The invitation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, to visit China sounded loud and unexpected. Back in June, the highest officials in Beijing skilfully avoided communications with representatives of Ukraine. Ambassador Pavlo Ryabikin directly complained about the silence of Beijing bureaucrats, the Chinese side did not agree to the visit of Deputy Minister Andriy Sybiga until the last moment, and the non-participation of Chinese diplomats in the Swiss Peace Summit was officially announced literally on the eve of the event. That is why the gates to the Celestial Empire were opened from the Chinese side for Dmytro Kuleba's visit in July. On the website of the local Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the meeting between Wang Yi and D. Kuleba was published without the usual Chinese-style emphasis on the fact that the guest had requested the visit.
China's sudden interest in communication with Ukraine does not at all indicate a change in its position on the "Ukrainian crisis". In the read-out issued by the Chinese side following the meeting, traditional clichés used by Beijing were reproduced: mentions of a political solution to the "Ukrainian crisis," China's commitment to negotiations, and its "constructive role" in ending the war. In it, again, there is no mention of either supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine or of Russia's responsibility for the war. China presents its position not as an individual stance but as a consensus based on an understanding with Brazil and supported by the "international community." None of this is mentioned in the press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, published after the meeting, where the main narrative focuses on a just peace ensured through President Zelenskyi's formula and highlights Russia's unscrupulous approach to negotiations. Although the texts from the Chinese Foreign Ministry rarely synchronize with the read-outs of their guests and are always presented in a specific manner, the total inconsistency of the parties' comments on the results of the meeting is striking. Why then did China need this visit?
Old new danger
The incentive to initiate it came not from events in the capitals of Asia or Europe, but in North America, where the election campaign for the president of the United States is ongoing. Joe Biden's failure at the debate, the shooting in Pennsylvania, the Republican Party's nominating conference, and the crisis in the Democratic camp created a clear impression in China of the inevitability of Donald Trump's return to power. The Chinese academic community woke up from its lethargy and began actively predicting the political typhoon that could arise with Trump's return to the White House. (However, with Biden's decision not to participate in the race for the presidential seat and his passing of the "baton" to Kamala Harris, it is now clear that Trump's victory is far from certain). Despite the fact that the practical aspects of policy in the Chinese direction will largely be determined not so much by Trump himself but by his yet-unknown advisers, invisible streams of analytical reports have already flowed from think tanks in China to the top, addressing a wide range of phobias related to the potential restoration of the Republicans.
The prevailing opinion among Chinese experts in international relations is that the diplomacy, political constitution, and economic system of the PRC will be attacked by the new Trump administration. They do not anticipate precise, targeted sanctions but rather the revival of broad-based tariff wars similar to those during his previous term. Beijing's ability to defend itself symmetrically will be quite limited, as trade between the countries continues to be skewed in China's favor.
A new trade war is brewing for China at an extremely inconvenient time. Its extensive growth model has hit a ceiling and needs a transition to a new quality, which will rely more on private consumption rather than government investment. The "modernization of productive forces" that Xi Jinping often speaks about now requires time, stability, and painful reforms. The Communist Party is striving to maintain the high dynamism of growth rates, which, as it was 20 years ago, is largely driven by surplus foreign trade. Damage to exports, equivalent to a fifth of China's GDP, has significant destabilizing potential. If avoiding this damage is not possible, China would at least prefer to minimize its losses.
Maneuver to protect against damage
The key role in securing the PRC's economy belongs to Europe, which provides both a substantial market and strong demand for Chinese exports. However, contradictions have also accumulated in trade between the EU and China, with the European Commission moving to protect its own markets from subsidized Chinese goods, particularly electric vehicles and solar panels. While Beijing views the conflict with Washington as existential, it believes that an understanding with Brussels can be achieved with bribing—such as integrating European companies into Chinese value chains.
China also strongly fears that the Trump administration might, as it claims, play the Russian card—drawing Moscow to its side and imposing peace on Ukraine at the expense of concessions on Russian terms. If this happens, Beijing will also find itself in the camp of losers as a result of the war. Despite the rhetoric of friendship and endless "deepening of partnership," Xi Jinping prefers not to rely entirely on Vladimir Putin. Cooperation between these autocrats is primarily confined to trade and diplomacy, with military collaboration remaining limited and humanitarian and investment relations being largely symbolic, reflecting an underlying mistrust. To restrict Putin's ability to court the new American administration, Beijing is considering increasing its influence over the "Ukrainian issue." This involves creating conditions under which the Kremlin cannot finalize the outcome of the war without approval from Zhongnanhai.
Chinese scientists believe that the active involvement of the USA in the Palestinian-Israeli war is also advantageous for the PRC. They interpret the European approach to the conflict region as a self-distancing strategy from the USA. This approach is expected to facilitate finding common ground between China and European countries.
In Chinese intellectual thought, there is a somewhat simplistic notion that Europe can be detached from the United States and engaged on China's side. They perceive the uncertainty gripping European capitals as they consider the American race, as well as the desperation that the prospect of a Democratic loss engenders. In this sense, Trump's victory seems not only a threat to China but also a window of opportunity on the European track. Disappointment over Trump's tariff wars, which will likely impact both China and the EU, and his destabilization of the NATO structure will fuel European concerns and facilitate rapprochement. China will also find a reason to restart relations with Europe, as next year will mark the 50th anniversary of the establishment of China's diplomatic mission to the EU (then still the Economic Community).
The meeting and dialogue with representatives of Ukraine, which almost every European leader asked Xi Jinping about and which he frankly ignored, could now become a powerful starting point for more substantive communication with Europeans. It is possible that Viktor Orbán, who positioned himself as a mediator during a pseudo-peacemaking tour of several influential capitals, might be chosen for communication until Beijing is convinced that he appears marginal within the EU. More likely, China will attempt to construct several parallel tracks for developing dialogue.
The signals and messengers that Kyiv sends will, as before, carry little weight in Chinese strategy. In the near future, Beijing will be interested in normalizing economic relations with Brussels as quickly as possible, temporarily showing openness to compromises on economic issues and concessions. Even if China's position on the Ukrainian issue is still declared to be "consistent and clear," it will increasingly shift into the gray area of vague diplomatic disputes with the European Union regarding trade.