In the first part of our conversation with the head of the Economic Security Bureau, Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi, we discussed his vision for personnel policy, plans to reboot the institution and his readiness to face systemic resistance to change. Yet many questions remained on the table.
Strategic intentions are one thing; their practical implementation is another. For years, the ESB has been associated with petty cases rather than large-scale economic crime, with distorted statistics and opening proceedings to pressure and extort. Is the new head ready to challenge not only the really big players, but also the Bureau’s “usual practices”? What specific tools does the ESB need to work effectively, and what is it lacking most? When can we expect the first results from this latest reboot?
And most importantly, how can we convince society that this time is for real—that the new ESB team will not chase indicators like “cases per detective” but deliver real, systemic change in the country’s economy?
We tackle these questions in the second part of our conversation with Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi.
IV: Oleksandr, yesterday—so as to remain impartial—we jotted down every fifth news item from the ESB. With your permission, we’ll quote: 11 million UAH in unpaid taxes; 23 million UAH not received by a local budget; violations in a tender worth 9 million UAH; seizure of counterfeit goods worth 12 million UAH; suspicion of embezzlement of 3 million UAH. All this against the backdrop of a four-trillion-hryvnia state budget shortfall. Meanwhile, we have restaurants that accept only cash, cigarettes sold without excise stamps and “minimum-price” retail chains that don’t issue fiscal receipts. Will you, like your predecessors, leave them alone? Or will you “lock horns” with the SSU?
OT: As for the news flow—yes, the Bureau is an organism that’s being re-tuned. We’re setting priorities, conducting audits, working, getting to know our people. That news format will definitely change.
IV: We’re not talking about the format. We mean the results—busywork on minor issues while ignoring large-scale problems.
OT: We are changing the institution and working on it. This won’t happen in a day or a month—it’s a process. We need not only to adjust the organizational structure and appoint people but also to change approaches and teach people to work in a new way. It took the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) years to achieve clear, systematic work. They also had various issues and ineffective practices to abandon. Will this happen in a single day? No.
Regarding the Security Service of Ukraine, I’ll say this: when I worked at NABU, I had effective joint cases with the SSU and the National Police, clear and well-coordinated.
Our position on how we work is unambiguous: if we detect corruption or any other criminal offense, I don’t care who committed it. If it falls under the ESB’s jurisdiction, we will investigate. If it does not, we will transfer the materials to the competent body.
The ESB will certainly not stop performing its functional duties in the most critical sectors of the economy.
IV: You do realize that a confrontation—not with the entire Security Service, of course, but with certain individuals—will be inevitable, difficult and challenging both for you and for new people coming in to reboot the ESB?
OT: I don’t want to personalize any law-enforcement body or government service. What I can say is that I’ve been preparing to lead this Bureau for ten years. My record in recent years shows clearly: there will be no preferences for anyone. If there is a crime, we work.
Do I understand the challenges and potential problems? Yes. Do I know what monied interests might oppose us? Of course. I live in Ukraine and have worked in law enforcement; I know the processes and influences. But our work will be honest.
Naturally, I don’t rule out mistakes. Anyone who works actively makes mistakes. But if we act with integrity, I’m convinced we will succeed.
One key reason my colleagues at NABU and I weren’t afraid to work honestly and objectively was that we felt the state treated us fairly in enforcing the law. If the law is applied fairly to ESB employees and they feel that fairness, they will work honestly as well. Those who feel fairly treated are best placed to project fairness outward.
I’m convinced I’ll be able to communicate with everyone and ensure compliance with the law as it concerns ESB employees, as well as proper working conditions for our staff.
IV: How do you view the parliamentary initiative to strip the ESB of the ability to initiate criminal cases against officials of business entities and transfer that power to the prosecution? Is this an encroachment on the ESB’s institutional capacity?
OT: In its current version, it would indeed deprive the ESB of powers it currently holds, while other agencies would retain theirs. The approach should be uniform, not selective. So yes, I’d like this to be done properly.
