After the selection commission reaffirmed its decision that Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi won the competition to lead the ESB, the Cabinet of Ministers is left with no lawful alternative but to formally appoint him. This must be done by the end of July to avoid forfeiting billions in IMF support.
On 14 July, the commission convened for an “informative” session—its final meeting, as its mandate formally expired upon the selection of the Bureau’s new director.
Crucially, all members of the commission, including representatives from the Ukrainian side, confirmed that their decision on Tsyvinskyi would remain unchanged. Having chosen the head of the Bureau, the commission completed its work and will not revisit earlier stages of the selection process. The government’s letter, providing the government’s justification for not granting Tsyvinskyi the appointment, will be returned to the Cabinet of Ministers.
This episode is truly emblematic. It demonstrates that standing up to the Presidential Office and independently selecting a winner for one of the country’s most sensitive posts is possible only when international experts are involved—experts with decisive voting rights and a firm stance. It is unlikely the Ukrainian part of the commission would have reached such a decision without approval from the Presidential Office. Nonetheless, public outcry proved to be a powerful incentive. Besides, launching a much-touted “government reboot” with such reputational risk is hardly advisable. But then again, in the Ukrainian political environment, anything is possible.
Should the government now refuse to appoint Tsyvinskyi as ESB director, it would raise a red flag for Ukraine’s partners providing assistance to the country. As a reminder: under its current IMF program, Ukraine stands to receive another $5 billion—conditional upon fulfilling all the obligations. One of them is the appointment of the ESB director, a deadline that has already been postponed twice. Obviously, a third deferral is out of the question.
Why is Tsyvinskyi unacceptable to the Presidential Office?
The Zelenskyy administration has breached the law by blocking Tsyvinskyi’s appointment. The rationale is transparent: a NABU detective who cannot be politically controlled and chairs the ESB poses a threat to entrenched corruption networks—those involved in smuggling, excise tax evasion, gambling revenues, embezzlement, shady privatization and falsified documents. These are precisely the areas the ESB was designed to investigate, but which have long remained untouched.
That is why, just ahead of the appointment deadline, the Cabinet of Ministers appealed to the commission with a “proposal” to resubmit no more than two candidacies—in other words, to replace the winner with a more compliant figure. Just like the government itself, which can issue letters to block suspension of officials from duty (e.g., the case of Chernyshov, Minister of National Unity) and violate the law purely at someone’s behest.
The commission responded by publishing a government protocol excerpt that lacked any legal rationale for rejecting the appointment. Preposterously enough, officials cited general provisions from the laws on the Cabinet of Ministers and national security, while ignoring the specific ESB law that clearly regulates appointment procedures. According to Article 15, Part 16 of the ESB Law, the government’s sole power is to appoint the director. It has no authority to replace the selected candidate.
At its final session, the commission also confirmed that the government’s letter did not contain any new information regarding “security risks” that had not already been considered. “There was no new information in the letter. In fact, the contents of the letter from the Security Service of Ukraine were fully reviewed prior to the final decision,” says Donatas Malaskevicius, an international member of the commission.
In reality, “security risks” are little more than a euphemism for the fear of the Presidential Office of losing control over a law enforcement agency dealing with economic crimes. In other words, the concern is over losing leverage in investigations into smuggling, tax evasion, gambling and other illicit activities.
Tsyvinskyi has worked at NABU for nearly a decade, holds a security clearance and conducts investigative work as a detective. He has passed Security Service background checks during competitions for the posts of head of the NACP (2019), NABU (2023) and now the ESB.
Clearly, he is the least convenient candidate for the Presidential Office. Not least because he has led politically sensitive investigations, including the infamous “Avakov’s backpacks” case, “Kurchenko’s fuel,” and the Kyiv land corruption scheme known as “Clean City.”
Despite the current delay and rollback—likely intended to save face before partners and allow the new government to prove itself—it is evident that the Presidential Office will continue seeking to block or at least postpone Tsyvinskyi’s appointment. One potential route is through judicial proceedings, as previously discussed in detail.
Will there be another disruption attempt?
As of today, 15 days have passed since the government failed to appoint the ESB director, in explicit violation of the law. For the first time in over a decade, the Cabinet of Ministers has attempted to overturn the decision of an independent selection commission.
Continued obstruction of this appointment sets a precedent for rollback across Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture. It puts at risk future competitions for key institutions such as NABU, the NACP and SAPO, thus undermining the independence of these agencies.
There is only one correct course of action left for the Presidential Office and the government from this embarrassment: appoint Tsyvinskyi, the duly selected candidate, and refrain from inventing new “security” pretexts. Doing so would fulfill a key structural benchmark under the IMF program and reinforce Ukraine’s commitment to its international obligations and European aspirations.
Should we expect further attempts to derail the competition? Undoubtedly. Delay tactics are almost guaranteed.
Will there be a response from international partners? Certainly—and it will not be in Ukraine’s favor.
The risk of a disrupted ESB competition remains high. This could cost Ukraine dearly—not only in terms of losing billions in IMF disbursements due to failure to fulfill the benchmark, but also in the sense of undermining broader international trust and financial support. Let us not forget: the social budget—salaries, pensions, reconstruction—is entirely financed through external aid.
A coalition of anti-corruption watchdogs and organizations has already alerted Ukraine’s international partners, including the IMF and the EU. Our anti-corruption center has met with representatives of all G7 embassies to make it clear: there is no other legal pathway for the appointment of the ESB director.
P.S. The circus surrounding the appointment of the ESB director resembles a poorly scripted film. But the result is just another “screening” of reforms, the same old show. And an embarrassment before the millions of Ukrainians defending their country on the front lines. At the same time, the whole ESB saga works against the country’s interests.