World Wars, the warring states transferred their economies primarily to military needs, mobilized the population for defense enterprises, spent up to 60% of GDP on defense, introduced a card system and imposed very large taxes on rich people. General mobilization (military and labor) is the only way to survive the brutal war that our enemy is waging against us in order to destroy our country.
But in order to start taking the defense industry seriously, to eliminate the insufficient numbers in drones and to ensure that drones have new strike capabilities, we need competent, experienced, non-corrupt government officials. We need new leaders because the ones we have now are not good for anything.