That said, the jurisdiction problem exists, and right now we have a unique opportunity to solve it.
Even before my appointment, not only at the ESB but in other bodies, proceedings were sometimes registered with no clear rationale. There were mass searches and summonses; the business community was outraged that instead of investigations, some “other measures” were being carried out.
What we’re seeing now is a response to that outrage. But if we spent six months running an independent competition with international partners, decided to reboot the ESB and selected a new head, then we need time to prove ourselves. For example, a year—until the first audit. If nothing changes and registration remains opaque, then we can talk about giving the ESB less discretion.
At the moment, I believe we should all be equal. If other bodies can bring matters under their jurisdiction, why can’t the ESB?
Still, the idea of bringing order to registrations is a good one. From my NABU experience: whenever other bodies brought Criminal Code articles under NABU’s jurisdiction and investigated them, chronic problems arose with the evidence base.
IV: In terms of effectiveness, we know what NABU and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) lack: independent forensics, wiretapping without SSU permission and the ability to open cases against MPs without the Prosecutor General’s approval. What does the ESB have right now, and what can be improved?
OT: The ESB needs fairness and enforcement of the law with respect to its employees.
First—ranks. We’re working to standardize them. It may seem minor, but for someone who served as a colonel in law enforcement, joining the ESB now means automatically becoming a lieutenant. This isn’t about money—it’s about dignity. We’ve reached consensus with the ministry and government. Case law is clear. Failing to adopt the necessary decision will only trigger lawsuits by ESB employees to restore fairness and will burden an already overloaded court system. Why do that? It’s now a purely technical issue, and we expect it to be resolved.
Second—pay parity with other special agencies. The State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), NABU, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) all use a tax-free minimum of 3,028 UAH. For the ESB it’s 2,102. That’s discrimination. Everyone’s pay is calculated as a multiple of the tax-free minimum, but the figure used for the ESB is different.
Next—personal income tax. Other bodies compensate income tax for management. Only about 500 ESB employees—out of literally a million security and defense personnel with command status—are excluded. As a result, an ESB detective’s salary is 50–60 percent lower than, say, an SBI detective’s. Under such conditions, you can’t win the talent competition. Equality in the business environment should be ensured by those who are equal within their segment—namely, the ESB among other law-enforcement bodies. A discriminatory approach uniquely toward ESB staff—not only compared to other special agencies but also to the National Police, border guards, State Emergency Service employees, etc.—doesn’t help a reboot.
Third—protection. Effective operations require physical protection for detectives. Of all law enforcement bodies, only the ESB has a problem both acquiring special security equipment and having clear legal grounds for its use. This also prevents proper witness protection. My NABU experience shows: if you can ensure real safety for a witness, they will cooperate. Conversely, if an agency cannot conduct searches on its own where resistance is likely—for example, at an illegal cigarette factory—and must bring in other agencies’ units, effectiveness is at risk.
IV: Do you have sufficient special measures for investigations? Are all the tools for covert investigations provided for in law?
OT: The law provides for them, but there are obstacles that significantly limit our covert work. This narrows our ability to gather evidence through searches. I want to change that—work more effectively but less publicly. To make smart investigations effective, we need amendments to the relevant Cabinet of Ministers resolution.
Let me continue. Fourth—we need legislative changes. For example, I can order a polygraph test, but I can only read the results—and they must be destroyed within seven days. We will propose changing this rule because over time both the disciplinary commission and civil society representatives should be able to review them. And this information should be stored at the Bureau.
There are also other legislative particulars which, if not resolved, could significantly cut salaries from 2026, making it practically impossible to restart and further develop the Bureau. If that happens, creating a new institution risks remaining an idea without the means to implement it.
We also face the problem of reserving staff from conscription. Unlike other bodies, we train IT specialists to build a unique information system. Under the current reservation rules, even after recruiting and training these people, we cannot reserve them. That would threaten the creation of a unified information system with no analogues in Ukraine. If we want to build something truly innovative, we must be able to reserve unique specialists. I served for a year myself—I’m not someone who would use reservation without real need. But without this tool, and with current pay levels, recruiting and retaining the right people will be difficult.
