President Zelenskyy has asked neighbors to cover western Ukraine’s underground gas storage facilities (UGS) with their anti-aircraft missiles.
The statement is good because it marked the first time Kyiv recognized the very existence of the problem.
Having launched a campaign of strikes against energy infrastructure in March 2024, Russia is hitting both power plants and gas storage facilities. Throughout the spring, not only Shahed drones but also Kindzhal missiles flew at them.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s wish to cover at least border facilities sounds logical. As for the realism of such expectations.... it’s complicated.
He actually addressed the Poles, who again politely refused to allocate Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine. What a surprise!
The President argued: “It is absolutely fair if Poland helps us — to shoot down missiles that are heading in the direction of Poland.... We are talking about this very direction — the direction of Ukraine’s gas reservoirs, where we often have missile strikes.... It is very important that the gas in our gas storage facilities is used by these very countries. If we do not protect our gas storage facilities, these countries will be left without gas during the heating season, our closest neighbors.”
Everything is correct, but, unfortunately, this will not happen this winter. There is practically no gas from Western traders in our storages now. It was there in the pre-war winter of 2021/22, when they pumped about a dozen billion cubic meters there. It was also there last winter, when at its peak the reserves exceeded 3 billion cubic meters. But it was gradually taken out or sold (much of it in Ukraine).
Now there are only about 0.6 billion cubic meters of gas belonging to non-residents (largely Moldova) left in the storages, and there are no prospects for growth. As for air defense systems in Chisinau... well, you get it.
At the end of last year, various scenarios were voiced to convince traders that they would be able to receive their gas. In general, it turned out that way. According to the reports of the Operator of the Ukrainian Gas Transmission System, 8.5 billion cubic meters were taken up during the heating season, of which 1.8 billion is bonded warehouse gas, i.e. gas of non-residents, which we simply store.
At the beginning of spring, there were intentions to accumulate 4–5 billion cubic meters of gas from non-residents “in the customs warehouse mode,” a third more than last year. But that was before the strikes. Actually, one of the main goals of the Russian missile attacks is to disrupt such supplies. And, unfortunately, they have achieved it quite successfully.
Now the condition of the damaged compressor shops, thanks to the hard work of the repairmen, ensures pumping. But there will be more strikes, so we need air defense, and those F-16s (and airplanes in general), which are at least a year late, to intercept them. And, of course, the gas itself.
Today the task is to bring the level of reserves to 13 billion cubic meters (last year, we managed to reach 16.6 billion cubic meters thanks to gas of non-residents).
We came out of winter with the level of about 7.5 billion cubic meters. According to the EU data, over 3.5 months the increase in UGS reserves amounted to 2.4 billion cubic meters. The total reserves are noticeably (by about 10%) less than the annual average. But consumption may be higher.
There are increasingly persistent talks about the need to import at least 1.0–1.5 billion cubic meters. At current prices on the stock exchange, this will cost $550–600 million (UAH 21–24 billion). With transportation to Ukraine, another hundred million will be added. The financial balance sheet of the Naftogaz national oil and gas company will definitely not get better from this, so they are dragging it out as long as they can. Especially against the backdrop of expectations, though already tame, that the head of Naftogaz, Oleksii Chernyshov, is about to be promoted.
And in general, buying on time is not our method.
By the way, against the background of the expected shortage, the story of the blockade by the government of its own gas production of the Kharkiv company Ukrnaftoburinnia looks particularly “entertaining.” Due to the actions of government agencies of all levels, Ukraine has not received at least 200 million cubic meters of gas for six months. And it will still receive less. All of that is gas that would have been produced by the state-owned Ukrnafta company. This is more than the industry has lost so far from shelling by the Ruscists. Moscow clearly owes our officials an order or two for the missiles they have saved it!
However, the Russians do not rely only on them, and the shelling of the gas infrastructure is becoming more frequent. Taking into account the fact that about 80% of Ukrainian gas is produced in the border regions of Kharkiv and Poltava, urgent measures are needed to strengthen their resistance to attacks. They won’t get a lot of air defense, but at least more light shelters and firefighting equipment should be provided.
I am certainly not calling for the creation of some new superstaff with extremely unclear (to put it delicately) effectiveness. There are enough of them already. But I would like to add speed to the implementation processes.
Recently, our gas transporters ordered and honestly placed in the Prozorro procurement system the development of a plan of protective measures. The deadline for implementation is exactly by the New Year.
Once again, this is not a deadline for the completion of protective measures, but a deadline for drawing up a megaplan for the beginning of their implementation.
We can only hope that this is a hoax for Russians, and the local authorities are not waiting for this waste paper.
In general, the main scenario for this winter is the operation of the system in conditions of enemy fire and lack of transit. Yes, this is bad news for investors, but we should proceed from it. If the situation turns out to be better, fine.
It is necessary to calculate — not before the end of the year, but a week in advance (yesterday is better still), how UGS facilities will work in different variants of damage, what can be dispersed (Russian missile stocks are not limitless either, and we are good at shooting down Shaheds).
It is also necessary to understand the modes of the gas transportation systems in the neighboring countries. This is where the gas resource may — or may not — come from. The lion’s share of non-resident gas came from Slovakia and Hungary. Legally speaking, this is EU gas. Physically, at least most of it is the same Russian gas. If transit to the EU halts, there will be problems with the availability of the resource.
It is necessary to purchase reserve fuel — somewhere it is diesel, somewhere it is fuel oil. And somewhere it is wood/charcoal fuel at the expense of Naftogaz. We are at war.
Here is another piece of advice: you need a little less public pipe dreams and visions (in the style of Lugano-22/London-23 presentations and so on) and more reality.
It is certainly easier to explain any opinion by referring to the enemy’s psychological operations, especially since Russia is actually conducting (and will step up) a systematic disinformation campaign. And the attempt to work in the best traditions of the Soviet Informburo with silencing everything in the 21st century is inherently unsuccessful. The enemy will write about our blunders for you, having put his own disinformation in there as well.
Trust in the accuracy of information from above is also a weapon, just as effective as real measures, not reports on their successful preparation.
We are four months away from winter. Time for countermeasures is running out. As for presentations... They can be written later.