On Tuesday, 4 November, the European Commission presented its annual Enlargement Package report, which concerns all aspiring EU members, including Ukraine.
After the political authorities’ attack on NABU and SAPO, many expected the document to be rather critical. And indeed, in this respect it is quite explicit and not particularly diplomatic: “[…] the parliament adopted a law dismantling important safeguards for the independence of NABU and SAPO and putting their operational work under the authority of the politically appointed Prosecutor General. Following domestic protests and international criticism, a law was subsequently adopted restoring NABU and SAPO’s independence. Undue pressure on anti-corruption agencies remains a matter of concern.”
Moreover, the European Commission reiterated a demand from its previous Enlargement Reports for legislative amendments to ensure that the procedures for selecting and dismissing the Prosecutor General become more objective, transparent and merit-based. In essence, Ukraine has been warned that, going forward, the Prosecutor General must cease to be a political figure, and the selection process should resemble competitions for vacant positions of judges—which is, beyond doubt, entirely logical, since the Prosecutor General is also part of the justice system in the broader sense. And surely, in a democratic country it cannot be the case that judges of district courts are selected through years-long competitions, taking four written exams and undergoing two public interviews, while the President’s Office simply pulls a card with the Prosecutor General’s name out of its pocket half an hour before the parliamentary vote.
The “small triangle” of justice—consisting of courts, prosecution and the Bar—must not only formally meet EU standards but also function accordingly in practice.
So, beyond the NABU and SAPO story, what else this year drew the European Commission’s attention in the rule of law?
International experts
Even before the war, Ukraine’s legislation on the judiciary had acquired a new safeguard against corruption, nepotism and arbitrariness: international experts participating in selection commissions for candidates to the highest judicial positions. This approach was first introduced in the competition for judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) and was later continued in the commissions responsible for selecting members of the High Council of Justice (HCJ), the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) and even disciplinary inspectors of the HCJ.
In 2021, the authorities believed that international experts would be a temporary compromise for three to six years, conduct one or two rounds of selections and then transfer their experience (and powers) to the respective self-governing bodies: the Council of Judges, the Council of Prosecutors and the Bar Council (in the cases of the HCJ and HQCJ), as well as to the authorities appointing CCU judges.
Time has passed; in some selection commissions the term of office for international experts has expired, raising an obvious dilemma: is Ukraine ready to do without international experts or is it impossible to ensure an impartial and transparent selection process without them?
For a long time, the European Commission refrained from public comment, emphasizing in private meetings that Ukraine should gradually phase out the involvement of international experts. However, after the NABU and SAPO incident, the rhetoric changed dramatically. And in this year’s Enlargement Report, we now see a clear requirement to continue involving international experts not only in the selection of future HQCJ members but also in the appointment of new Supreme Court judges. The same applies to the vetting of judges of higher courts.
The EU also stresses the need to continue the work of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE) in selecting new judges for the HACC. The previous competition failed, as only two of 25 vacancies were filled. A repeat competition is now underway for 23 vacancies in the HACC and its Appeals Chamber, scheduled by HQCJ to conclude in March 2026. Yet, anticipating potential delays, the European Commission has already specified that the PCIE must remain engaged until all vacancies are filled. In other words, if this competition again fails to recruit a full complement of judges, the PCIE’s mandate will be extended accordingly.
Notably, these very proposals were voiced by a coalition of civil society organizations led by the Agency of Legislative Initiatives in their Shadow Report, which they have prepared for the European Commission for the second consecutive year.
Brussels has also noticed attempts to undermine the role of international experts through the Constitutional Court or the parliament. “Growing resistance to the involvement of internationally nominated independent experts in various selection or vetting processes, including a pending constitutional petition and a legislative initiative challenging all internationalised processes, raises serious concern,” the EC notes.
Thus, both civil society and the EU are sending a clear signal to the political leadership: any attempts to encroach upon the anti-corruption infrastructure or the role of international experts will prompt an immediate response and intensified oversight. One can only hope that, despite the public satisfaction over the diplomatically balanced tone of the EC’s report, the Presidential Office will have learned this lesson.
The existing experience of involving international experts in selection procedures now requires systematization, unification, and standardization, as each commission or council currently operates under its own rules and procedures. This somewhat undermines the lofty notion of Ukraine’s “path to the rule of law,” since there have been numerous cases where different commissions / councils have reached entirely opposite conclusions regarding the same candidate. It thus remains unclear whether a candidate actually meets the standards of integrity and ethics if one commission has deemed them trustworthy while another, only months earlier, ruled otherwise.
Institutional capacity of key bodies
The European Commission notes a certain degree of progress in Ukraine’s efforts to conduct competitions and appoint new judges. However, it also points out that “the judiciary still suffers from severe understaffing.” The EC further observes that the bodies of judicial governance are functioning properly, yet urgent issues remain concerning the selection and appointment of their members as well as their overall institutional capacity, including IT tools, analytics and access to databases. The Commission also recommends strengthening the capacity of the Public Integrity Council (PIC): “the PIC needs to be strengthened, especially by improving its access to judicial dossiers and its analytical capacities, and by creating a sufficiently resourced secretariat.”
The coalition of civil society organizations supports these recommendations in its 2024 and 2025 Shadow Reports.