I’ll stop there for now, but for context: we need about 15 legislative changes, eight of which are key.
IV: Please outline the main areas you plan to focus on.
OT: First and foremost, these are customs, excisable goods, export-import operations, tax evasion, international technical assistance and the gambling business.
IV: It’s important to record this so we can review results in about a year.
OT: What we will definitely achieve in a year is integrity. There will be no cases of detectives taking bribes.
Will we meet society’s broader expectations in that time, given re-certification of roughly 15 percent of personnel? That’s an extremely complex story from a staffing standpoint. We’ll strike a balance and try to be effective, but we must be realistic.
If our headcount potentially decreases, competition commissions must be launched; many people are drawn into selection rather than their core work. So if everything happens solely with ESB resources, we’ll face a choice between a formal approach and a genuine re-certification geared to a marathon, not a sprint. I will not agree to formalism, even at reputational cost.
A quality product does not appear instantly. Expectations may be too high because achieving everything at once is impossible. We’ll move forward step by step, developing the institution.
We’ll conduct re-certification, meet our obligations to international partners, and strive to achieve our targets. We’ll set priorities. We will shift away from minor investigations toward organized criminal groups and the largest sums. But if there are smaller crimes under ESB jurisdiction, they will also be investigated.
I believe we’ll succeed, within real timelines and given the actual state of affairs.
IV: You’ve already mentioned a unified information system. What will it look like, what will it give the Bureau, and—most importantly—how much will it cost?
OT: The ESB must strengthen its analytical component. Today, the world runs on big data. High-quality analysis, the ability to see trends and connections, lets you build a modern prevention system and a risk-based approach to many problems. A unified information system means all databases—tax, customs and more—brought together, with the ability to run deep analysis, identify trends and deviations, spot sudden changes and so on. It’s large-scale work and takes effort, but the result is worth it.
For the moment, however, we have a problem with several bodies that supply us information. For some reason, they’ve stopped providing it in the form they should. I hope this is purely technical, not the sprouting of resistance.
I believe this system could make us world leaders in this field and help not only in investigations but also in addressing a range of systemic economic problems.
As for cost, we currently have only rough estimates for the hardware and some other components. We’re building a unique product from scratch, consultations are ongoing on many issues, so I can’t name a final amount.
But I’ll stress this: even the best specialists cannot solve our tasks effectively without quality tools. I will not agree to build of thing of yesteryear. It has to be the future.
IV: You’ve said it’s important that relations between ESB employees and business be rooted in integrity. How will you determine that?
OT: Good question. There are many factors. I’m not saying ESB employees should be liked by businesses or love business themselves. They must perform their work professionally and at a high quality—that’s the key. If ESB employees are held accountable for corruption in the course of their duties, we will respond…
IV: You know, there’s a group called “Monaco” in the tax service, reportedly overseen by Ihor Abramovych, that collects 0.15 percent of turnover from some businesses as a “subscription fee,” like classic 1990s racketeers. That’s a lot—but everyone is silent, which signals disbelief that the rule of law is even possible here. If everyone stays silent, you simply won’t learn that something’s wrong.
OT: My experience suggests that when an institution works with integrity, it should not be confused with silence. There were never integrity claims against NABU staff. They could be accused of many things, but they always passed the so-called secret integrity test—and that came from the investigation targets themselves. When people under investigation in many cases, on covert investigative recordings, say outright that it’s impossible to “come to an agreement” with those employees—that’s a signal.
Frankly, my dream is that the same will be said—off the record—about ESB employees: you can’t come to an arrangement with them. That will be a sign of real integrity. Believe me, word travels through unofficial channels.
