Russia is gradually increasing its geopolitical influence in Africa. In some cases, by sugarcoating with words and selling wheat; in others, using grease payments and supplying weapons.
One of the tools of this Kremlin expansion was the first ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum that was held last weekend. It was attended by 54 delegations from African states and regional associations that discussed investment, agriculture, security, etc. The conference adopted joint statements — a general political one and three sectoral ones: on international information security, the fight against terrorism and the peaceful use of space.
From the standpoint of African countries, such a forum is beneficial because it allows them to establish political, economic and military-technical ties. But the main thing is to probe the possibility of receiving investments and weapons. For Russia, the conference, at which Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke of “vibrant” relations with African states and artificial obstacles from the “collective West,” is a diplomatic mechanism to help fulfill the Kremlin's goals in Africa.
And they are as follows.
First, to demonstrate that there is no international isolation of Russia.
Second, to build an image of Russia as the defender of the global majority and to become the leader of the anti-Western front, which is supposed to give Moscow additional geopolitical weight in negotiations with Washington, Berlin, Brussels, London, and Paris.
Third, to lobby for alternative financial instruments capable of replacing the dollar in international settlements.
Fourth, to promote Russia's economic presence on the continent: 30% of the world's natural resources is concentrated in Africa.
Russia has partially achieved these goals, which poses additional threats to Western countries and Ukraine. And this relates not only to voting in the UN, where about a quarter of the seats belong to African countries.
Thus, the Kremlin largely controls several African states, namely Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, the Central African Republic, whose subsoil assets include deposits of diamonds, uranium, gold, oil, lithium, titanium, etc. Russia's influence in Libya and Sudan is strong. Moscow not only gets access to the natural wealth of these countries but also an opportunity to destabilize European states by instigating a migration threat in Africa. However, the Kremlin's plans are not limited to the countries of the Sahara-Sahel region.
Russia's trade turnover with Africa is growing little by little: from $18 billion in 2022, it increased to $24.5 billion in 2023 and is now $18.6 billion for the first eight months of 2024. At the same time, about 25% of Russian supplies is grain; oil and petroleum products account for 22%. Then there are weapons, a lot of weapons. However, the main trading partners for Africa are still the EU and China. The trade turnover with the European Union is $225 billion, and with China it amounted to $282 billion in 2022. At the same time, of the foreign investments coming to the continent, the share of the Russian Federation accounts for less than 1%.
Moscow is making inroads into Africa in different ways, establishing political and economic control over the states. For example, it uses a pro-Russian lobby: some ruling African politicians graduated from Russian universities, some simply receive Russian money. In aggressive information work, they capitalize on Africans' memories of Soviet assistance during the Cold War. The Kremlin is also actively using anti-colonial rhetoric, conducting a large-scale disinformation campaign.
The Kremlin presents Russia's war against Ukraine as a war the West is waging against Russia by the hands of its proxy power, whilst also accusing the EU and the US of spending money meant for African countries on Ukraine. During the ministerial conference, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated that the West is funneling money to the Kyiv regime to the detriment of aid to African countries: “What are they doing this for? With but one purpose: to defeat Russia strategically.”
To gain popularity, Moscow is writing off debts to African countries: according to Mikhail Bogdanov, special representative of the Russian president for the Middle East and Africa and deputy foreign minister, this amount is $20 billion. Hypocritically accusing the West of disrupting the “grain deal,” the Kremlin claims that Russia is able to replace Ukrainian grain and organizes demonstrative deliveries of small batches of fertilizers and wheat to African countries.
At the same time, many residents of African countries do not think about the fact that it was Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that led to a decrease in supplies of Ukrainian wheat and an increase in grain prices on the world market, which threatened to starve East Africa. The disinformation campaign of the Rossotrudnichestvo agency and the Roscongress Foundation, the Sputnik agency and RT TV company is yielding results: the popularity of the Russian flag and Putin is growing, and Africans blame the West, not Russia, for their troubles.
According to Gallup, Russia's approval ratings in Africa, which had fallen sharply in 2022, rose again in 2023 from 34% to 42%. China's rating has also grown: from 52% in 2022 to 58% in 2023. But the popularity of the United States diminished from 59% to 56%. However, it is still higher than Russia's.
But behind the Kremlin's anti-colonial rhetoric lies a policy of neocolonialism, Russia's pragmatic interest in controlling Africa's natural resources and logistics routes. And the Kremlin's geopolitical competition with the West and information operations are also increasing tensions on the continent.
Moscow today has little to offer African countries. Until recently, the main tool for strengthening Russia's presence in Africa was not food and fertilizer supplies (although Russian grain exports to African countries largely solve the problem of hunger), but arms sales and the provision of security services — first through Prigozhyn’s Wagner PMC and now through the Africa Corps, controlled by the Russian Defense Ministry.
Military coups in Gabon, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Guinea, Chad and Mali helped Moscow to strengthen its position. Being in conflict with the West and in need of at least partial international recognition, the junta representatives are looking for political and military support in Russia. They pay for the presence of Russian mercenaries by transferring control over mineral deposits to the Kremlin. But Russian support strengthens the position of authoritarian regimes, which often suppress opposition and violate human rights, leading to internal conflicts and increased instability.
Most Russian arms sales on the African continent are made through the state-owned Rosoboronexport company. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2018 and 2022, 40% of weapons sold in Africa were from Russia. But the US, China and France accounted for 16%, 9.8 and 7.6% respectively. One of the reasons for the attractiveness of Russian arms is that Moscow does not condition its arms sales on democratic principles.
After the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, which affected arms supplies, Russia has relied on nuclear power. There is an acute shortage of electricity in Africa, and Moscow is offering countries the construction of nuclear power plants. For Russia, cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy is part of a long-term strategy to strengthen its political and economic presence in Africa. However, while the nuclear power plant in Egypt is already a real project, the construction of nuclear power plants in the Sahel countries is still only an intention.
The fact that the EU and the US have lost interest in the continent in recent decades also contributes to the strengthening of Russia's position in Africa. This is explained not only by the decline in its importance for the West after the end of the Cold War. Despite the economic attractiveness of Africa, many Western companies were deterred by the instability of political regimes, constant armed conflicts, corruption, underdeveloped transport infrastructure on the continent and low-skilled labor.
There are no indications yet that the West will strengthen its political position in Africa in the future. Despite Paris's efforts, France is rapidly losing influence in its former colonies. It is unlikely that the Trump administration, which sees China as a major threat and is preoccupied with conflicts in the Middle East and the Russian-Ukrainian war, will pursue an aggressive policy in Africa: the US is expected to be even less engaged in the continent than it was during the Biden presidency.
This geopolitical void left by the West is being filled by Russia and China, which are not afraid of the risks and threats that abound in Africa: unstable political regimes, territorial disputes, religious fundamentalism, terrorism and weak state institutions. And while Western companies are under pressure from the public that disapproves of cooperation with dictators who suppress opposition and violate human rights, Russia and China are not deterred.
Although economic competition for Africa persists between Moscow and Beijing, it is in the background: on this continent, Russia and China are increasingly acting as political partners in confronting the West. That said, Brussels and Washington are more concerned about what Beijing is doing in Africa than Moscow, seeing China as the main threat to their interests on the continent.
Given that Russia views Africa as yet another battleground against the “global West,” Russia's expansion does nothing to promote stability and security on the continent.