Quorums in key bodies
The European Commission pays equal attention to the quorum problem within Ukraine’s principal bodies of judicial governance—the High Council of Justice (HCJ), the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU). For a long time, the HCJ operated right on the edge of its quorum (15 members), while the CCU had to suspend its work for half a year due to the lack of one.
Such occurrences are unacceptable in stable democracies, yet they happen regularly in Ukraine. Over the past eleven years, both the HCJ and HQCJ have ceased functioning entirely twice, while the CCU has done so once completely and several times partially due to recurring internal conflicts or external interference (such as the illegal dismissal of two CCU judges by a presidential decree). Although in the past three months the president has appointed two new judges to the CCU and two members to the HCJ, there is still a risk that these institutions could again become paralyzed, as the HCJ remains short of a quarter of its members and the CCU lacks almost one-third.
When selection processes last from six months to a year, forming stable bodies becomes virtually impossible: by the time some members are appointed, the terms of others expire. Moreover, some appointing authorities consciously neglect their duties. For instance, last month the parliament failed to vote for two CCU judges, while the Congress of Attorneys has not convened for almost four years to elect its two representatives to the HCJ, citing the war as an excuse.
The EC stresses that the authorities appointing CCU judges “must urgently proceed with the selection […], avoiding further delays.”
Reform of the Bar
The European Commission’s report states that no progress has been achieved in reforming the bar. “Concerns about the abuse of disciplinary mechanisms against lawyers and uneven disciplinary practices remain. The Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) has still not launched the competition for the HCJ members from its quota. In addition, the Bar’s self-governing bodies have not held elections, despite their mandates having expired.”
Whereas in previous years the European Commission diplomatically hinted at the need for reform in just a sentence or two, this time it spoke plainly: “Ukraine needs to urgently launch a comprehensive reform of the Bar.” At the same time, the EC emphasizes that the formation of UNBA bodies must be based on “transparent and credible procedures”, while access to the profession and the qualification system must be “significantly improved.” There are also questions regarding financial management, disciplinary accountability, and continuing education for lawyers.
In essence, the EC stated that war is no excuse for postponing the Congress of Attorneys or re-electing the Bar’s leadership, nor for delaying reforms in financing or professional qualification systems.
Yet, the reform of the Bar always involves two components: the state, represented by the parliament, which must pass the necessary legislative amendments, and the attorneys themselves, who must implement them independently of state interference. Ukraine may fulfil as many “EC requirements” as it wishes, but the reform of the Bar must ultimately be carried out by attorneys. Does the UNBA have a critical mass of lawyers willing and able to meet the European Commission’s demands?
There is a well-known saying: “If you really want to do something you'll find a way. If you don’t, you’ll find an excuse.” Undoubtedly, over nearly four years of war, the Bar Council could have taken the initiative to amend the Law on the Bar and Legal Practice to change the mechanism for holding the Congress of Attorneys—for instance, through online voting in the Diia application or other simplified means of electing delegates. But that has not happened. Therefore, even if a law were adopted to schedule the Congress (an idea that periodically resurfaces—and is clearly misguided), under the existing procedures, it would still be impossible to hold it. And in a year’s time, the EC will again ask: what has been done? Hence, it would be wiser to seek opportunities rather than hide behind excuses.
Independence of the judiciary and anti-corruption bodies
This issue drew considerable attention following the summer 2025 assault on the independence of NABU and SAPO. Yet, such attacks occur not only against these institutions. For example, in the spring the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) conducted searches at the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) and interrogated its members in several criminal cases. At that time, the HQCJ publicly declared that these actions constituted interference in its work, a point also reflected in this year’s Enlargement Report.
The story of criminal proceedings against the HQCJ continues to unfold. After a meeting of the parliament’s Temporary Investigative Commission (TIC) on alleged corruption-related offenses within law enforcement and judicial institutions—attended by the HQCJ chair—the SBI opened a case concerning unauthorized interference with information (automated) systems during examination checks. The HQCJ publicly stated that the TIC’s actions amounted to pressure on the institution.
However, in its report the European Commission stressed that “it is important that parliamentary oversight does not erode public trust in anticorruption institutions.”
In lieu of conclusions
Despite the overall balanced and cautiously positive tone of the 2025 European Commission report, Brussels has clearly identified the areas where reforms must accelerate and where the Ukrainian authorities must demonstrate immediate attention. In addition to the major areas already discussed, the report also contains more “technical” recommendations — such as the adoption of the Strategy for the Development of the Justice System and Constitutional Judiciary, which has already been drafted.
There are also more specific requirements: for example, finally allocating adequate premises for the HACC. Strictly speaking, such operational details should not even appear in a strategic document of the EC’s level. However, when the Cabinet of Ministers has been dragging its feet for six years over providing suitable space for the HACC, Brussels has felt compelled to say: we see this too.
Summing up this year’s requirements for Ukraine, three conclusions can be drawn with certainty:
First, yes—Ukraine is being given a “war discount”, but only where that aligns with common sense.
Second, the European Union will not allow the rollback of the progress achieved over the past decade; any attempts to undermine it will have the opposite effect.
Third, Ukraine’s path toward EU membership remains long. It will certainly extend beyond the deadlines of the Rule of Law Roadmap, which is scheduled to run until early 2028. Yet even within the 2025 milestones, many of the planned measures have not yet been implemented.
In essence, the time has come to start implementing them actively so that next year’s Enlargement Report will not require any “discounts” in order to sound positive.