IV: After Operation Clean City, you wrote to Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko with many recommendations on how to end disorder and corruption in Kyiv. We published the letter. But the situation hasn’t changed. Komarnytskyi’s people are still in Kyiv City State Administration departments and municipal enterprises. Povoroznyk returned to his post through the courts. Palatnyi is in charge. My point is this: those letters were written by a NABU detective, but who will the head of the ESB write to, and what will those letters say? We currently have no substantive anti-corruption review of legislation. The parliament has long ignored the conclusions of the Verkhovna Rada’s Main Scientific and Expert Directorate. The NACP is a lame duck. The Anti-Corruption Committee can no longer keep up. Laws passed by the parliament often embed corruption schemes across the state. You speak of strengthening analytics—will there be a unit or department to analyze draft laws and respond?
OT: First, we already have such a unit. Second, after discussions with the business community, I’ve identified several tracks that are already in progress.
I won’t talk about them now—I want to implement them first. Not words, but deeds.
Moving on to our recommendations, I like to assess the situation against preliminary results. Here are some simple, concrete facts that make me believe that while the result may not be exactly what we want, it will come.
On February 9, 2022, at NABU we carried out an operation against illegal trade in Kyiv (more information on the case was published here – editor’s note). We did our job, but we didn’t stop at bringing those responsible to justice—we began work on a fundamental change to the approach to street trading.
We submitted several motions, worked hard and explained our position. This isn’t a one-day issue. If you write a document, the decision doesn’t come tomorrow. It’s a process.
Now, in 2025, we can state the following: in 2024, thanks to the MPs who adopted our submission and the body that implemented it, revenues increased five- to six-fold.
Previously, the corrupt scheme for selling these trading locations operated through a non-transparent website—only those who paid a bribe could access it. In 2024, for example, the site we investigated—previously purchased for 150,000 hryvnias—was sold for 1.8 million UAH. That’s a telling difference.
So I’m optimistic—with reason.
Yes, prevention isn’t immediately visible, but its results are always more significant. In reality, when we referred cases to court, our work didn’t end, it began. We identified problems that enable corruption; eliminating them is the real anti-corruption measure. And now we see clear, concrete results in numbers—thanks to clear, equal rules for business.
I don’t want formal results; I want fundamental change. I’m a diver, not a surfer.
But this is long-term work that doesn’t yield quick wins. Look: this case began in 2022, and only in 2025 can we speak about changes backed by figures.
IV: From the ESB, whom will you address with detailed recommendation letters—will it be the parliament, the government?
OT: We will initiate changes wherever needed.
If a problem must be solved, it doesn’t matter at what level efforts are required. The idea is that the ESB will be open to business.
When we investigate a problem and, for example, a business comes and says: look, these regulatory norms are impossible to comply with without paying a bribe—so you can’t proceed lawfully—then we sit down, work it through, verify that this is indeed the case and conclude the rules likely need to change. What should the ESB do next? For example, gather nationwide statistics, assess the scale and initiate consideration of the problem by the relevant ministry, the head of government or the parliament. Of course, we don’t have the right of legislative initiative, but that doesn’t mean we cannot submit proposals to the government. The aim is to launch systemic anti-corruption changes, not to perform our functions formally.
That is, in fact, the key idea behind all the changes we’ve discussed. The changes we make today will yield concrete, monetizable results in two to three years. I understand I’ll be asked about quick results in a few months, but my philosophy is to work realistically and in depth, not to pad the stats.
I hope this approach will be accepted and we’ll work efficiently. It would be a pity if the ESB were pushed back into prehistoric practices where efficiency is measured by cases per detective. What kind of statistics is that? What do we want to achieve with it? Is it a problem for the head of the main detective unit to raise the number of cases? Let’s be honest—what can you assess by that indicator? What is the real result?
Fortunately, there is hope that we really are moving toward qualitative change. There is a strategic program for reforming law-enforcement bodies through 2027, which already mentions smart approaches and qualitative performance evaluation. Admittedly, implementation is slow and some deadlines have likely already been missed, but the direction is right.
In my view, every investigation points to a problem whose solution should change the existing system, clearly signal the issue and prevent its recurrence. Only then can we speak of quality work.